Despite public declarations of solidarity with Kyiv, Europe’s ongoing trade with Russia—especially in energy—continues to funnel billions of euros into Moscow’s war effort. This raises questions about the duality of Europe’s approach. Data and analysis from 2025 reveal both reductions and paradoxical increases in certain economic spheres, as Europe’s allies to Ukraine inadvertently fuel Russia’s ability to sustain its campaign.
Sanctions on Paper, Revenue in Practice
Since the start of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the European Union (EU) has imposed sanctions targeting Russian industries, banking, and individuals. The EU’s intention was to reduce Russia’s ability to finance the war and support Ukraine.
According to Euronews, between early 2022 and mid‑2025, EU imports from Russia dropped by approximately 86–89%, while exports to Russia declined by about 58–61%. Prior to the invasion of Ukraine, Russia was a major energy supplier. Moscow provided around 45% of the EU’s natural gas imports in 2021 and ranked among the top sources of petroleum oil. By 2025, the EU’s dependence was sharply reduced: oil imports from Russia fell from €14.06 billion in Q1 2021 to just €1.48 billion in Q1 2025, with natural gas imports experiencing a similarly significant decline.
Despite these reductions, the reality is less straightforward. According to Reuters, in the first eight months of 2025, seven EU member states increased their imports of Russian energy relative to the previous year. The European Union as a whole over €11 billion worth of Russian energy during this period, with France’s purchases soaring by 40% (reaching €2.2 billion), and the Netherlands’ imports jumping 72% to €498 million. Belgium, Croatia, Romania, and Portugal also raised their imports (Belgium ~ 3%, Croatia ~ 55%, Romania ~ 57%, Portugal ~ 167%). Hungary, which has declared it will not send weapons to Ukraine and has refused to participate in arms transfers, recorded an 11% year-on-year increase. These nations, many publicly supportive of Ukraine, remain major recipients of Russian oil and gas, often through existing infrastructure like the Druzhba pipeline.
The Illusion of Energy Independence
Several reasons underline Europe’s persistent, and sometimes rising, imports. One is that Russian liquefied natural gas (LNG) entering EU terminals is often shipped onwards, the gas sometimes lands in France or Spain only to be redirected to buyers elsewhere in the bloc. Another is the patchwork of exemptions embedded in the sanctions’ regime, with certain EU states negotiating loopholes amid domestic energy pressures and fears over price volatility. Even as maritime imports of Russian crude have been largely banned, pipeline flows and indirect deliveries via “shadow fleets” and third-party intermediaries help Russia bypass restrictions and retain profits.
The cumulative impact is sobering. According to Reuters, since the start of the war, European payments for Russian energy have amounted to more than €213 billion, steady revenue for Moscow even as overall reliance dropped. In 2024, EU imports of Russian fossil fuels exceeded the bloc’s financial aid to Ukraine, with purchases surpassing €18.7 billion while direct support to Kyiv lagged behind. The Center for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA) described this dynamic as “a form of self-sabotage,” arguing that Russian energy revenues remain the single largest funding source for the war.
The structure of this economic relationship is multifaceted. While energy (especially oil and gas) was once the dominant flow, other goods have persisted despite sanctions. In 2024, the EU exported about €31.5 billion in goods to Russia and imported approximately €35.9 billion. Trade continues in sectors such as chemicals, machinery, vehicles, and fertilizers, though at levels sharply reduced from before the war (exports down ~58 %, imports down ~86 %). Notably, chemicals remain a major component of the EU’s exports to Russia — of the €31.5 billion in 2024, €13.7 billion were chemicals. Meanwhile, Russia continues to be the EU’s largest supplier of fertilizer: its share in extra-EU fertilizer imports rose from 28 % in Q1 2021 to 34 % in Q2 2025. These patterns underscore that, even under sanctions regimes, tariffs and regulations face limits in curbing dependency in certain sectors.
Europe’s Strategic Dilemma: Principles vs. Dependence
Amid these realities, European policymakers and leaders face mounting pressure to close loopholes and enact more effective sanctions. Discussions are underway about using frozen Russian assets — or the revenues generated by them — to support Ukraine’s war effort. New sanctions packages increasingly target vulnerable sectors of the Russian economy, especially energy and banking, along with measures designed to cut off export earnings, and restrict key imports. However, the effectiveness of all these measures depends heavily on uniform enforcement, legal clarity, and closing remaining policy gaps.
Overall trade volumes with Russia are at their lowest since 2002. While most member states have significantly reduced economic interactions with Russia, some continue importing Russian energy at levels that sustain Kremlin revenue. The uncomfortable truth is that European allies of Ukraine, in seeking to balance their own energy needs and economic resilience, have enabled Russia to weather much of the sanctions pressure and maintain its military campaign. As the war enters its fourth year, the challenge for EU policymakers is whether they can fully align their support for Ukraine with stricter enforcement and closure of remaining trade, finance, and energy loopholes that continue to enable Russia’s war-economy.
Anna Mahjar-Barducci is a Project Director at the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI). She has also contributed to think tanks and academic institutions such as TRENDS (UAE). Her writing has appeared in The New York Sun (USA), Osservatore Romano (Vatican), El Mundo (Spain), Maroc Diplomatique (Morocco), and Haaretz (Israel). She is currently a columnist for the Italian daily La Ragione. Mahjar-Barducci lectured at the U.S. State Department and has been part of several U.S. State Department-sponsored events through the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI). She also worked as a researcher in South Asia, Tunisia, Senegal, and Zimbabwe.
This article is published under a Creative Commons License and may be republished with attribution.
