On the back of their Strengthened Strategic Partnership, Japan and the Philippines have signed a Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA). This indicates the strength and evolution of the security relationship and the approach of both sides to managing regional instability.   

On 8 July, Japanese Foreign Minister Kamikawa Yoko and the Philippine Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro Jr. signed the Philippines-Japan Reciprocal Access Agreement. The agreement formally sets the groundwork for greater cooperation between the security forces of both countries. The legislation provides the procedures and guidelines for when the armed forces of either country visits the other. This includes joint exercises and disaster relief, with the aim of improving the interoperability of the armed forces of the two nations.

Increasing Regional Tensions

The agreement comes at a time of increasing regional instability. In the Philippines, clashes between Chinese Coast Guard forces and Filipino navy personnel have occurred over attempts to resupply Filipino forces in the Second Thomas Shoal. For Japan, the contest with China over islands in the East China Sea continues to be a point of bilateral tension. The geographic location of the Philippines is also significant for its proximity to key economic sea lanes in the South China Sea and to Taiwan.

The RAA as a natural product of prior cooperation

Tokyo and the Philippines have steadily but surely increased the manner and intensity of security cooperation. Beginning in May of 2005 the two countries began to lay the groundwork for security cooperation with the first Politico Military (PM) Dialogue. Successive Politico-Military Dialogues occurred in 2006 and 2007, in addition to Military-to-Military (MM) Dialogues. These near-annual meetings institutionalised regular security discussions between the two nations. However, rather than tangible results, these dialogues, alongside other meetings such as the Vice-Ministerial policy dialogue, established the need and basis for a more comprehensive form of bi-lateral partnership. This need was articulated in a joint statement in 2009.

In 2011, the relationship between the two countries transformed into a “Strategic Partnership.” The partnership, while including areas of economic cooperation and people-to-people exchange, importantly outlined in the 2011 joint statement concrete forms of security cooperation. These included upgrades to high-level dialogues (Vice-Ministerial Policy Dialogue to a Vice-Ministerial Strategic Dialogue), maritime security cooperation (Training between Coast Guards, port calls, visits between Chiefs of Staff, and meetings between maritime officials) and further support for peace processes and development in Mindanao.

Four years later, the partnership was elevated to a “Strengthened Strategic Partnership” with an accompanying Action Plan. The declaration on the elevated partnership detailed the expansion of security cooperation in addition to other areas, including development of cooperation in disaster relief, anti-piracy operations, maritime operations, and capacity building. The plan also highlighted consultation on international law, reflecting concerns over territorial disputes.

A key inhibitor of security cooperation between the two nations has been legal constraints on Japanese defence equipment and personnel. The gradual lifting of restrictions has importantly allowed increased levels of joint training, initially with maritime operations, and then with the Airforce and, with the RAA, the exchange of ground troops. This has also included an agreement on the terms and conditions for the exchange of defence equipment and technology. The agreement was a key goal of the 2015 strengthened strategic partnership and mandated that there be a joint committee in charge of approving transfers. This committee would be made up of representatives from key ministries in both nations. The result of the agreement is visible in the purchase in 2020 by the Philippines of Japanese made Mitsubishi warning and control radar systems. This was significant for it was the first supply by Japan of finished defence equipment after the ban prohibiting such exports was lifted in 2014.

Significance of the Agreement

The significant investment placed in the Japan-Philippines security relationship should be viewed as working within the existing hub and spokes system of the United States alliance network. Traditional security relationships with the US are naturally important to both the Philippines and Japan. This can clearly be seen in both the history of military and defence ties, and also the more recent trilateral summit between the three nations on 11 April 2024.

However, the actions and policies of both states indicate that both are increasingly acting to independently strengthen their own security and the relationships between the spokes of the US system. For Japan, this can be seen in its efforts to normalise military modernisation and self-defence within the constitution. Under Shinzo Abe, Japan’s post-war defence and foreign policy was transformed and elevated, placing Japan as a significant regional security partner. This has continued under his successor Fumio Kishida, where defence spending has increased, defence technology development has been supported, and other Reciprocal Access Agreements signed with actors such as Australia and the UK. The Philippines has been a key supporter of Japan’s elevated role with its strengthened strategic partnership, the exchange of defence equipment and technology, and joint exercises.

The Philippines under Marcos Jr. has demonstrated an approach characterised by flexibility and preventive diplomacy. On the one hand, it continues to enjoy substantial military investment from the US. On the other, Manilla has made efforts at the bilateral level to secure security partners and assistance such as with Japan. This allows Manilla to more easily balance against China’s aggressive behaviour. At the same time the Philippines has previously sought to directly manage relations with China in attempts to assuage Beijing from further actions against its interests in the South China Sea. This was briefly seen under Rodrigo Duterte with a pivot to China away from the US.

Despite the slow and gradual developmental of the Japan-Philippines security relationship, the results of such progress have been substantial—annual meetings and dialogues between high-level officials, the potential for defence equipment and technology exchanges, and now a fully realised visiting forces agreement. Both countries clearly are invested and have invested heavily in the ongoing strategic partnership and, in the case of the agreement, its security aspect.

Aidan Matthews is a fourth-year student of International Relations and Politics, Philosophy and Economics at the Australian National University in Canberra. He is a former Media and Communications Intern at the Australian Institute for International Affairs. 

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