Beyond the initiative’s obvious aim of securing the US’ and its allies’ economic position in the AI Cold War with China, Pax Silica can potentially alter regional security architectures – as in the case of the Philippines.
Washington’s Pax Silica seeks to establish a US-aligned global technology supply chain network to compete with Beijing. The initiative was officially inaugurated on 12 December 2025 together with Japan, South Korea, Singapore, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and Australia – the list of participating countries has since grown to 25. The initiative envisions a comprehensive technology supply chain network linking participating countries’ industries: rare-earth mineral extraction and refining capabilities, advanced semiconductor manufacturing, and establishing linked logistical and digital infrastructure. Beyond the initiative’s obvious aim of securing the US’ and its allies’ economic position in the AI Cold War with China, Pax Silica can potentially alter regional security architectures – particularly, in the case of the Philippines.
Supply Lines for the AI Cold War
At its core, Pax Silica aims to enhance the economic security of its members by establishing resilient strategic supply lines for semiconductor manufacturing and AI-related technology and linking their competitive advantages to counter Beijing’s rapidly expanding tech industry. Washington signalled its intent to compete with its CHIPS and Science Act in 2022 under the Biden administration, which sought to develop the US semiconductor industry. Arguably, Pax Silica is a logical corollary to Washington’s efforts to stay ahead of Beijing in their technological competition. Washington is taking the first-mover advantage in securing official cooperation from critical countries through a single multilateral institution across the global technological supply chain.
Although the initiative is still in its infancy and a comprehensive picture of the supply structure is far from complete to be fully parsed, official statements issued by the US Department of State and the competitive advantages in the tech industry of participating states provide insights into its envisioned paradigm. For instance, several of the participating countries are already critical junctures in global semiconductor production: Taiwan’s Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) produces 90% of the world’s advanced chips; the Netherlands’s ASM Holding has a production monopoly on extreme ultraviolet (EUV) lithography equipment used for advanced transistor manufacturing; and Japan’s Shin-Etsu Chemical and SUMCO Corporation produce approximately half of global silicon wafers used for advanced electronics. By institutionalising cooperation among these countries, the US is not only securing its own manufacturing supply lines but also influencing China’s industrial access to these technologies.
Official statements from the US Department of State also emphasise the importance of critical minerals and rare earths supply and refining in the Pax Silica’s envisioned paradigm and note it as a salient vulnerability in the global technology supply chain. As noted under the initiative’s 2026 Critical Mineral Ministerial last February, critical minerals and rare earths’ ‘…market is highly concentrated, leaving it a tool of political coercion and supply chain disruption, putting our core interests at risk.’ This statement alludes to the fact that China controls 60% of the world’s rare earth supplies and holds a near-monopoly on refining capacity – dominance it has previously used for economic coercion against both Japan and the US. It is expected that the US will seek to secure alternative supply markets – such as the Philippines – for these materials to ensure the resilience of the envisioned Pax Silica initiative.
In sum, if the establishment of Pax Silica succeeds, the US-aligned coalition will have created an end-to-end technology supply chain that can not only curtail Beijing’s technological expansion but also remain fully insulated from Chinese politico-economic interference.
Beyond Securing Supply Lines
On 16 April 2026, US Under Secretary for Economic Affairs Jacob Helberg announced the Philippines’ official inclusion in the Pax Silica initiative. The same day, a US Department of State communiqué outlined plans for a 16.2 km² Economic Security Zone in New Clark City, Tarlac – the initiative’s first infrastructure project. The project aims to leverage the Philippines’ vast critical mineral reserves, existing electronics manufacturing sector, and geostrategic proximity to other Pax Silica participants, such as Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea, through a series of infrastructure projects for semiconductor manufacturing and AI technology development.
According to a recent Philippine Senate hearing on Pax Silica held on 14 August 2026, the project is expected to generate approximately 200,000 direct jobs, attract roughly USD 70 billion in investment over the next decade, and facilitate technology transfer in advanced semiconductor manufacturing – providing significant momentum in developing the country’s tech industry.
More importantly, the Philippines’ inclusion in the Pax Silica initiative can significantly shift its role in the regional security architecture. The envisioned supply chain resilience of Pax Silica – a stable supply of critical minerals and rare earths, and control over key junctures in manufacturing processes – is irrelevant if the maritime trade routes linking these countries remain vulnerable. The proposed Philippine infrastructure project will position the country as a critical node in the Pax Silica supply chain, necessitating that the US and its allies ensure freedom of navigation along the country’s maritime trade routes, particularly in the South China Sea – which accounts for a third of international maritime shipping – and its surrounding chokepoints. Ensuring the integrity of these trade routes and regional stability will require Washington and its allies to further entrench themselves in Manila’s ongoing maritime territorial dispute with Beijing in the South China Sea to deter potential Chinese aggression. China’s assertive maritime posture, compounded by its well-established anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities and significant military presence, poses a clear and present threat to regional maritime security.
In recent years, Manila has made significant headway in enhancing its security ties and defence cooperation with the US and other allies – such as Japan, South Korea, and Australia – in maintaining regional security. As seen in Taiwan’s successes with its “Chip Diplomacy” in recent years, the Philippines is now well-positioned to leverage its inclusion in Pax Silica by translating its emerging economic significance into deeper defence commitments with other countries to further its national security interests.
Karl Ragas is an international strategic marketing consultant specialising in Southeast Asia and a graduate student in International Security and Development at Jagiellonian University in Kraków. Upon finishing his undergraduate degree in Applied Economics from De La Salle University, he pursued a master’s degree in International Relations and National Security and a graduate degree in Project Management from Curtin University, Australia. His master’s dissertation examined the theoretical foundations of hybrid warfare and its application in Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea.
He has contributed to Future Directions International, the Australian Institute of International Affairs’ Australian Outlook, and the Lowy Institute’s The Interpreter. His current research interests encompass strategic studies, alliance formation, and defence policy.
This article is published under Creative Commons License and may be republished with attribution.
