Modi’s meeting with Putin in Bishkek marks a new phase in the India–Russia partnership, one being reshaped by a turbulent era in global politics. Far from signalling an alignment with Moscow’s politics, however, New Delhi’s continued engagement shows that strategic autonomy remains the organising principle of Indian foreign policy.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin, on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit in Bishkek on 31 August, reaffirmed the enduring importance of the India–Russia strategic partnership at a time of considerable geopolitical uncertainty.
The meeting came only days after External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar co-chaired the 27th India–Russia Inter-Governmental Commission on Trade, Economic, Scientific, Technological and Cultural Cooperation in Moscow. Together, the two developments demonstrate that India–Russia relations are not merely surviving the turbulence of recent years; they are being adapted to a changing strategic and economic environment.
The central question is no longer whether the partnership remains relevant. It is how India can use it to advance its own strategic interests.
A Partnership with Enduring Strategic Value
India and Russia have described their relationship as a “Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership”. Defence cooperation has traditionally been its strongest pillar, but the relationship has expanded considerably.
Energy, fertilisers, nuclear cooperation, space, technology, trade and investment now form an increasingly important part of the bilateral agenda.
At Bishkek, Modi and Putin discussed cooperation in trade and investment, energy and defence, alongside regional and global developments. Modi also reiterated India’s support for efforts to bring the war in Ukraine to an end, stressing the importance of peace and diplomacy.
This combination of rhetoric is significant. India is maintaining close relations with Russia while making clear that its partnership does not mean endorsement of the continuation of war.
That distinction has become an important feature of India’s foreign policy.
Energy Has Transformed the Relationship
The economic dimension of India–Russia relations has grown rapidly.
Bilateral trade has increased roughly fourfold in five years, from about US$13 billion in 2021–22 to nearly US$60 billion in 2025–26. Yet this growth has also produced a major imbalance, with India’s imports from Russia far exceeding its exports. Jaishankar identified correcting this imbalance as one of India’s foremost priorities.
Energy is at the centre of this transformation.
Russia has become an important source of energy for India, helping New Delhi diversify its supplies and manage volatility in global energy markets. Moscow has also assured India of continued supplies of energy and fertilisers, both of which are directly connected to India’s economic and food security.
For India, this is not simply a commercial relationship.
Energy security is national security.
Defence Remains a Crucial Pillar
Defence cooperation continues to give the relationship strategic depth.
For decades, Russia has been one of India’s principal defence partners, providing platforms, systems, technology and technical support. Although India has substantially diversified its defence procurement in recent years, Russian-origin equipment remains embedded in the country’s military capabilities.
This makes the relationship different from a conventional economic partnership.
There is institutional experience, technological familiarity and a long history of defence cooperation that cannot easily be replaced.
At the same time, India increasingly wants the relationship to move beyond the traditional -seller model towards deepening joint production, technology cooperation and greater industrial participation.
That transition will be essential for the future of the partnership.
India–Russia Relations amid the Ukraine war
The Ukraine war has undoubtedly complicated India–Russia relations.
India has refused to join Western sanctions against Moscow and has continued its economic engagement with Russia. At the same time, New Delhi has consistently called for dialogue and diplomacy.
Modi’s latest message to Putin in Bishkek was particularly clear: the world needs to move away from an “endless war” towards an end to the conflict.
India’s position reflects neither complete alignment with Moscow nor acceptance of the Western approach.
It reflects India’s long-standing preference for strategic autonomy.
New Delhi wants to preserve its ability to communicate with Moscow while maintaining strong relations with the United States, Europe and other partners.
Strategic Autonomy Remains the Foundation
This is perhaps the most important reason why the India–Russia relationship continues to matter.
India does not view its relationship with Russia as incompatible with its growing partnership with the United States.
New Delhi’s strategic calculations are based on its own issue-specific interests, rather than strict alignment with the politics of its respective partners.
Russia remains important for India’s defence and energy security. The United States is an increasingly important partner in advanced technology, defence and economic cooperation. India therefore seeks to maintain both relationships without allowing either to determine its foreign policy.
The Modi–Putin meeting demonstrates that this approach remains firmly in place.
It also explains why India will continue to engage Russia even as the international system becomes more contested.
The Next Phase
The challenge now is to make the partnership more balanced and future-oriented.
The rapid growth in trade must be accompanied by greater Indian exports. Energy cooperation should be complemented by deeper investment and technology partnerships. Defence cooperation should increasingly emphasise co-production and technological capabilities.
The relationship also needs to deepen cooperation in areas such as nuclear energy, space, critical technologies and connectivity.
The India–Russia relationship is therefore entering a new phase.
Its foundations remain strong, but its relevance will increasingly depend on its ability to respond to India’s emerging economic and strategic requirements.
For India, Russia remains neither an alliance commitment nor simply a legacy relationship.
It is a strategic asset.
The Modi–Putin meeting in Bishkek showed that, despite the profound changes in global politics since the end of the Cold War, India still sees value in maintaining a close and independent relationship with Moscow.
The objective is not to recreate the past.
It is to build an India–Russia partnership suited to India’s interests in the twenty-first century.
Dr Ashok Sharma, Visiting Fellow, The University of New South Wales Canberra at the Australian Defence Academy and an Academic Fellow at Australia-India Institute, The University of Melbourne.
