Indonesia’s plan to deepen defence cooperation with China could fast-track its aspirations to modernised its defence capabilities. But unfamiliar systems, interoperability gaps and Washington’s likely reaction might risk putting these aspirations on pause.
Indonesia and China have just concluded the second 2+2 Dialogue forum on August 21, 2026. Several agreements were reached, one of which is that both countries plan to establish joint munition, rocket, and missile factories in Indonesia. If realised, this agreement holds strategic benefits for Indonesia, namely the development of its defence capabilities. Access to this missile technology can aid Indonesia’s weapon modernisation programme while also enhancing the capacity of the national defence industry. Meanwhile, for China, this agreement opens up the arms market and establishes its influence in Indonesia. However, translating the agreement on paper into real success on the ground is filled with questions considering the various obstacles that must first be overcome.
Intensifying Defence Cooperation and Modernising Indonesia’s Military Capabilities
The Indonesian defence minister, in his statement to the press after the 2 + 2 dialogue, stated that both Indonesia and China agreed to intensify their defence cooperation. This agreement is logical considering that analysts state that the defence relations between the two countries are relatively weak. This condition is caused by a number of reasons, but perhaps most prominently, by the memory of anti-communism in Indonesia, which is often associated with the ‘freezing’ of diplomatic ties between China and Indonesia.
One of the efforts to intensify the defence cooperation between the two countries is through the plan to build joint munition, rocket and missile factories in Indonesia. This agreement certainly looks promising for Indonesia. The joint factory scheme with China opens access for Indonesia to technology and know-how in the production of rockets and missiles, which China has certainly mastered more. Based on records, China has been able to produce several types of missiles, including the C-802, C-705, and the YJ-18.
Access to technology and know-how in missile production comes alongside the direction of Indonesia’s defence build-up, which has recently been actively acquiring missiles. Based on reporting from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, in the past three years, Indonesia has purchased various types of missiles, including the Atmaca anti-ship missile (AShM) and the Hisar-O surface-to-air missile (SAM) from Türkiye, and the QW-3 SAM from China. Indonesia’s vigorous increase in missile ownership is closely linked to the implementation of the Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) strategy, which has recently garnered more attention in the discourse on Indonesia’s defence planning. Moreover, the concept of the Perisai Trisula Nusantara (ATS), an updated joint military doctrine proposed by President Prabowo Subianto while he was still serving as Minister of Defence, also requires the support of a capable missile arsenal.
However, there are a variety of complex obstacles that must be overcome for Indonesia to realise the points of the agreement. As such, the strategic value that can be brought by this 2 + 2 Dialogue agreement—namely, bolstering Indonesia’s military capabilities— is highly likely to remain an aspiration and a scribble on paper.
Where Indonesia Must Overcome Obstacles
The first obstacle facing Indonesia is related to the lack of familiarity with Chinese-made armaments. As previously mentioned, the defence relationship between Indonesia and China is relatively weak. This can be seen from the very minimal arms trade between the two countries. Throughout its history, Indonesia has only purchased from China the C-802 and C-705 AShM, the portable QW-3 SAM, the CH-4B UAV, and the Type-90B rocket launcher. Other sources also indicate that Indonesia operates the Giant Bow anti-aircraft (AA) gun. Logistically speaking, Indonesia’s limited operation of Chinese-made armaments means its personnel lack the experience and familiarity needed to use and maintain them. Therefore undermining the efficacy of day-to-day operations and delaying any immediate payoffs until troops and engineers are appropriately trained.
Not only that, the aspect of interoperability with other weapons will also be a hindrance. This is because the majority of the armaments operated by Indonesia come from the technology blocs of the United States and Europe. In the context of advancements in defence technology and the era of Network-Centric Warfare (NCW), modern armaments no longer operate in isolation but are designed to connect through tactical data links and specific network architectures. Since each weapon system can use different datalinks, communication protocols, and interoperability standards, the integration between systems from different technological ecosystems can become increasingly complex and costly. Which is particularly worrying given that interoperability is one of the main elements in the implementation of Indonesia’s ATS doctrine.
Another issue that will also be an obstacle is Indonesia’s track record in operating Chinese-made armaments. The Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) have at least two bad experiences in operating Chinese-made weapons. First was the C-705 AShM that failed to launch during a military exercise in Natuna, in Indonesia’s northwestern province. This incident can also be suspected to be one of the reasons for the uncertainty regarding the fate of the previously agreed C-705 transfer-of-technology (ToT). In the second incident, the Giant Bow AA canon malfunctioned, resulting in the deaths of 4 TNI personnel and injuring 8 during military exercises. Moving forward, Indonesia will have to build trust around these artilleries in order to both ensure personnel are confident and willing to operate them, and that they will not lose more people or compromise on their strategy should this weaponry malfunction outside of drills. Which will be difficult to do if these problems arise from the unreliability of these weapons and Indonesia’s commitment to using them.
While these initial obstacles stem from Indonesia as the party agreeing to acquire these arms, the final obstacle posed to this procurement might come from a third party outside the agreement altogether, the United States.
In every plan for the acquisition of armaments, there will be geopolitical calculations that must be taken into account. If Indonesia shows its seriousness in realising this cooperation with China, it could be perceived negatively by the United States. If, or more likely when this cooperation is realised, it will indicate that the ties between Indonesia and China are becoming increasingly tight and deep. This perception will certainly place Indonesia in a risky position, considering the increasing geopolitical rivalry between the United States and China in recent times.
Towards Careful Consideration
Indonesia itself has long been proven to place the calculation of geopolitical impacts that may arise from arms purchase contracts as an important consideration. The cancellation of the purchase of Russian-made Su-35 fighter jets due to the threat of CAATSA sanctions from the United States is one such example.
The agreement reached in the 2 + 2 Dialogue cannot be denied as a strategic opportunity that should not be overlooked. However, Indonesia also needs to conduct thorough calculations before fully realising the points of the agreement. Issues related to interoperability, the track record of operating Chinese-made armaments, and geopolitical impacts must be seriously considered. Currently, the most significant challenge for Indonesia is not making an agreement with China, but rather ensuring that the agreement can truly bring the expected and needed benefits without geopolitical repercussions that could be detrimental.
Febry Triantama is a Lecturer at the Department of International Relations Paramadina University and a Defense Analyst at the Paramadina Public Policy Institute.
This article is published under a Creative Commons License and may be republished with attribution.
