In May 2026, a Pakistan Air Force C-130J landed quietly in Dhaka carrying a single heavy crate. Inside was a full-scale JF-17 Thunder Block III combat simulator—the first piece of Pakistani military aviation hardware to enter Bangladesh since 1971. That historic symbolism alone should give us pause.
The simulator, delivered during the first formal Air Staff Talks between the two air forces, is being framed as a training tool ahead of a potential procurement of 16 to 48 JF-17 Block III multirole fighters, estimated at between USD 400 and 720 million. Policymakers and defence commentators have focused on the operational logic: the Bangladesh Air Force’s fleet is ageing; its F-7BGs and MiG-29s are approaching end of life; and the Forces Goal 2030 modernisation plan demands credible air power. That operational logic is sound, as far as it goes, but it goes nowhere far enough, for it says nothing of the political alignment this procurement implies, the fiscal obligations it will incur over decades, or what it means to bind Bangladesh’s strategic future to a Sino-Pakistani supply chain at a moment of acute economic fragility.
A fighter jet is never merely a weapons platform. It is a political instrument, an economic commitment, and over the long arc of defence dependency projects a statement of alignment that outlasts governments. Bangladesh is not simply buying an aircraft. It may be buying into a strategic orbit from which exit will be difficult, expensive, and diplomatically consequential.
The Political Dimension
The JF-17 is a Sino-Pakistani product: conceived to reduce Pakistan’s dependence on Western suppliers and jointly manufactured by Pakistan Aeronautical Complex and China’s Chengdu Aircraft Corporation. Its sale to Bangladesh is therefore not a bilateral transaction between Dhaka and Islamabad; in structural terms, it is a trilateral one, with Beijing as the quiet principal.
That matters enormously in the current moment. In August 2024, a student-led mass uprising triggered by protests over public sector job quotas forced Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina to resign after 15 consecutive years in office, ending the Awami League’s long hold on power and ushering in an interim administration led by Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus. Bangladesh’s relations with Pakistan had been at their lowest ebb under Hasina, partly as a result of Dhaka’s prosecution of individuals accused of collaborating with Pakistani forces during the 1971 Liberation War. That adversarial posture reversed sharply under the Yunus administration. Dhaka simultaneously signaled a deepening tilt towards Beijing, including the acquisition of Chinese SY-400 missile systems. The JF-17 deal, if confirmed, would anchor this realignment in steel and silicon.
Political scientists since James Morrow have argued that arms transfers are rarely neutral commercial transactions. They embed “security for autonomy” trade-offs: the buyer gains capability, but surrenders a degree of strategic independence, which means the practical freedom to reorient foreign policy, realign with new partners, or exit a defence relationship without prohibitive switching costs, to the supplier. The longer the relationship continues through spare parts, training, upgrades, and interoperability standards, the deeper the dependency lasts. Pakistan has explicitly framed its JF-17 export drive as a mechanism to amplify strategic influence in regions previously dominated by Western or Indian-aligned suppliers. Bangladesh would be entering that ecosystem dominated by Sino-Pakistani influences, knowingly or otherwise.
There is also a domestic political reading that cannot be ignored. The simulator arrived from Pakistan for the first time since 1971, the year Bangladesh won its independence from Pakistan through a Liberation War in which Pakistani forces carried out mass atrocities against Bengali civilians, with some estimates placing the death toll at three million. That history of profound rupture shaped decades of bilateral estrangement, a watershed moment in Bangladeshi political memory that significantly changed national identity. Its acceptance, when the previous interim government that has also overseen a rehabilitation of Islamist political actors, sends a signal within Bangladesh’s own contested landscape. Defence procurement, in this reading, is simultaneously foreign policy and domestic political messaging.
The Economic Burden
On the economic side, the analysis grows more troubling. At the very moment Bangladesh is contemplating a defence acquisition of historic scale, during a time when its macro-economic position remains acutely fragile. As of the IMF’s January 2026 Article IV assessment, Bangladesh faces “mounting macro-financial challenges from weak tax revenue and financial sector vulnerabilities.” Gross foreign exchange reserves, which peaked at USD 48 billion in August 2021, collapsed to below USD 20 billion by 2024, a reversal that forced Bangladesh to seek a USD 4.7 billion IMF program in 2023, with repeated delays in tranche disbursements. Inflation stands at roughly 9 per cent, and GDP growth, projected at 4.7 per cent for FY2026, remains well below Bangladesh’s historical trajectory.
Against this backdrop, committing between USD 400 million and USD 720 million to a fighter program through financing mechanisms consistent with Pakistan’s established practice of extending defence lines of credit to partner states and China’s documented use of concessional loans for strategic procurement in South Asia, raises acute questions that have conspicuously failed to enter public debate. Defence economists Jurgen Brauer and Paul Dunne have long argued that military procurement in low- and middle-income countries systematically crowds out productive investment, generates long-term foreign exchange outflows through sustainment costs, and produces scant economic spillover unless accompanied by meaningful technology transfer. The JF-17’s sustainment ecosystem is tightly bound to Chinese avionics, weapons, and logistics chains; Bangladesh’s exchequer will service those chains for decades.
Dependency in Uniform
Political economy theory offers a sharper vocabulary here than the language of bilateral “defence cooperation” typically employed. Dependency theorists, from André Gunder Frank to Immanuel Wallerstein, have observed that peripheral states systematically reproduce their subordination by importing the security architecture of more powerful states, thereby embedding structural relationships that persist long after the initial transaction.
The JF-17 is precisely such an architecture for Bangladesh. Its primary avionics rely on the Chinese KLJ-7A AESA radar; its principal air-to-air weapon is the Chinese PL-15 missile; and its logistics chain runs through Chinese and Pakistani suppliers. Each spare part requisition, every software update, and all future weapons integration will require continued engagement with that chain. A government that decided to reorient Bangladesh’s foreign policy away from Beijing and Islamabad would find its air force progressively degraded. That is what strategic lock-in means in practice: not a formal political commitment, but a maintenance schedule.
What makes Bangladesh’s situation distinctive is the conjuncture. It is a state in economic stress, in political transition, approaching LDC graduation in 2026 and the attendant loss of preferential trade arrangements, while simultaneously reshaping its external alignments. In this environment, a major defence procurement is not an isolated decision; it is a de facto foreign policy instrument with generational consequences. Susan Strange’s concept of “structural power”, the capacity of a state to shape the frameworks within which others must operate, is instructive: Beijing, through the JF-17, is exercising structural power over Bangladesh’s future strategic options, whether or not that is the stated intent of any party at the negotiating table.
What Bangladesh Needs
None of this is an argument against air force modernisation. Bangladesh’s ageing fleet is a legitimate security concern, and no sovereign state should be indefinitely denied the right to defend its airspace. However, the terms of modernisation matter enormously: the financing structure, the technology transfer provisions, the degree of local industrial participation, the interoperability implications with Bangladesh’s existing defence partnerships, and above all, the political conditionalities, implicit or explicit, that accompany the deal.
Bangladesh’s foreign policy has long rested on the principle of “friendship towards all, malice towards none.” A commitment of up to USD 720 million to a Sino-Pakistani aviation system, at a moment of economic fragility and contested realignment, tests that doctrine severely. It also tests the quality of the national conversation. A decision of this magnitude, one that will shape Bangladesh’s strategic posture, fiscal space, and geopolitical relationships for a generation, deserves rigorous parliamentary scrutiny, independent economic analysis, and open public debate.
The simulator has landed. The crate has been opened. The question is whether the debate has begun.
Arman Ahmed is an independent researcher and a research analyst at the Nicholas Spykman International Center for Geopolitical Analysis in Paris, focusing on South Asian geopolitics and international security. His work has been widely published in platforms such as The Geopolitical Monitor, The Geopolitics, Modern Diplomacy, The Madras Gazette, Eurasia Review, The NewAgeBD, The Daily Star, The Business Standard, Prothom Alo-English, the Australian Institute of International Affairs, and many more national and international outlets. He specializes in strategic affairs, South Asia, defense policy, and foreign policy analysis.
