FWhat is a “minilateral” and why are these groupings “strategic”?

Essentially “minilateralism” refers to cooperation on a scale greater than bilateralism (think: US-alliances, and various Strategic Partnerships), but smaller than multilateralism (think: ASEAN or APEC). Minilaterals, in generic terms, typically convene about three-to-six states to engage in practically orientated security cooperation in a newly institutionalised format. Designed to solve collective action problems outside of the confines of cumbersome multilateral organisations, they have emerged (or rather: re-emerged) as the instruments of choice for a range of states within the region wanting to increase their security cooperation.

But not all minilaterals are the same. “Strategic” minilaterals, first identified by Kei Koga—such as the Quad, AUKUS, and TSD—stand out from the crowded minilateral space on several counts. First, they are principally aimed at strategic competition across multiple potential domains—military, defence, economic, technological, ideological, and informational. Their intent is to maintain either the military balance of power and the normative security order in the Indo-Pacific (or in some cases both). Second, they have strategic impact on account of their powerful membership—including major powers such as the US, Japan, India, and the UK, as well as “middle power” Australia—and they have the resources and capabilities to achieve strategic effects.

The Quad, AUKUS, and the TSD are, in one way or another, exemplars of the category of strategic minilaterals. The Quad is focussed on order-building, through the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) vision, and the provision of public goods as a contribution to regional governance. AUKUS is fixated on developing deterrence through defence-technological collaboration, paying only lip service to the FOIP. Meanwhile, the TSD is also concerned with deterrence and developing a combined crisis response capability, though it also undertakes limited activities in the order-building space. These strategic minilaterals are all well-documented and analysed in their current form.

But many commentators have speculated on how these kinds of strategic minilaterals might evolve in the future. Speculations abound on whether the Quad will be transformed into a formal military alliance, whille some would argue that AUKUS and the TSD might already represent de facto “virtual” alliances. Also, in the case of the Quad, given its seemingly non-military orientation, speculation has emerged as to whether it might become more like ASEAN—a provider of regional security governance.

As part of a research endeavour into the future trajectory of strategic minilateral formations, myself and Felix Heiduk of the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) applied a set of International Relations theories to rigorously evaluate possible evolutions in the institutional format of the Quad, AUKUS, and TSD. While the findings might not be entirely surprising, the research does help clear up a lot of misconceptions about these strategic minilateral formations, as well as offering some nuanced insights into their purpose, nature, and integrity.

In the case of the Quad—often mischaracterised as an “alliance” in its current composition—we concluded that short of a far more overt and menacing “threat” to India from China, the promulgation of a quadrilateral military alliance was extremely unlikely. New Delhi, jealous of its strategic autonomy, has no desire to explicitly back the US or its frontline allies in a confrontation with Beijing, over for example the Taiwan Strait or South China Sea. While India wishes to “balance” Chinese power in broad terms it has no desire to provoke the PRC. However, the Quad’s increasing focus on governance issues, health, climate, infrastructure, emerging technologies, humanitarian assistance for example, might prospectively establish it as an alternative provider of regional security governance, perhaps competing with ASEAN. This would likely entail its development into a more formally institutionalised platform as well as an expansion in its membership (with the “Quad-plus” process as an indicator).

The AUKUS Trilateral Security Partnership is likewise often misleadingly referred to as an “alliance,” though there is no trilateral defence treaty at its heart. However, given the extraordinary level of existing alignment between the three member states, this mischaracterisation might not be so far off the mark as in the case of the Quad. The degree of defence integration being undertaken through AUKUS when combined with the deep security ties that the three partners enjoy creates an impression that it could easily evolve into one in the future. Technically it would require the signing of a formal mutual defence security treaty (per NATO) to achieve this condition. Yet, the way in which alliances and other expressions of alignment operate in the 21st may make such a move redundant if joint expectations of support in time of conflict are either psychologically embedded or can be activated through pre-existing alliance partnerships (US-UK through NATO, US-Australia “ANZUS” treaty). Yet evolving into a de facto military alliance would still require emplacing the necessary alliance “infrastructure,” including combined political council, joint command arrangements, and operational plans, none of which exist in a trilateral context. Without this, AUKUS would function as a looser military “coalition” in the event of regional hostilities.

The TSD meanwhile has been around since 2002 and has steadily accreted many of the trappings of a military alliance without a treaty instrument. As strategic competition has intensified trilateral threat perceptions among the three states the TSD (an umbrella terms for all “trilateral” activities) has attracted more attention. The TSD is sufficiently institutionalised through political and defence consultation mechanisms, not only the TSD forum itself, but the Defence and Security Cooperation Forum (DSCF), though these stop short of a comprehensive alliance infrastructure (mentioned above). These fora provide the opportunity to discuss combined responses to crisis contingencies and synergise their strategic postures. The most recent Trilateral Defense Minster’s Meeting (TDMM) announced the creation of a dedicated “Trilateral Defence Consultations” “to support alignment of policy and operational objectives of the Japan Self‑Defense Forces (JSDF), the Australian Defence Force (ADF), and the United States forces from peacetime to contingency.” This significant step is backed by a regular and increasing pattern of high-end trilateral military exercises aimed at “warfighting.” Although the TSD—unlike AUKUS—possesses dedicated top-level political consultation mechanisms, it still lacks the essential treaty commitment for all three states to respond to an attack in concert. Again, like AUKUS, this could be a moot point—the three are so closely connected through their bilateral relationships (which do include security guarantees), that taking such a step is practically unnecessary.

To comprehend how strategic minilaterals like the Quad, AUKUS, and TSD might institutionally evolve in the future, one needs a prior understanding of how they are purposed and composed at the present time. The Quad has never been envisaged as a military alliance and appears to be developing in the opposite direction as a provider of security governance. AUKUS and the TSD are highly “alliance-like” in different ways and rest upon far closer alignment of relations between their membership, in each case built on a strong platform of bilateral security and defence ties. Rather than “taking the plunge” and formalising their commitments in an alliance treaty they will likely maintain ambiguity and avoid provocation by remaining within their present institutional formats, while at the same time accreting greater integration that would prospectively allow them to function as an effective military “coalition” in time of crisis.

“Alliances” as we understand them, based upon their historical pedigree, may be increasingly eclipsed by less rigid forms of security cooperation of which strategic minilaterals (as well as “strategic partnerships”) are emblematic. This is not to say we have witnessed the “end of alliances” as Rajan Manon predicated in the early 2000s—NATO and the US hub-and-spoke system are still going strong—but that we won’t necessarily see newly-minted alliances born of strategic minilaterals. In any case, the most potent strategic minilaterals are effectively built around the US alliance system. This is a deliberate move by Washington to expand the range and reach of its alliance network through additional formats.

Dr Thomas Wilkins is a Senior Fellow (non-resident) at the Japan Institute for International Affairs (JIIA) thinktank and Associate Professor at the University of Sydney. He publishes widely in leading academic journals such as The Pacific Review, Pacific Affairs and International Relations of the Asia-Pacific and his latest monograph – Security in Asia-Pacific: The Dynamics of Alignment – is published with Lynne Rienner.

This article is published under a Creative Commons License and may be republished with attribution.