The Strait of Hormuz is still shut, and the world continues to pay the price. As talk turns to tolls and defence pacts around the Strait of Malacca, ASEAN has a rare chance to prove it can keep its own chokepoint open before a crisis forces the question.
Five months since the US and Israel attack on Iran, the Strait of Hormuz remains closed. This marks one of the most consequential events in this century. The implications for the international community, particularly the rising cost of fuel in many countries, are devastating. It shows how important a maritime chokepoint and navigation are for all countries, yet how vulnerable it is to any disruptions. Closer to home the Strait of Malacca faces a similar risk. So, what should ASEAN learn from the Hormuz crisis?
This article will focus on how ASEAN, as a regional organisation, can learn to avoid such disruptions to its most important regional maritime chokepoint, the Strait of Malacca. This will ensure that theree will be no such disruptions to one of the most important maritime chokepoints.
Similar Risk for the Strait of Malacca
After the Hormuz crisis, some officials have realised how important the Strait of Malacca is and how it can be used as leverage. For instance, inspired by the Iranian move to impose a toll on vessels passing through the Strait of Hormuz, Indonesian Minister for Finance, Purbaya Yudhisadewa, proposed imposing a toll on vessels passing through the Strait of Malacca to generate more income for Indonesia. The idea was then supported by the Chief of the Indonesian Coast Guard. Before it was later clarified that it wasn’t a serious proposal, other littoral states such as Singapore and Malaysia immediately responded to Minister Purbaya statement by reiterating their commitment in ensuring transit passage regime and rejecting any proposal to imposing toll fee.
Moreover, drawing lessons from the Hormuz crisis, Indonesia’s Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, Arif Havas Oegroseno, also wrote a commentary arguing that Indonesia and other archipelagic countries in the Indo-Pacific should leverage their strategic geographic locations through a sea-denial defence strategy.
Indeed, the Strait of Malacca is undeniably one of the most important maritime chokepoints for the international community. Every year, more than 90,000 ships pass through the strait, carrying 60% of global maritime trade. It also carries one-third of the world’s petroleum and other liquid cargo, becoming the shortest maritime route connecting the Middle East and Europe to the Asia-Pacific region.
Avoiding the Hormuz Problem
The Strait of Hormuz and the Strait of Malacca share similarities and differences. Under the Law of the Sea Convention, both straits have the status of international straits used for international navigation because they connect exclusive economic zones (EEZs) or high seas to other exclusive economic zones or high seas. Therefore, the uninterrupted transit passage applies in both straits, and any disruptions to the Strait of Malacca can have devastating impacts.
To understand how ASEAN can learn from the Hormuz crisis, we can look at it from two perspectives. First, how to avoid such a crisis, and second, if a conflict ever escalates in the region how the organisation ensure the strait to remain open.
If we look at some basic facts, ASEAN puts Southeast Asia in a much better position to prevent any disruptions in the Strait of Malacca. All countries bordering the Malacca Strait, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand, are parties to UNCLOS. In contrast with the Persian Gulf, Iran and the United Arab Emirates are not parties to UNCLOS. This made the law ambiguous to those countries. For the Malacca Strait, it is clear that not only are all states bordering the Malacca Strait parties to UNCLOS, but all ASEAN members are as well; this makes it easier for ASEAN to ensure uninterrupted transit passage in the Malacca Strait.
More specifically, those four countries bordering the Strait of Malacca already have specific cooperation to secure the Strait of Malacca. Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand have established an “Eyes-in-the-Sky” Combined Maritime Air Patrol in the Strait.
Existing ASEAN Mechanism
As a region connected by the seas, ASEAN understood how important maritime affairs are for the region. If we look at ASEAN initiatives, many are already dedicated to maritime affairs. Those include the ASEAN Maritime Forum, ASEAN Maritime Forum Plus, ASEAN Maritime Outlook, and, under the 2026 Philippine Chairmanship, the newly established ASEAN Maritime Center.
If we look at those documents, freedom of navigation, safety of navigation, and overflight are always at the center of ASEAN maritime initiatives. ASEAN maritime cooperation with other countries such as China, India, and Australia consistently underscores the importance of ensuring freedom of navigation in the region. Therefore, this maritime cooperation infrastructure will create a regional decision-making process. As Mohamad Hasan, Malaysian Foreign Minister, pointed out, “Whatever is to be done in the Strait of Malacca must involve the cooperation of all four countries. That is our understanding – it cannot be done unilaterally.”
However, the challenges posed by the Hormuz crisis are more significant in a scenario of conflict in the region, and ASEAN must remain relevant to ensure the strait remains open. If we look at ASEAN member states’ security relations, it is quite diverse. Thailand and the Philippines are the two US Non-NATO treaty allies in the region. Even though Singapore is not a formal US treaty ally, the Changi Naval Base hosts some US Navy vessels and provides support to the US Seventh Fleet. Other countries, such as Indonesia and Malaysia, are more likely to remain neutral in a conflict.
These diverse security alliances and preferences will likely affect their decision-making response to a conflict in the region. With this diversity, it is important for ASEAN to have a response to a conflict scenario.
Protecting the Strait of Malacca
Despite challenges arising from these diverse views, ASEAN is still in better shape compared it to the Hormuz. There is no regional organisation comprising all countries bordering the Strait of Hormuz. Iran is not a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Only after the ongoing war, Iran and Oman aim to form ‘joint working group’ on future management of Strait of Hormuz. Therefore, when a conflict arises, the question is where the best venue is to discuss and mediate it.
However, ASEAN has often been criticised as being ineffective in dealing with crises, such as what happened during the Myanmar coup. In this case, ASEAN may also have limited capacity to respond effectively to any disruptions. It can only become a venue for dialogue and communication. Any major decision will most likely be made by the littoral states of the Strait of Malacca.
That being said, reflecting on the Strait of Hormuz crisis, there are at least two lessons ASEAN should learn to avoid such disruptions at maritime chokepoints in the Strait of Malacca. First, through the existing ASEAN maritime cooperation infrastructure, ASEAN member states should demonstrate a shared commitment to ensuring the strait remains open. Secondly, when a conflict arises in the region, there should be an effective forum for dialogue to mitigate and avoid unilateral actions.
Aristyo Rizka Darmawan is an Assistant Professor of international law at Universitas Indonesia and a PhD Scholar at the Australian National University. He is also a research fellow with the Yokosuka Council on Asia Pacific Studies (YCAPS).
This article is published under a Creative Commons License and may be republished with attribution.
