Contemporary ROK-ASEAN relations have been downsized under the Yoon government. For relations to be substantive, it is crucial to acknowledge ASEAN as more than a subset of the Indo Pacific strategy.

Both the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are perceived as middle powers whose ties have grown from strength to strength in a constantly changing international order that is greatly influenced by major power rivalry. ROK-ASEAN relations began with a sectorial dialogue partnership in 1989 and moved towards a full dialogue partnership by 1991. Given the high degree of economic integration between the ROK and ASEAN, the two nations’ ties are basically grounded in complementing economic resources and strategic interests.

Turning Points in bilateral relations

Historically, ASEAN played a peripheral role in foreign policy concerns due to the ROK’s more Western-focused foreign policy. However, the Asian financial crisis of 1998 marked a turning point in the expansion of regionalist tendencies, which envisioned deeper bilateral links in order to avoid another crisis. The ROK subsequently became more involved in ASEAN-led mechanisms such as the ASEAN Plus Three, East Asia Summit, and the ASEAN Regional Forum. The inauguration of the ASEAN Centre in 2009, and the 2012 establishment of the ROK Mission to ASEAN, showcased the increasing importance of ASEAN to the ROK’s political, economic, and social concerns. Inter-cultural links also coincided with the implosion of Hallyu, which introduced Korean drama, film, music, food, and later cosmetics to Southeast Asian consumers.

While Korean popular cultural content remains dominant in ROK-ASEAN ties, President Moon Jae-in’s introduction of the New Southern Policy (NSP) in 2017 catapulted ASEAN to a more esteemed position in South Korean perceptions. Under the NSP, Moon recognised ASEAN as equal to Korea’s traditional economic partners – the United States, China, and Japan. As a sign of his commitment, Moon became the first South Korean to visit all 10 ASEAN nations. Understanding that social linkages will help to raise awareness of ASEAN within South Korea, Moon constructed the ASEAN Culture House in Busan in 2017, highlighting the diversity of Southeast Asian cultures.

Politically, expanding relations with ASEAN was a means of diversifying ROK’s trading partners and reducing dependence on China. The rather dramatic foreign policy shift was a reaction to Beijing’s economic and social sanctions in response to the 2017 Terminal High-Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) missile defense system’s installation in Korea.

Forced by China’s aggressive stance, Moon looked towards Southeast Asia and India as alternative and more responsible trading partners. Despite some drawbacks, the NSP mostly benefited the economies of ASEAN member states. Projects relating to development cooperation with a goal of closing the development gap within the region, and boosting regional connectivity, significantly boosted ROK-ASEAN collaboration.

Under the NSP, ROK’s trade and investment linkages heavily pivoted towards Vietnam due to its welcoming economic environment, highly developed industrial zones, cheap labour, and geographical proximity. With the THAAD deployment remaining a sensitive issue, Korean businesses are increasingly relocating their manufacturing facilities to Vietnam, though China remains the ROK’s major trading and investment partner.

Change in Policy

Under President Yoon Suk Yeol, ROK-ASEAN ties have become entrenched in a new paradigm entitled the Korea-ASEAN Solidarity Initiative (KASI). With a stronger leaning towards the US in the new ROK government, it is not surprising that KASI is embedded within ROK’s Indo Pacific framework, which is the “Strategy for a Free, Peaceful and Prosperous Indo-Pacific Region.” Like its key security partners, the Yoon government continues to endorse ASEAN Centrality and the “ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific.”

KASI has the potential to expand relations in much needed areas like digitalisation, environment and climate change, public health, smart cities, and capacity building. These areas complement well with the AOIP’s goals of enhancing regional connectivity, strengthening the economy, and stimulating sustainable development collaborations.

The Yoon government views ASEAN as a crucial partner for regional peace and prosperity, but the fact that the organisation has become linked to the Indo Pacific strategy illustrates that ASEAN no longer enjoys the same status as ROK’s time-honoured partners as depicted in the NSP. Furthermore, in recent months, the pivoting of Yoon towards the US while appearing to take a hard line on China risks a collision with ASEAN’s AOIP, which emphasises inclusiveness.

Seoul’s support for the AOIP is likely to remain more of a rhetorical construct as long as the alliance with Washington is emphasised. At the very least, ASEAN expects the ROK to contribute to sustaining some type of neutrality regarding China. Moreover, a more prudent ROK policy that is anchored by a genuine endorsement of ASEAN Centrality that supports ASEAN as the prevailing regional platform in managing mutual regional challenges would be more acceptable. Such a strategy will strengthen the ROK’s ability to leverage its regional alliances, be it for economic or political advantages when needed.

A need for closer security diplomacy

Outside of economic and social relations, the security relationship has focused predominantly on inter-Korean relations. ASEAN has supported the ROK in advancing a denuclearised Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). Pyongyang’s ongoing nuclear and missile operations have stalled negotiations on this front. Thus far, ASEAN has been left out of the Korean Peninsula security discussions despite the fact that the DPRK is a member of the ASEAN Regional Forum and almost all ASEAN member states enjoy reasonably good relations with the country.

The summits between President Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un in Singapore and Vietnam is an indication that Pyongyang will welcome ASEAN’s participation as a facilitator because it views Southeast Asia as a neutral zone. Like past leaderships, during his visits to the region, President Moon did urge ASEAN member states to support the Korean peninsula peace process.

That said, ASEAN remains a peripheral actor as there has never been a concrete South Korean proposal to include the organisation in any form of inter-Korean discussions or negotiations, especially together with the major powers. It is regrettable as ASEAN has the experience and capacity in conflict management as seen in the Cambodian conflict. When Vietnam invaded Cambodia in 1978, ASEAN internationalised the issue by seeking support from the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), and at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meetings (CHOGM). More importantly, ASEAN’s diplomatic initiatives saw the Association working with external powers like the US and China to thwart a Vietnamese fait accompli. While ASEAN cannot be credited for solving the conflict singlehandedly, nonetheless, it emerged as a credible regional facilitator and negotiator in preventing further escalations. Seen in this context, it would be more pragmatic if the Yoon government invited ASEAN to play a larger, multilateral role in inter-Korean negotiations instead of simply requesting closer cooperation on ROK’s North Korea policy and the nuclear issue as defined in KASI.

Today, ROK and ASEAN share functional and mutually advantageous relations. In order for future relations to be sustainable, the Yoon government should build upon past achievements, seek newer opportunities and, more importantly, view ASEAN as more than a mere subset of a larger construct in the context of an ever-changing Indo Pacific region.

Dr Geetha Govindasamy teaches at the Korea program at the Department of East Asian Studies, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Universiti Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. She has a PhD in International Relations from Monash University, Australia. Her research interests include East Asian international relations, inter-Korean relations, South Korean foreign policy and ASEAN.

This article is published under a Creative Commons License and may be republished with attribution.