Stalin once posited, “Ideas are more powerful than guns. We would not let our enemies have guns, why should we let them have ideas?” Soviet and current Russian leadership stood by this conviction through periods of revolution, war, peace, détente, political collapse, regime change, failed reform, and resets.
The adage holds firm today as the central pith in the Kremlin’s psyche and struggle against its perceived enemies – at home and abroad.
George Kennan, the US Ambassador to Russia during Stalin’s rule, observed: “Kremlin’s neurotic view of world affairs is a traditional and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity… Russian rulers have invariably sensed that their rule was relatively archaic in form, fragile and artificial in its psychological foundation, unable to stand comparison or contact with political systems of Western countries.”
What this reflects, and remains true today, is that Moscow is in a constant state of siege. Its struggle with the West is unending and there is little or no distinction between periods of war and periods of peace. The ‘special military operation’ in Ukraine, the suppression of domestic opposition, and covert operations aimed at western Europe and the US are not separate fronts. They are interlocking theaters of war engaged in a single struggle. The strategy is permanent. The organising principle is perpetual.
Putin’s geopolitical losses have made him desperate for victories in other conflict arenas, and yet his desperation has yielded no results.
Russia’s image of itself as a great powerful state (derzhava) has been shattered. The war in Ukraine exposed its military’s weaknesses in conventional high-intensity operations and has accelerated the decline of its faltering economy. Putin ‘s own finance officials and lawmakers warned that the war has become unaffordable and unsustainable. As his options expend, Putin has increased his reliance on hybrid war or, what his strategists now refer to as “ New Generation Warfare”.
Whether referred to as “active measures”, “support measures”, “nonlinear war”, or “Phase Zero” operations, hybrid warfare offers the Kremlin a power projection and new battle-scape where its conventional forces have failed. Its toolkit includes:
- Electronic Warfare
- Disinformation (Cogops / Psyops)
- Energy Politics and Leverage
- Proxy Forces
- Use of Mercenaries
- Covert Subversion, including sabotage, blackmail and assasination
War Without Limits
Bespredel (беспредел), a term whose closest English equivalent means “the absence of limits”, is the moral and behavioural guide in Russia’s hybrid operations. In theory it refers to a total disregard of norms. In practice it often relates to the nexus between the official state and organised crime.
The Associated Press has tracked more than 150 grey zone incidents linked to Moscow since the invasion of Ukraine. These acts include everything from vandalism to attempted murder. It also reports that Russia is elevating its game. It now places greater emphasis on the creation of complex sabotage cells and the “closed structures” of organised crime.
According to Poland’s Internal Security Agency, Agencja Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego (ABW), there is a clear shift away from “disposable agents” who are usually recruited on line or from the ranks of known petty criminals. Its analysis reveals that the FSB and GRU have now intensified efforts to “prefessionalise” agent training. More are being instructed and drilled on Russian territory.
In its essence, the 2024-2025 AWB report contends that Russia is in a “state of undeclared war”. Its long term aim is; “…the disintegration of Euro-Atlantic structures, the isolation of selected states, and their internal socio-political and economic destablisation.”
These hybrid war tactics offset weaknesses in military hard power by exploiting ambiguity and offering credible deniability. The costs are low but the returns can and have been high. Hybrid operations sow fear and division among populations. At the same time they test and map western responses – militarily and politically. Intrusions and disruptions expose lapses in response times, gaps in interagency coordination, and the measure of political will.
Because these operations come under the threshold of the conventional definition of war, targeted states react independently and in accord with their separate criminal justice codes. Cases are tried individually and treated as isolated unlawful acts. Therefore, there is no coordinated response to Russia’s coordinated hybrid campaign.
A report from the Center for European Policy Analysis summarises their effectiveness; “…shadow warfare operations succeed when they disrupt, they succeed when they’re exposed, and they succeed when they fail.”
Deterrence
European deterrence in ‘shadow wars’ is primarily reactive. There are no clear thresholds for use-of-force since they do not involve armed attacks. There are no established uniform escalation ladders or decision trees for operational response because national laws, security structures, sense of urgency, and political consensus vary. Without even a shared definition of what constitutes a threat and what suitable retaliatory actions to adopt, the West will struggle to match the Kremlin’s current tempo of assaults and to deter their mounting intensity.
For deterrence to work it must be credible. Establishing fear of retaliation in the mind of the Kremlin must be undoubtable. Unfortunately, credible deterrence, once the main pillar of the West’s defence alliance is less convincing now than at any point in nearly a century. The withdrawal of US aid comes at the moment when liberal democracies face the biggest challenge and greatest land war since WWII. Biden and Scholz’s hesitancy emboldened the Kremlin in its war in Ukraine. Trump’s odd deference toward Putin stoked hope.
And yet, the West’s resources are immense. Their advantage is overwhelming but under-deployed. Combined NATO members spent 2.77 percent of GDP on defence in 2025, or more than $1.4 trillion. By comparison, Russia spent $206 billion in 2025, or 7.5 per cent of GDP while prosecuting its war of attrition in Ukraine.
Aggression should have consequence. This would include more military assistance to Ukraine in reprisal for Russian hybrid operation. Moscow has to be convinced that the cost of their actions will outweigh the gains. The way to alter the current calculus is with consistent pressure that is not just costly, but ingrained.
An in-depth analysis of a 2025 report by the Pulaski Foundation concludes in a well-turned précis: “Only by linking infiltration in Europe to punishment on the battlefield can the alliance transform Moscow’s gray-zone strategy from a tool of coercion into a liability of its own making.”
Russia is aware of the imbalances. Its dwindling resources, diminishing place in the world and increasing isolation only makes it more phobic, more desperate, and more dangerous. NATO and the EU must think and act independently from the White House. If their members can establish a framework of a collective security structure under common rules and shared burdens, they will not only outlast Putin, but unite a continent and begin a renewal.
Dr Jack Jarmon served as a USAID Technical Advisor to the Russian government in the mid-1990s. He has taught international relations at the University of Pennsylvania and Rutgers University where he was Associate Director and Research Professor at the Command Control and Interoperability Center for Advanced Data Analysis. He is currently editorial board member and contributor at PostPravda.info, a Ukrainian and Polish news organisation.
This article is published under a Creative Commons License and may be republished with attribution.
