The security architecture of the Indo-Pacific is in the middle of a fundamental restructuring. Great-power strategic competition, China’s growing assertiveness in the South and East China Seas, and increasing concerns about the U.S. long-term commitments have fundamentally changed the strategic calculus of regional states.
Traditional U.S. allies, faced with these challenges, are moving away from the traditional “hub-and-spokes” approach, whereby the U.S. is the central “hub” maintaining separate bilateral alliances with individual states that are the “spokes,” and the “spokes” themselves have few, if any, direct linkages with one another. Instead, these states are pursuing a “cross-bracing” approach, in which U.S. allies form closer direct relationships with one another, building an interconnected network of partnerships that are flexible and able to provide mutual support.
One of the hallmarks of this strategic evolution was the elevation of Japan–Philippines bilateral relations to the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (CSP) in May 2026, as well as the deepening security synergy between Japan, the Philippines, and Australia.
Australia’s Strategic Pivot
For almost five decades, Australian defence thinking was dominated by the “Defence of Australia” doctrine, which was centred on low-level threats from small and medium powers in Australia’s immediate region. Nevertheless, Canberra was forced to rethink that approach in light of significant changes in its strategic environment marked by intensifying U.S.-China rivalry, large-scale wars in Europe and the Middle East, China’s growing military build-up, and continuing tensions in the South China Sea and across the Taiwan Strait.
The 2023 Defence Strategic Review and 2024 National Defence Strategy (NDS) marked a shift to a “National Defence” approach whereby Australia will proactively shape the regional strategic environment rather than simply react to emerging threats.
In practice, the environment is one where the rules-based international order is upheld, economic connections remain secure and a favourable balance of power is maintained across the Indo-Pacific. This proactive shift is clearly reflected in the adoption of a “Strategy of Denial” to deny potential adversaries the ability to successfully undertake actions that would threaten Australian interests or regional stability. The strategy emphasizes credible deterrence through enhanced military capabilities and political will, supported by investments in AUKUS nuclear-powered submarines, long-range strike systems, upgraded northern bases, littoral manoeuvre capabilities, and collective deterrence with regional partners across the Indo-Pacific.
Australia’s 2026 NDS, released in April 2026, indicated a further subtle shift in Canberra’s defence outlook, towards a focus on positive contributions to the regional balance of power. Australia has been explicit that China is a major driver of the changing security landscape in the Indo-Pacific region.
To address this challenge, Australia has identified that developing a resilient network of like-minded partnerships has become one of its most critical strategies for upholding the international rules-based order.
Australia as a “Strategic Node” in the Regional Network
Given its core interest in maritime stability, Canberra must now position itself as a “strategic node” in the emerging network of like-minded partners along the First Island Chain, a string of islands stretching from Japan, through the Philippines, to northern Borneo, to effectively preserve a rules-based regional order.
Australia’s unique strategic position, distant from the front lines of regional flashpoints such as the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait, does not diminish its significance. On the contrary, Canberra has clear advantages that make it a critical link in the regional security web.
However, Australia plays different roles for different partners.
For Japan, the depth of defence-industrial integration with Australia is qualitatively different from that with any other regional partner. The two countries are moving beyond traditional security cooperation toward the co-production of advanced long-range strike systems and autonomous systems, gradually forming what can be described as an integrated defence-industrial ecosystem geared toward regional deterrence.
Rather than focusing on basic capability-building, Japan’s priority is to expand strategic space to scale up defence production and invest in advanced systems, including long-range missiles and hypersonic weapons. Against this backdrop, Australia provides “strategic depth” by offering a secure industrial hinterland resilient to missile threats, enabling Tokyo to expand its defence production capabilities and conduct safe and confidential testing of advanced weapons systems at facilities such as the Woomera Test Range.
Furthermore, military facilities and infrastructure in Darwin or Townsville also allow Japan to expand its operations and training, conduct equipment maintenance, and access to secure digital infrastructure, such as the Asia Connect Cable-1 (ACC-1). This connectivity provides a high-speed corridor for sharing military data and intelligence critical for joint operational coordination and situational awareness in times of regional crises.
The logic is reversed in the case of the Philippines. The Philippines is located on the front line of key security flashpoints in the South China Sea, yet it possesses significantly more limited defence capabilities and military infrastructure. In other words, if Australia serves as a “strategic hinterland” for Japan, it plays a different role for the Philippines by strengthening its “presence forward” through acting as a capacity support partner to Manila.
Therefore, Australia is emerging as a “southern node” for the Philippines, enhancing Manila’s defence capacity through infrastructure investment, joint training, and further interoperability. Notably, Canberra has committed to the construction, operation, and maintenance of eight defence infrastructure projects in five Philippine military bases.
Emerging Strategic Triangle between Australia, Japan, and the Philippines
Taken individually, the bilateral relations between all three countries have made significant strides in recent years. The Australia–Japan Special Strategic Partnership has evolved into Tokyo’s most critical security partner after the United States. The most prominent development from this partnership being the construction of the Mogami-class frigates, signalling deepened integration in defence technology and production between the two nations.
Similarly, Canberra is currently considered by some to share a strategic alignment with Manila that is even more tightly coupled than its engagement with Washington. This relationship is realised through large scale exercises such as Alon 2025 and Australia’s commitment to upgrading infrastructure projects in Philippine military bases. Meanwhile, the recent progression of Japan-Philippines relations to a CSP indicates a move toward a more institutionalised and stronger “quasi-alliance”.
The strategic convergence of these three countries is building towards a new “strategic triangle” in the Indo-Pacific security architecture. Under this arrangement, Australia would be the strategic hinterland, logistics hub and institutional connector, with Japan and the Philippines as forward outposts along the First Island Chain.
What is Canberra’s Next Move?
To make the most of this strategic convergence and build a strong position within the emerging partner network, Australia needs to implement a comprehensive, consistent agenda.
First, Australia should aim to upgrade its relationship with the Philippines to a CSP. As of mid-2026, Japan remains the only country to have achieved a CSP with the Philippines, following years of sustained trust-building and defence cooperation through initiatives such as the Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA), Official Security Assistance (OSA), and increasingly joint military exercises. This demonstrates that the Philippine government remains highly selective and cautious in granting CSP status.
Against this backdrop, the current momentum of Australia–Philippines relations suggests that Canberra is uniquely positioned to pursue a similar upgrade. The bilateral relationship has already been strengthened by the Status of Visiting Forces Agreement (SOFA) and the 2023 upgrade of the Strategic Partnership. Moreover, Canberra’s consistent support for the 2016 South China Sea Arbitral Award has built significant strategic trust that will help to facilitate this bilateral advancement. Taken together, I believe that these developments make Australia the next most logical candidate to achieve a CSP with the Philippines after Japan, although such an upgrade would ultimately depend on the political willingness and strategic interests from both Canberra and Manila.
Second, Canberra must champion the “SQUAD” framework, which brings together Australia, the United States, Japan, and the Philippines to strengthen maritime security cooperation in the South China Sea. Australia’s 2026 NDS already recognises the grouping as a key vehicle for “deeper security engagement” and “collective deterrence” across a strategically important region. Building on this foundation, priorities should include joint patrols, multilateral exercises, maritime domain awareness (MDA) sharing, and logistical cooperation. Simultaneously, Australia should accelerate the institutionalisation of this framework, such as a proposed “Indo-Pacific Chiefs of Defence Cooperation Council.” A more institutionalised SQUAD would not only enhance collective deterrence and operational coordination but also help anchor long-term U.S. engagement in the region at a time of growing uncertainty about Washington’s strategic commitments.
Third, Australia should expand economic and strategic industrial cooperation with both Tokyo and Manila. Beyond deep-seated defence ties, Australia’s strengths in critical minerals, agriculture, and education offer a resilient foundation for trilateral cooperation. Most importantly, Canberra must frame these initiatives as part of a long-term strategy to build a regional partnership network capable of greater resilience and adaptability in the face of future geopolitical volatility.
With close ties to both Japan and the Philippines, Canberra is well placed to take a decisive role in weaving a broader network of partnerships, ultimately preserving regional stability and defending the rules-based order.
Nguyen Thanh Long holds a Master of Arts in International Relations from the Ho Chi Minh City University of Social Sciences and Humanities. His research interests focus on maritime security and international relations in the Asia-Pacific. All views expressed in this article are the author’s alone.
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