Sudan’s peaceful transition was cut short by the eruption of a devastating war in April 2023. Too many peace initiaitves however have proved counterproductive, and what is needed is far from being provided. 

Since the start of the war in April 2023, the political and security situation in Sudan has been the focus of diplomatic and scholarly efforts for three legitimate reasons. One reason is the rapid deterioration of the humanitarian crisis, which the UN characterised as one of the worst in the world. A second  is the political and security context that emerged due to the war and its implications for the once hopeful political transition and the Sudanese state. The war has brought the country to the “verge of disintegration.” A third is the high probability of state collapse and what this means for stability of the already fragile region—the Red Sea basin, the Nile Valley, the Sahel, and the Horn of Africa.

The warring parties, the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have yet to sign a ceasefire agreement. Several factors likely account for the lack of progress in the mediation process. Firstly, the fluidity of the military situation on the ground suggests the parties’ lack of readiness to compromise and, simultaneously, their intention to pursue military solutions to either win or gain the upper hand for a better bargaining position. Currently, all indications suggest that neither warring group can achieve an outright win and impose a government on the nation.

For the RSF, the longer the war takes, the more challenges it is likely to face with its tactical mobility and associated logistical capacity, as the recent military setbacks in Khartoum and other places suggest. Moreover, RSF and its leader General Dougalo (also known as Hemedti), lack public legitimacy both domestically and regionally. This is related to RSF’s narrow social base and its history of violence, as media reports on the situation in Darfur show.

The SAF seems to have limited capacity to militarily win against RSF and control the entire country. SAF’s forces have dwindled  over the decades due to constant wars and subsequent ideological purges under General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan. Its legitimacy as a central national institution has been systematically eroded due to political instrumentalisation in  under Omar al-Bashir’s regime.

Secondly, despite the international armes embargo, access to weapons remains unhindered. The vastness of the country and its porous borders, along with revenues gained from illicitly mined gold, have helped to precipitate this. Moreover, there are reports that the SAF receives support from Egypt and other neighbouring countries in training recruits and weaponry. The United Arab Emirates is reported to be supplying hardware and financial resources to the RSF. New recruits for the war are mostly young Sudanese (and foreigners in cases of RSF) who are either voluntary or forced to join the warring parties on ethnic, ideological or economic grounds, delaying the conflict from reaching “the state of mutual hurting stalemate.”

Thirdly, the multiplicity of peace initiatives has created “mediation shopping,” an obstacle to progress in the peace process. Whether the RAF or RSF attend a mediation initiative depends on who initiates and leads the process. To date, mediation initiatives have lacked coordination. The Saudi-US mediation, the African Union (AU) initiative, Egyptian efforts, Chadian facilitation, and the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) are cases in point. The AU’s “Roadmap for the Resolution of the Conflict in Sudan,” announced in May 2023, called for, inter alia, the establishment of a coordinating mechanism to support Sudan, an immediate cessation of hostilities, respect for international humanitarian laws, and an inclusive political process. Hardly had the AU decision come into effect when Egypt convened another summit, “Sudan’s Neighbouring Countries Forum,” on 13 July 2023 in Cairo with the purpose of aligning neighbouring countries’ positions on the conflict. IGAD, under the Kenyan president’s chairmanship, called for a meeting between al-Burhan and Hemedti in Addis Ababa on 10 July to agree to a ceasefire, the provision of humanitarian assistance, and to find political solutions to the conflict. The Sudanese government’s delegation boycotted the meeting by accusing the Kenyan President of siding with RSF. Undeterred, IGAD convened its summit in January 2024 in Kampala, Uganda. The Sudanese government once again boycotted the summit and “accused the regional body of violating its sovereignty and setting a dangerous precedent.” The AU, for its part, established the African Union High-Level Panel on Sudan. It remains to be seen what the effectiveness of the AU Panel will be. The US has also convened talks in Geneva in August 2024 with no concrete outcomes.

What is the prospect for peace in Sudan?

So far, international mediation efforts in Sudan have focused on the humanitarian situation. The political transition has hardly been on the agenda. The belligerents are at the centre of the ongoing negotiations. In such a context, central issues, such as constitutional matters, resources allocation, and national identity may be included. Given past experiences, continued political dominance of the military groups is likely to take Sudan back to a system akin to that of al-Bashir.

Sudan can proudly look back to a long history of civic activism as demonstrated in the removal of Omar al-Bashir from power in 2019. But the war has impacted current civil society negatively. Leading personalities and groups are in exile. Despite their continued activism, a shared political agenda among them is yet to be consolidated. It is critical that such an agenda draws lessons from the past and finds answers to what Nada Ali called “stubborn historical legacies.”

Sudan’s national identity has remained devided between African and Arab regions,with mutually exclusive identities playing a central role in political power and access to national wealth. Such exclusivity has been further reinforced by the center-periphery dichotomy and the role of religion, mainly Islam, in politics. The protracted conflicts that have bedevilled Sudan since its independence have their root causes in these historical legacies. Moreover, accountability for the violence committed over the years, and justice for the victims, can not be ignored if Sudan is to venture into a new and better political future.

Only long-term national efforts can address the root causes. Priority should be set toward creating conditions for intra-Sudanese dialogue which, in turn, requires silencing of the guns. Two complementary efforts could help for this: one, preventing the inflow of weapons; and two, heightening the cost of continued violence for the belligerents by cutting their financial sources and recruitment reservoirs. As for the former, coordinated and sustained lobbying and advocacy targeting neighbouring states and the international community could make an impact. In the case of the latter, awareness raising and presentations of a national vision to the communities using different media and channels could also contribute positively and may increase the prospect for peace in Sudan.

Dr Adane Ghebremeskel is a Political Scientist specialising in peace and security. He works as a policy advisor with an international agency. He engages in academic research and guest lectures in different universities in the Southern African region.

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