The administration of Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr. has shown dexterity and flexibility in Manila’s ongoing relationship with the United States and China. With changing headwinds likely to come from several directions in 2024, this short era of foreign policy independence is likely to close.  

Originally formed to counter the Soviet Union, the US-led hub and spoke alliance system has adapted to address new challenges, including China’s growth. The Obama administration sought to hedge against China’s rise. The Trump administration treated China as a strategic competitor, with a focus on addressing systemic issues in trade and economics. The Biden administration, meanwhile, recognises China as a national security threat. As these changes illustrate, “spoke” countries like the Philippines (PH) must navigate a complex situation, balancing interests between the US and China. Implications of “a” new Cold War evidently extend beyond military and economic spheres.

Domestic preferences: Foreign policy elements from Fidel V. Ramos to the Benigno Aquino III

An early key change in US-PH relations was the non-renewal of the Military Bases Agreement in 1991, which limited the physical presence of US military bases on Philippine soil. This was to later characterise the dormancy in US-PH relations. President Fidel V. Ramos at this time sought to develop of a more resilient national security strategy – known as the AFP Modernization Act (1995).

However, the continued reliance of the Philippines’ on the US for strategic autonomy was exposed in 1995 when China made assertive claims toward Mischief Reef. For the US, this was also taking place at a time when its geopolitical limitations in responding to a possible crisis in Taiwan were becoming more evident. This led to talks in 1996 that resulted in the Status of Forces Agreement, allowing for US troops to visit on a rotational basis; joint military exercises with Philippine troops; and the transfer of arms to the military and coast guard. In 1999, to address their own military and political concerns, the Philippines signed the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) with the US under President Joseph Estrada.

Gloria Macapagal Arroyo’s term coincided with 9/11 and the anti-terrorism policies of the United States. Arroyo’s response to the revised alliance relationship prompted her to deploy Philippine troops to Iraq to showcase support and strengthen the alliance. Additionally, there was increased military assistance to tackle internal security challenges and access to advanced counter-terrorism equipment. However, the capture of overseas Filipino worker Angelo dela Cruz exposed the Philippines’ vulnerable position as a lesser power, leading to the withdrawal of their forces from the US-led coalition. This emphasised the need for a revised internal security approach to address transnational security threats. Macapagal Arroyo’s presidency also saw a shift in alignment as Manila established new ties with China, indicating a balancing act to seek security guarantees in an uncertain geopolitical climate.

The late Benigno C. Aquino renewed the commitment of the Philippines to safeguarding maritime claims, and his administration’s successful case in the arbitral tribunal resulted in a landmark decision in favor of the Philippine state. Benigno Aquino’s foreign secretary, the late Albert del Rosario, promoted rebalancing, increased rotational presence, minimum credible defense posture, maritime domain awareness, and disaster response as key responses in the disputed areas. Under Benigno C. Aquino’s leadership, the Philippines’ foreign policy aligned with Obama’s pivot to Asia.

The Duterte shift: Unmooring of US-PH relations

The administration of Rodrigo Duterte signalled yet another step in US-PH relations as occasional strong statements (which ranged from demanding the “balangiga bells” – three church bells taken by the US Army in 1902 – back from the United States to souring relations with President Barack Obama before a regional summit with a few choice words) served as foreground for attempts to end Philippine-US joint military exercises. These often-terse comments corresponded with efforts to strengthen ties with China. Duterte’s rhetoric softened as Donald Trump assumed the presidency in 2017 through to Duterte’s announcement of the end of the Visiting Forces Agreement in 2020. The Balangiga bells were returned to the Philippines in 2018.

Marcos 2.0: Flexible foreign policy

A new national alliance, “Team Unity,” brought together the support of Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, Rodrigo Duterte’s daughter Sara, and Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr., signaling an important shift on the national political front.

As president, Marcos has shown active support for both the US and China, visiting both countries within the first year of his presidency. More recent visits by US secretary of state, Anthony Blinken, in August 2022, and China’s Foreign Minister Qi Gang in April of this year underscore active relations on both sides. Marcos has declared a foreign policy of “not choosing sides,” seeking to explain that his administration was “friendly to all and [an] enemy to none” and that it “shall seek, not scorn dialogue” with other countries equally.

Thus far, the Marcos administration has aligned such pronouncements with cooperative measures with both the US and China. The question is how long can framing foreign policy as flexible provide stability for the Philippines amid escalating tensions between China and the US in the East and Southeast Asian region?

Biden and Beyond: The impact of US Indo-Pacific Strategy for the US-PH alliance

For the time being, the US continues to bring influence to bear on Philippine security decisions. Having established and nurtured a steady relationship across multiple fronts, and with security being the centerpiece of continuing diplomatic ties, Philippine-US mutual ties are stronger than most. China has yet to prove the longevity of its initial forays into deeper relations with the Philippines. Of course, continual challenges to Philippine sovereignty in the West Philippine Sea are likely to prove prohibitive, at least in the short term. Until then, prospective winds have the capability to lift the sails in either direction. Such examples include the continued utilisation of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (including four more new sites) and the new guidelines of the Mutual Defense Treaty issued in April of this year; Biden’s Indo-Pacific strategy and its potential mark on Philippine relations and regional alliances; and the outcome of the 2024 US presidential race and the 2025 Philippine Midterm elections which may further the biases on different foreign policy directions set by the Biden and Marcos administrations.

It will be crucial in the near future for the Philippine state to define in whose favor this “flexible” foreign policy falls and whether it is indeed in pursuit of an “independent foreign policy.” Going forward, the government will ultimately need to decide what alliance structure the country will “re-spoke” into.

Maria Elissa J. Lao is Assistant Professor of the Department of Political Science, Ateneo de Manila University. Alma Maria O. Salvador is Associate Professor of the Department of Political Science, Ateneo de Manila. They both teach courses in International Relations, Global Politics, and Diplomacy.

This article is published under a Creative Commons License and may be republished with attribution.