Türkiye is developing a conceptual framework and tangible initiatives to sustain its engagement in the Indo-Pacific region, including bilateral military cooperation, maritime capacity building, the development of interregional trade corridors, and diplomatic outreach.
Turbulence in the global geopolitical landscape, which has been growing for about a decade, became widely visible across all levels of global governance at the beginning of 2026. Developments such as the release of the 2026 U.S. National Defense Strategy (NDS), the capture and prosecution of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro by U.S. officials, arguably the most sensational Davos summit in history, and the Munich Security Conference convening under the title ‘Under Destruction’, have collectively brought the debate on ‘power transition’ (which was previously only theoretical in international relations literature) into the realm of realpolitik.
It is within this context of an accelerating multipolar order that the Munich Security Conference Report’s assessment assumes particular analytical significance: analysing the spheres of influence of regional powers in depth, and analysing the need for them to cooperate. As the report asserts, “The US administration generally seems to accept that the new order will be multipolar, recognising that other powers are entitled to their own regional spheres of dominance.” And indeed, Türkiye, as it appears, is poised to emerge as one of the countries that will grow increasingly dominant within its own region.
Over the past two decades, Turkish foreign policy has undergone a significant structural transformation, becoming increasingly anchored in a doctrine that might be characterised as ‘proactive geopolitical neutrality’. This approach has given Ankara the strategic flexibility to manoeuvre deftly between competing great and regional powers while projecting its influence far beyond its immediate geographical boundaries.
This transformation has extended Türkiye’s strategic reach to Southeast Asia, drawing Ankara into the emerging geopolitical landscape of the Indo-Pacific. Türkiye’s growing presence at the crossroads of the Eastern Mediterranean, the Gulf, the Horn of Africa, and South and Southeast Asia indicates a significant strategic shift towards the Indo-Pacific region. These engagements are deliberate attempts to expand Türkiye’s footprint along the Indo-Pacific maritime corridor, in pursuit of greater strategic autonomy in an increasingly unstable global order.
The Eastern Mediterranean and the Red Sea constitute the western gateway through which Indo-Pacific trade routes connect to European markets. From this perspective, Türkiye occupies a position of considerable strategic value. It does not merely border the Eastern Mediterranean or project military and diplomatic influence into the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa; it effectively functions as a frontier state to the Western Indo-Pacific. This geographic and strategic proximity means that Türkiye is closer to the Indo-Pacific region than many other external actors currently engaged with it.
To fulfil this emerging role, Türkiye is developing the conceptual framework and tangible initiatives to sustain its engagement in the Indo-Pacific region. These efforts include bilateral military cooperation, maritime capacity building, development of interregional trade corridors and diplomatic outreach, all of which are aimed at bridging the gap between Ankara’s historical legacy and its ambitions as a rising Indo-Pacific actor.
These strategic efforts are as follows:
- The Blue Homeland (Mavi Vatan) doctrine: This represents more than a maritime boundary claim; it constitutes a conceptual reorientation of Turkish strategic culture toward sea-based strategic autonomy. By asserting sovereign interests across the Eastern Mediterranean, the Red Sea, the Arabian Sea, the Persian Gulf, and beyond, Ankara has effectively established a theoretical basis for projecting naval presence into waters that sit at the very core of Western Indo-Pacific geopolitics. In this sense, Mavi Vatan should be read not merely as a defensive posture, but as a maritime expression of Türkiye’s broader ambition to operate as a self-sufficient, extra-regional power.
- Libya Agreement: The 2019 maritime delimitation agreement between Ankara and Libya’s internationally recognised government was a calculated geopolitical move, one that not only extended Türkiye’s jurisdictional reach across the Eastern Mediterranean but also effectively positioned Ankara as an indispensable player in the region.
- Gulf Anchor: The Qatar-Türkiye Combined Joint Force Command represents a decisive foothold, granting Ankara both air and naval reach into the Persian Gulf and establishing Türkiye as a credible balancing force at one of the Indo-Pacific’s most strategically vital chokepoints.
- Strategic Engagement in Horn of Africa: Türkiye’s military base in Mogadishu, its largest overseas installation, combined with security agreements, economic partnerships, and naval patrols within Somalia’s Exclusive Economic Zone, has secured Ankara a rare operational foothold near the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, placing Türkiye among a select few non-regional powers with genuine access to the Gulf of Aden and the maritime corridor linking the Mediterranean to the Indo-Pacific.
- Connectivity Gambit in Basra: As confidence in the Suez Canal as a reliable trade route between the Indo-Pacific region and Europe continues to deteriorate and become increasingly fragile, Türkiye is positioning itself as the strategic backbone of an alternative corridor, most notably through the ‘New Development Road’ project, which would connect the Persian Gulf to European markets via Iraqi and Turkish territory. By doing so, the New Development Road is, in essence, Ankara’s attempt to convert geographic centrality into economic and political leverage, offering Indo-Pacific partners a credible overland-maritime alternative at precisely the moment when the old route’s reliability is most in question.
- Asia Anew: Launched in 2019, the Asia Anew Initiative codifies Türkiye’s decision to engage with the Indo-Pacific region on its own terms: a non-aligned, non-interventionist approach focused on economic, diplomatic, and cultural outreach. In a region increasingly characterised by rivalry between major powers, Ankara is establishing a unique identity as a partner that avoids geopolitical rivalry.
Beyond its long-term strategic initiatives, it is increasingly evident that Türkiye has also been capitalising on recent regional developments to consolidate meaningful strategic gains. The Syrian crisis, which has long been one of Ankara’s most costly burdens with direct implications for domestic politics and the economy, has gradually shifted in Türkiye’s favour. Meanwhile, the UAE’s diminishing influence in Yemen has strengthened Saudi Arabia’s and Türkiye’s positions, effectively placing these two powers on a common strategic platform built on converging interests. Significantly, the first outcome of this realignment was the potential for a trilateral security pact among Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan.
One process accelerated by these developments, as well as development in Somalia, is the potential establishment of a Turkish military base on Sudan’s Suakin Island. If realised, this would give Ankara a connected military presence stretching from Sudan through Qatar to Somalia, spanning some of the world’s most critical maritime chokepoints.
At a time when the international order is moving towards a framework of regional spheres of influence in which regional powers are increasingly being allowed to shape their own regions, Türkiye finds itself with a rare strategic opportunity: to act as the playmaker between the wider Levant, the Gulf, the Horn of Africa and the Western Indo-Pacific.
Türkiye’s deepening partnerships with legitimate governments across the region are steadily expanding its operational footprint in the Western Indo-Pacific. In an era of accelerating global instability, Ankara is poised to emerge as an actor that both great powers and regional players will increasingly need to factor into their Indo-Pacific strategic calculus.
Mustafa Cem Koyuncu is Co-Founder of Bridge Turkey.
This article is published under a Creative Commons License and may be republished with attribution.
