India is not choosing sides—it is shaping the regional environment. Five strategic fundamentals are steadily redefining China’s room for manoeuvre in the Indo-Pacific.
India should not be understood as an “ally” in the classic sense, but as an actor that maximises options without hardening them into permanent constraints. This is the grammar of strategic autonomy, which—depending on context—translates for Beijing into both constraints and opportunities: constraints, because it makes it difficult to predict when and how New Delhi will lock in with partners still external to, or even hostile to, China’s sphere of influence; opportunities, because it leaves room for Chinese actions that do not interfere with, or appear hostile to, Indian interests.
This condition is partly paradoxical. Strategic rivalry between the two states has sharpened since the 2020 Ladakh standoff and is now visible both along the Line of Actual Control and across the Indian Ocean, while the broader contest is also unfolding within the evolving Indo-Pacific framework.Yet, economic interdependence remains significant. In FY2024–25 India recorded a trade deficit with China of US$99.2 billionwithinin a total bilateral trade of about US$127.7 billion—an asymmetry that continues to shape policy choices.
Here, the key question is not to ask “which side India is on”, but which five fundamentals drive the recurring action–reaction dynamic between the two actors.
Strategic Autonomy and Multi-Alignment
The first concerns an Indian trajectory that the literature describes as multi-alignment or tepid balancing: a cautious form of balancing that prefers multilateralism, maximising diplomatic outcomes while reducing exposure to systemic vulnerabilities. New Delhi is able to launch partnerships across multiple domains and different strategic poles, while simultaneously maintaining functional relations with competing powers. This unstable equilibrium compels Beijing to continually mediate between two impulses, on the one hand, the messaging of a functional openness aimed at limiting the Quad’s potential and, on the other, using economic leverage to prevent India’s full shift into an overtly anti-China orbit—an issue closely linked to debates on the Quad’s role
The second fundamental concerns the Himalayan border—arguably the most sensitive arena—because it simultaneously carries the possibility of real clashes and serves as a measure of mutual coercive credibility/ Analyses of Sino-Indian military competition and grey-zone tactics, including infrastructure-enabled coercion, highlight how this theatre functions as both a deterrence mechanism and a pressure point.Meetings between senior Sino-Indian military commanders have consequently become routine: maintaining tactical de-escalation to avoid new misunderstandings and incidents, rather than producing a political thaw. These dynamics frame India’s strategic choices amid recurring crises Recent assessments suggest that the border-management framework built around the 1993–96 agreements and subsequent confidence-building protocols has reduced the scope for tactical miscalculation, without producing a political settlement of the boundary dispute.
The third fundamental is geopolitical. For India, Sri Lanka, the Maldives, Bangladesh, and Nepal belong toform an inner protection security belt—but they are also arenas where China operates over the long term through credit, infrastructure, and elite training. Sri Lanka remains emblematic. In 2022, India was the principal source of foreign assistance, with support exceeding US$4 billion, while China—through a Chinese company—controlled the strategically significant port of Hambantota, located near major global routes crossing the Indian Ocean, yet still within India’s perceived security space. That said, many analysts emphasise the convergence between Chinese interests and Sri Lanka’s domestic needs, rather than reading the case exclusively as a targeted strategic move.
The fourth fundamental is connectivity as a form of power. The textbook exmaple is the port of Chabahar in Iran. For India, the project is essential to connect with trade routes toward Central Asia bypassing Pakistan, enabled by a long-term operational contract signed in 2024This exposes New Delhi to U.S. sanctions policy on Iran. However, Washington has granted time-bound waivers for Chabahar-related activity, allowing the project to proceed despite the sanctions regime and underscoring the dossier’s enduring geopolitical significance. Within the same strategic logic—India has aligned itself to the IMEC (India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor) to strengthen connectivity to Europe via the Gulf. The initiative was formalised through a Memorandum of Understanding announced at the G20 inSeptember 2023 by the leaders of the United States, India, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, France, Germany, Italy, and the European Union
The fifth fundamental is systemic: building coalitions functional that serve India’s interestswithout explicitly being framing framed as anti-China. One example is a Quad initiative of clear strategic value, the integrating of commercial satellite data to track maritime activity in near-real-time within partners’ naval zones, including cases where transponders are switched off.
China’s Likely Responses
Within this framework, what should we expect from China? For Beijing, the “India question” is less a direct challenge than a strategic dilemma. Excessive pressure risks pushing India closer to Beijing’s competitors, while excessive patience would allow India to shape regional coalitions and alternative relationships. Beijing’s default posture, therefore, is a multi-level, risk-averse equilibrium. Consistent with this approach, Chinese diplomacy keeps bilateral channels open to prevent rigid alignments; routine commander-level talks on the Himalayan dossier illustrate a case in point—managing friction procedurally, without political concessions. Militarily, China will likely continue consolidating positions along the Line of Actual Control, emphasising deterrence while avoiding escalation. Economically, interdependence remains a tacit constraint: China’s competitive advantage can elicit Indian accommodation, but overt coercion would trigger backlash, including from the Indian public. Regionally, while open confrontation appears unlikely, but competition over infrastructure and influence across South Asia will probably persist, particularly along corridors positioned as alternatives to the Belt and Road Initiative.For China, the central issue is not—at least for now—preventing India’s rise as a global power, but containing India’s influence where converging interests erode Chinese primacy.
Stefano Gujon is an independent analyst and writer focused on geopolitical risk, information operations, and Indo-Pacific strategy.
This article is published under a Creative Commons License and may be republished with attribution.
