The zenith of techno-politics has created a paradigm shift in the global supply chains – from operational marvels to geopolitical flashpoints – making weaponised interdependence a quintessential feature of contemporary era.
The “weaponisation of supply chains” is narrowly defined here as “intentional exploitation of supply chain to disable, manipulate, and compromise the critical technologies through cyber-physical attacks, tampering, and manoeuvring the embedded vulnerabilities.” Critical technologies is defined as the amalgamation of present and emerging technologies deemed vital for strategic interests, including national security, economic prosperity, and development. Their peculiar characteristics include indispensability – dominance or access to such technologies is critical for; and maturity – it includes both well-established and emerging technologies.
But the most notable aspect linked to critical technologies is the associated supply chain vulnerability. Disruption, sabotage, and supply chain scarcity, along with their critical components, can lead to multifaceted vulnerabilities and amplify threat vectors. Critical technologies include, but are not limited to, advanced communication and information technologies, Artificial Intelligence (AI), quantum computing, biotechnology, PNT sensing technologies, advanced materials and manufacturing, cyber and encryption technologies, advanced energy technologies, logistics and sensors, machine learning, semiconductors and microelectronics. State and non-state actors, through various means exploit the various structural vulnerabilities in supply chain such as logistics, digitisation, opacity, and concentration to cause disruption and sabotage.
Techno-Politics & Weaponised Technological Interdependence
Techno-Politics is manifested through deeply embedded reciprocal nexus between technological advancements and geopolitical dynamics wherein the technology itself has become a cardinal indicator of national security. At its core, tools and techniques shapes the global stage by altering balance of power, diplomatic clout, and reconfiguring the matrix of international cooperation and competition. Traditional concept of geopolitics constitutes the state’s ability to exercise superiority and mobilise national resources by preoccupying certain physical place or space. This space is not limited to four domains of warfare i.e., land, oceans, air, and outer space, but has rather expanded to environments entailing exchange of data, knowledge, and information in a digital age.
Technological innovation comprised of technological breakthroughs, novel inventions, and advancements across various fields are now considered as catalyst for geopolitical power with profound potential to upend existing power structures.
Two key trends are metamorphosing this techno-politics landscape:
- Ascendancy of critical and emerging technologies, notably advanced telecommunication, quantum computing, Artificial Intelligence (AI), and biotechnology are begetting structural shifts in global economic, security, and power dynamics;
- The geopolitical flux is amplifying strategic quest for technologies and resources, shifting global and regional alliances, and reengineering supply chains.
The convergence of these two trends has led technology to assert its monopoly on inter-state tensions and battlefields. Consequently, it has propelled governments to seek technological prowess, employ policy autonomy and industrial policies, use protectionist measures, and exercise investment and export controls to strategically reorient global supply chains and data flows. Resultantly, the fierce technological competition, evident from US-China race for AI supremacy and chips, has unmasked the non-neutrality of technology. The most tangible entanglement between geopolitical realities and technological innovation can be understood by the multifaceted forms of interdependence technology has created. Amongst these, critical technologies global supply chain remains the primary example that orchestrates economic ties, but concurrently engenders geopolitical vulnerabilities and risks.
Vulnerabilities and Threat Vectors Regarding Critical Technologies Supply Chain
The era of techno-politics imbued with technological disruption and geopolitical flux has rendered supply chains as high-value targets whereby actors execute calculated attacks to erode trust, sabotage markets, and wield enormous influence beyond traditional battlefields. Cost efficiency, scale, and speed once hailed as quintessential attributes of supply chains have now become liabilities. The inherent vulnerabilities in intricate and large critical technologies supply chain make them an easy target for exploitation. Defence sectors of states are also dependent on such types of complex and long international supply chains for acquiring critical infrastructure, communications and other technology which makes them vulnerable to supply chain infiltration. This undermines the supply chain security which implies security of technologies, techniques, and process intertwined with the supply chains.
The digitisation of supply chains has given birth to multitudinous technological vulnerabilities alongside existing geography-centric threats. These threats can either be accidental or targeted attempt to corrupt and infiltrate supply chains that in turn compromise predictability (forecastable and stable flow despite disruption risks) and reliability (quality or quantity of a particular product) of supply chains.
Supply chain threats can arise from four key sources:
- Foreign or concentrated dependency – upstream supply dependency on single foreign firm or supplier susceptible to geopolitical risks;
- Counterfeiting – imitation of original product design to manufacture counterfeit ones;
- Inadequate security infrastructure – lack of necessary security measures and potent technology systems; and
- Fragile contingency planning – unpreparedness from possible disruption in supply chain.
Moreover, digital supply chains remain highly vulnerable to sabotage threats wherein attackers can damage or disrupt the process, product, or whole supply chain for some malicious purpose. Interdependency in digital supply chains further provides conduits to tampering that can allow attacker to contaminate or alter the product in supply chain. Such unauthorised modifications can later be used for carrying out information leakage attacks or induce faulty behaviour in hardware system at the chosen stage of supply chain. The information leakage attacks can provide attacker different types of data including logistics, confidential data related to suppliers, design information, as well as data stored in digital device. By employing machine learning and reverse engineering, attackers may model Physically Unclonable Function (PUF) of chips to make challenge-response pair and thereby fabricate chips. Besides, attackers can target memory of the system to acquire critical information through either buffer flow or direct access memory-based attack.
Cyber supply chain attacks have become the most lethal and recurrent threat vectors that can exploit software and hardware systems at different stages of the supply chain. In terms of hardware supply chain attacks, attackers may inject malicious code during manufacturing, alter hardware or insert harmful firmware into a device during shipping, or activate embedded backdoors post-product deployment. Whereas software supply chain cyber-attacks mostly occur as initial breaches, in which insider threats, unpatched software vulnerabilities, and phishing tactics are used to subvert third-party vendor systems. Besides, malicious actors can carry out code manipulation by lacing software destined for distribution with a backdoor or malware. Rudimentary recognition of risks associated with poor supply chain security, limited safety measures against such risks, and elusive supply chain visibility remain the key factors that increase the vulnerability of critical technologies’ supply chains. Lebanon Pager attack is the real-life manifestation of how attackers carry out cyber-kinetic attacks by targeting Cyber Physical Systems (CPS) in a supply chain. Pager attacks reveal supply chain vulnerabilities and the fragmented nature of global supply chains, marked by geographical dispersion across raw material extraction, production, assembly, and distribution stages.
These developments necessitate states to adopt multi-layered techno-security architecture to ensure integrity at four levels – software, hardware, supply chain monitoring, and cross verification. This mechanism could serve as a control mechanism across critical technologies supply chain to curb their weaponisation and concurrently enable technological interdependence to function smoothly.
Safia Mansoor is PhD Scholar of International Relations at School of Integrated Social Sciences, University of Lahore. She has also served as Research Associate at the Maritime Centre of Excellence, Pakistan Navy War College Lahore. Her research area includes armament and disarmament, emerging military technologies, nuclear deterrence and strategic stability in South Asia.
This article is published under a Creative Commons License and may be republished with attribution.
