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Moving to the Far Right in Hungary

26 Aug 2015

Challenged by the growing popularity of the country’s far-right party, Jobbik, the Hungarian government is radicalising its agenda in order to win back disgruntled voters.

April 12th 2015 was an unneventful day in most countries; certainly not for Hungary. In local elections held in the town of Tapolca, the candidate for the Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik), an extreme-right party, won the seat with 35.3% of the vote. This seemingly minor political victory was a cold shower for the ruling conservative Fidesz party, and its controversial Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán.

Following his re-election as prime minister in 2014, a mandate he had previously held in 1998 and 2010, Orbán enjoyed popularity levels most of his European colleagues could only dream about. However, a string of corruption scandals and a number of unpopular policy decisions have eroded his electoral support.

While the public appears to have grown tired of Fidesz, Jobbik, with its refined, modern communication strategy, its easy solutions to complicated problems and its charismatic leader, Gàbor Vona, resonates well with many constituents. No longer does the party name conjure up images of men in paramilitary uniforms or openly anti-Semitic, anti-Roma statements. And the results speak for themselves: in the latest polls of June 2015, Jobbik now peaks at an unprecedented 27 per cent, still 13 per cent behind Fidesz, but the front runner in the opposition.

The realisation that his party was leaking voters to the right has spurred Orbán into action. Since June 2015 his party has launched what can only be described as a charm offensive, intended to win back the more conservative fringe of the electorate.

Over the first few weeks of June, Hungarians woke up to find huge billboards plastered around the country and warning: “If you come to Hungary, don’t take the jobs of Hungarians!” or “If you come to Hungary, you must respect our laws”. This government-sponsored campaign, specifically targeting foreign migrants crossing over into Hungary, was rapidly followed by a “national consultation on immigration and terrorism”. 8 million copies of the questionnaire were distributed, asking leading questions such as “Do you agree that mistaken immigration policies contribute to the spread of terrorism?” or “In your opinion did Brussels’ policies on immigration and terrorism fail?”. The overall aim was to gauge public support for sweeping reforms in the field of immigration and to take a stab at Brussels, always a popular move.

At a summer university in late July in Băile Tuşnad, Romania, the Prime Minister spoke of preserving the “Hungarian Hungary” and warned of the dangers of immigration coming from the “depths of Africa”. The location of his speech was symbolic. In a nod to the pan-nationalist nostalgics of Greater Hungary (prior to the 1920 Trianon Treaty which saw Hungary lose at least two-thirds of its former territory and two-thirds of its inhabitants ) he addressed his public in a region with a significant Hungarian ethnic minority. His intentions have since been made crystal clear by prominent figures such as the Prime Minister’s Office leader, János Lázár, who declared that “Hungary’s neighbours should get accustomed to the idea that the Hungarian state will defend all of its citizens by any means possible”, a topic which is particularly sensitive in countries such as Romania or Ukraine, which harbour large Hungarian communities.

In the latest development of his political shift, Orbán has ordered the construction of a fence along Hungary’s 175km border with Serbia, in an effort to curb the flows of Syrian and Afghan refugees streaming across the border. The army has mobilised soldiers to help in the construction while additional police have been deployed to the area – a show of force to signal the administration’s determination to see this project through despite the EU’s protests.

All these initiatives have met with widespread criticism from NGOs, international institutions such as the EU  and domestic opposition, which Orbán has consistently dismissed. His party has preferred to claim Hungary is the victim of international conspiracies or unjustified criticism, and portrayed the government as the bulwark against tidal waves of immigration and Brussels interference, creating a siege mentality favourable to the conservative vote.

Orbán’s strategy may succeed in stopping Fidesz’s electoral haemorrhage. By taking a tougher stance against immigration, by playing the patriotism card and criticising the EU, Orbán and his cabinet have taken a few leaves from Jobbik’s manifesto. The problem, however, is that this radicalisation might not only affect Hungary and migrants there. Orbán’s policies have already earned him the praise of extremist parties, and will continue to inspire radical political forces abroad. At a time where tensions are running high in Europe, particularly in the East, the added volatility represented by a government scapegoating foreigners and vowing to protect its ethnic minority abroad is something that should be closely monitored.

Arthur de Liedekerke recently completed his MA in European Studies at Maastricht University and is undertaking a double MA in Geopolitics, Territory and Security at King’s College, London. He has worked for the European Parliament on Central European Affairs. This article can be republished with attribution under a Creative Commons Licence.