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Understanding Russia’s Military Strategy: The Pitfalls of Western Ethnocentrism

14 Oct 2024
By Dr Nicolò Fasola
Military parade on Red Square 2016-05-09. Source: The Presidential Press and Information Office / https://t.ly/p2wK2

Intellectual biases compromise the Western understanding of Russia’s military strategy. Analysing Russian strategic culture on its own terms is essential for a deeper understanding of Moscow’s approach to war. 

Plenty of analyses on Russia’s strategy and war-fighting have been published since February 2022. However, the soundness of mainstream commentary is compromised by a lack of familiarity with the peculiar strategic culture that underpins Moscow’s approach to war. While relevant exceptions exist, many Western analysts continue to employ questionable interpretive lenses, such as “hybrid warfare” and “escalate to de-escalate doctrine;’ while others hastily conclude that the Russians simply don’t know how to wage war, revealing nothing but a limited grasp of Russia’s military history and strategic thinking.  

These flaws are a symptom of “strategic ethnocentrism”—the tendency to interpret an adversary’s moves through our own logic, concepts, and doctrines, without considering that the adversary may assess the situation differently or hold different beliefs about when and how to use force. In essence, strategic ethnocentrism fails to recognise differences in strategic cultures. Strategy-making and war-fighting are social phenomena, influenced by the historical, social, and cultural contexts of a given country. While Russia is not as different from Western countries as, for example, China, its elites do think about war differently than those in the West. Our inability to appreciate this curtails our ability to contextualise and contain Russia’s growing assertiveness. 

The reminder of this paper aims at shedding light on some peculiarities of the Russian approach to strategy and war-fighting. Here, I will focus on two key aspects: the role of war in Russian strategic culture and the relative value Russian strategists place on conventional and nuclear weapons.  

The role of war in Russia’s strategic culture 

Russian strategists define “war” (vojna) as a form of violent resolution of controversies, where violence and the use of weapons are central. More precisely, the term indicates conflicts characterised by the intensive use of military force and motivated by an otherwise irresolvable clash over political interests. While acknowledging its exceptional nature, Moscow does not believe resorting to war is anachronistic, dysfunctional, or divorced from international politics. On the contrary, war and politics maintain a fundamental connection in Russian strategic thinking—with war remaining a usable and legitimate, albeit extreme, political tool.  

Russian strategists do recognise the growing importance of non-violent forms of competition, having a political, economic, social, informational nature—which they broadly label as “struggle” (bor’ba). However, “struggle” serves different objectives than war. While one meaning can indicate the aim to establish conditions for lasting peace (on Russian terms) by resolving disputes through force, struggle is also seen as an ordinary activity of “everyday” politics, in support of long-term strategic competition against major adversaries—or, failing that, in preparation of military operations. 

Notably, and contrary to the enthusiasts of hybrid warfare, Moscow does not believe that the expanding importance of bor’ba in contemporary international relations diminishes the ultimate relevance of vojna for ensuring Russia’s security. Prominent Russian strategists and official documents have emphasised that, in future wars, all forms of confrontation will be actively employed, yet military force will retain its decisive role and even enhance its utility.  

The balance between conventional and nuclear forces 

Moscow’s proclivity to use force does not mean it would employ any type of force indiscriminately. Russia categorises different types of war, each varying in geographical scope, participants, and ultimate goals. While each war-type is expected to be fought at high intensity, the weapons and signalling measures used change according to a calibrated escalation ladder. Nuclear use appears quite late on this ladder and is associated with the risk of Armageddon—a scenario the Russians are extremely fearful of and consider a failure of strategic deterrence. 

While the Kremlin values its nuclear arsenal as a showcase of Russia’s great power status and the ultimate guarantee of survival, its war-fighting utility seems limited. Russian nuclear programs appear to be driven by the need to grant strategic stability vis-à-vis the United States—ruling out nuclear options as viable confrontation measures while allowing Moscow to keep focusing on its preferred (conventional) means of conflict.  

From this perspective, Russian announcements about ground-breaking innovations in ballistic missiles should not be seen as attempts to alter the nuclear balance, but to restore strategic stability (in light of concerns about US missile defences) and strengthen conventional delivery capabilities. As Dara Massicot has put it: “although strategic nuclear weapons remain the foundation of Russian strategic deterrence, strategic non-nuclear deterrence forces will better assist the Kremlin to manage escalation and secure Russian interests short of the nuclear threshold.” Likewise, the arguments put forth by proponents of a Russian “escalate to de-escalate doctrine” are shaky at best and do not convincingly support the notion that tactical-operational warheads play a paramount war-fighting role in today’s Russian doctrine.  

In Russian strategic culture, war-fighting is primarily the domain for conventional forces, with land power (infantry and artillery) taking the lead. Military writings and debates still emphasise, much like in the 20th century, mass and preponderant fire-power as the cornerstone of military victory, with air and sea power joining the effort to support and multiply the effects of ground operations. Notably, the physical destruction of the adversary’s armed forces and the occupation of its territory are seen as indicators of successful military operations, thereby enabling military victory and long-lasting political settlement. Current Russian military debates show no indication that the war-fighting role of conventional forces are shifting towards (tactical) nuclear power. The latter remains a means of last resort, to be used only if all conventional options have failed and Russia faces imminent strategic (political) defeat. 

Conclusion 

Some useful considerations can be derived from the discussion above. First, the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 should not be seen as surprising—given the enduring utility of war in Russian strategic culture and the allegedly existential significance of the Ukraine issue for the Kremlin. War still retains an exceptional character even in Russian strategic culture. This raises the question of which “exceptional circumstances” and narrowing set of non-violent options Moscow perceived that led to the decision to invade. I expand on this argument in my book. 

Second, the West should reassess how it evaluates Russian operations, intentions, and capabilities. The Russian armed forces have proven to be less effective than expected, but if they had no qualities at all, Ukraine would have won already. While failing at operations they are not designed for (such as the blitzkrieg attempted in February 2022), the Russian war machine is well suited to sustain the current type of war-fighting indefinitely and successfully. The operations they have been conducting since the summer of 2022 are not accidental or backup measures, but rather deliberate implementations of key tenets of Russian strategic culture. Moreover, the nuclear threats periodically voiced by the Kremlin’s acolytes should not be seen as attempts to escalate the war abruptly, but rather as a risk-taking method to limit further escalation, both vertically and horizontally. The primary goal is to avoid direct military involvement by NATO troops, allowing Russia to continue fighting by conventional means.  

In closing, it is paramount for the West to invest in developing a new generation of Russia experts, similar to the Cold War Sovietologists. These experts, familiar with Russian strategic culture and domestic developments, are essential for understanding the specific rationality behind the Kremlin’s decision-making. Without this expertise, the West will continue to interpret Russian actions through an ethnocentric lens, to the detriment of the ability to contextualise and contain Moscow’s assertiveness. 

This article draws on insights from my recently published book, Reinterpreting Russia’s Strategic Culture: The Russian Way of War.

Dr Nicolò Fasola, Roberto Ruffilli Postdoctoral Fellow and Adjunct Professor, University of Bologna 

This review is published under a Creative Commons License and may be republished with attribution.