The suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty by India marks a turning point in South Asia’s geopolitical and environmental future. As water becomes both a strategic asset and a source of conflict, the stakes for regional stability and transboundary cooperation have never been higher.

In a dramatic escalation of India-Pakistan tensions, India has suspended the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT). This was in response to a deadly Islamist terrorist attack in Kashmir that claimed 26 lives, including 25 Indian nationals and one Nepalese tourist. The decision, framed as a reaction to Pakistan’s alleged failure to curb cross-border terrorism, marks a significant shift in India’s approach to the 1960 water-sharing agreement. By suspending the treaty, India aims to prioritise its water security and regional development, but the move risks inflaming bilateral relations and inviting international scrutiny.

India is now expected to accelerate infrastructure projects to harness the western rivers (Indus, Jhelum, Chenab) for power generation and irrigation in Jammu and Kashmir. Key initiatives, such as the 850 MW Ratle and 330 MW Kishenganga hydroelectric projects, could unlock an additional 2,500 MW of electricity and irrigate 1.5 million acres, fostering economic growth in the region. By diverting up to 15 percent of the 135 million acre-feet of water previously allocated to Pakistan, India seeks to bolster its resilience against climate-induced shortages, particularly as glacial melt in the Indus basin is projected to reduce flows by eight percent by 2040.

However, this aggressive posture could be perceived as economic warfare, potentially prompting Pakistan to pursue retaliatory measures or seek international arbitration. India’s actions, while aimed at securing national interests, risk further destabilising an already volatile region, with the Indus waters emerging as a new flashpoint in the India-Pakistan rivalry.

Pakistan, which gets 80 percent of its irrigation and 50 percent of its GDP from agriculture through the Indus system, is staring at a severe water crisis due to the IWT suspension. A 20-25 percent potential cut in supply—equivalent to 25-30 million acre-feet per year—could have grave consequences for Punjab and Sindh, decimating crop production by 18 percent, and threatening food security for 240 million citizens. According to United Nations estimates, 12 million people may be mass displaced in Pakistan by 2030, as per capita water availability hovers at 850 cubic meters. Diplomatically, Pakistan will probably elevate its case to the World Bank or the Permanent Court of Arbitration. Islamabad is already calling it an “act of war,” but India’s stance is that it will not compromise its sovereignty on the basis of cross-border terrorism by Pakistan.

It’s very obvious that India’s suspension of the IWT not only escalates tensions with Pakistan but also threatens ecological environments—likely to further exacerbate water relations. Altered river flows jeopardise the Indus basin’s biodiversity. Environmental studies warn that the Indus Delta, sustaining 1.4 million livelihoods, could lose 20 percent of its mangrove cover and 12 percent of its fish stocks by 2035, exacerbating poverty, particularly in Pakistan’s Sindh province. Upstream diversions by India may also reduce wetland areas and diminish the Hudiara Drain’s hydration by ten percent. In all, humanitarian concerns loom large with Pakistan potentially facing water shortages that could deprive 40 million people of adequate drinking water by 2030.

The future of India-Pakistan water relations hinges on whether the two nations can negotiate a revised framework amid deep mistrust. India’s insistence that Pakistan dismantle terror networks—such as Lashkar-e-Taiba, responsible for thousands of deaths in India since 2000—has become a virtual precondition for resuming water cooperation.

Two long-term scenarios emerge: adversarial water wars or cautious cooperation. If India maintains its suspension, Pakistan might resort to indirect attacks, an imminent strike or cyberattacks targeting India’s dams—68 percent of which are vulnerable, according to a Central Water Commission report. Climate pressures, projected to reduce Indus flows by 15 percent by 2050, could exacerbate tensions but also incentivise a new treaty focused on joint management, including shared early-warning systems for floods that affect 20 million people annually.

The IWT’s collapse sets a global precedent for transboundary water disputes, with a 2025 UN Water report noting that 60 percent of such agreements are under strain. India’s actions may embolden upstream nations like China, which controls 30 percent of Asia’s river flows, to weaponise water, reshaping the geopolitical landscape. The trajectory of India-Pakistan water relations will ultimately test the management of these complex, high-stakes challenges.

Neeraj Singh Manhas is Special Advisor for South Asia at the Parley Policy Initiative, Republic of Korea, and affiliated as a subject matter expert at the Centre for Joint Warfare Studies, HQ-IDS, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, and a Non-Resident Visiting Senior Fellow at the Centre for National Security Studies, India. The views expressed in this article are those of the author. 

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