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Georgia and the "Russian law" – Will Georgia Ever Break its Historic Ties to Russia?

13 Jun 2024
By Xanthe Murrell
Protests in Georgia against the Russian occupation. Source: Giorgi Abdaladze / https://t.ly/ZfFt9

Russian military and political influence have dominated the past two centuries of Georgian history. Since its independence in 1991, Georgia has been trying to reduce its exposure to its great northern neighbour, however developments over the past month show that escaping Russia’s sphere of influence may be impossible.

On Monday 3 June, a new “Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence”  was signed by the speaker of the Georgian parliament. Known colloquially as the “Russian law,” it has sparked outrage among the population. In short, the legislation will require all non-governmental organisations who receive more than 20 percent of funding from overseas to register as “agents of a foreign influence.” The law mimics one enacted in Russia 2012, which worked to silence non-governmental voices by labelling them as traitors. The legislation effectively ended civil society as an accountability-seeking institution, and helped push Russia further into total autocracy.

The bill has major geopolitical implications, and will likely isolate Georgia from Europe by jeopardising the nation’s candidate status in the European Union (EU). This status was only granted in December last year, with full membership contingent on Georgia continuing to liberalise (politically and socially) its institutions. Opponents see this authoritarian legislation as evidence of creeping Russian influence in Georgia, facilitated by the ruling “Georgian Dream” party. By sabotaging its position with the EU, the Georgian government seems to be turning towards Russia, trading West for East.

This has angered many Georgians, who have supported European integration since Georgia gained its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. Since the bill was announced on 3 April, hundreds of thousands have taken to the streets of Tbilisi to protest the law. Led by the country’s youth, these rallies have been some of the largest seen in Georgia since its independence movement.

Since the beginning of the 19th century, Georgian statehood has been engulfed by two successive Russian empires: first in 1801 when it was annexed by Alexander the First, and then in 1921 when the Soviet Red Army invaded.

Despite almost two centuries of subjugation, Georgia sees its statehood as continuous. A common saying in the country is: “the Roman Empire is extinct but Georgia still exists.”  This is an expression of Georgian pride, which describes how a tenacious Georgian nation survived years of Russification and regained its rightful independence.

Georgia’s independence movement gained momentum in 1989, when Soviet troops brutally suppressed a peaceful anti-government protest in Tbilisi. Twenty-one people were killed, and this national tragedy sparked the beginning of the end of Soviet rule in Georgia. In 1990, the nationalist opposition beat the communist party in Georgia’s first free elections. After the fall of the USSR in 1991, the independence referendum passed with 98 percent of the vote. The results were announced on the two-year anniversary of the 1989 tragedy, forever linking Georgian independence with freedom from Soviet tyranny.

An independent Georgia has looked increasingly to integrate into Europe and the West, joining in 1999, for instance, the Council of Europe. However, the process has not been an easy one, with integration efforts coinciding with economic sanctions, political pressure, and the threat of military involvement from Russia.

Even from the beginning of independence, Russia has been militarily and politically involved in Georgia’s two separatist regions, South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Russia supported the separatists during the Georgian civil war (1991-1993) and, much to Georgia’s dismay, the 1993 ceasefire agreement allowed Russian peacekeepers to be stationed in both regions. Georgians saw this Russian military presence as an existential threat to their sovereignty. This was particularly the case for President Mikheil Saakashvili, who governed Georgia between 2004 and 2012. Reunification with the separatist regions was top of Saakashvili’s agenda, and in 2007 his government formally requested that Russian troops leave Georgian territory. He also pushed for greater integration with the West and for NATO membership. During the same period, Russian President Vladimir Putin continued to support South Ossetian and Abkhazian independence and refused to withdraw his troops from the territories. He also pressured Georgia to loosen its ties with the West.

In August 2008, tensions erupted into a short, five-day war between Georgia and Russia. The Russian military pushed Georgian authorities out of their remaining outposts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Russian troops have remained in both regions since the cessation of hostilities, and Moscow has recognised both as independent—a condition Georgia sees as occupation.

Much like the experience in the Donbas region of Ukraine, Putin has used his support of separatist groups to exert pressure on Georgia. And just as in Ukraine in 2014, Russia invaded and secured a military outpost in Georgian territory. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 is therefore a worrying example of what Russia might do to retain its sphere of influence.

Despite this, the Georgian people have remained strong in their European outlook. Since independence, they have aspired to join both the EU and NATO. In December 2023, Georgia was granted EU candidate status, a step on the way to full membership. Public support for the EU has remained strong despite changes in government and the outbreak of the Ukraine War. In a 2023 poll, 79 percent of Georgian respondents expressed support for EU membership. This European optimism is particularly strong among Georgian youth, who are also vocally anti-Putin.

However, Georgia’s relationship with Europe is not a simple one. A prolonged EU membership process has left many Georgians feeling a lack of support by the Europeans. According to a 2020 poll conducted by the Caucasus Research Resource Centre (CRRC) ambivalence and euro-scepticism is prevalent in older and less affluent Georgians, as well as in minority groups. Due to Georgia’s vulnerable position between Russia, the Middle East and Europe, there is pressure to pick a side. Europe is the pragmatic choice, but not necessarily a passionate one.

Since the Georgian Dream Party came into power in 2012, it has maintained EU membership as a policy priority. However, in recent years it has begun to ally itself with ultraconservative, pro-Russian groups to maintain power. The party’s rhetoric has become increasingly pro-Putin and anti-West, particularly under Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili (who retired in January of this year.) According to opposition politician Giga Bokeria, “demonising the West is a cornerstone of Georgian Dream’s strategy.” Many believe this new “Russian law” will legitimise policies that move the government closer to Russia, in the process forcing the EU to abandon Georgia’s candidacy. After Georgian Dream announced the bill in early April, Garibashvili told reporters that Georgia is “not ready to become [an EU] member country.”

This leaves Georgia at a crossroads, choosing between democracy and the EU, and authoritarianism and Russia.

It is unclear which path Georgia will choose, but the recent legislation suggests it is heading East. The world will look to the upcoming October elections to see how Georgian civil society will withstand the assault of the “Russian law.” For now, the protesters will have to hope that the electoral process will represent their voices. Can Georgia break the cycle of history and safeguard a future free of Russian influence? Right now, it doesn’t look likely.

Xanthe Murrell is a freelance writer, who is interested in foreign affairs and political commentary. She is a graduate of the Australian National University, with a Double Bachelor’s Degree of International Relations and Arts. She specialised within this degree in French, Spanish, and Middle Eastern and Central Asian Studies.

This article is published under a Creative Commons Licence and may be republished with attribution.