Australia seems to have taken a more deliberative approach towards research security, which is likely to require Australian institutions to adopt more counterintelligence approaches in their work.
Internationalised Research in a Contested Geopolitical World
Over the past few months, research security has become of heightened interest in Australia. In March 2026, the Education Minister repeatedly warned the Foreign Minister about foreign collaborations with Iran, Russia, and North Korea. A few months later, the Australian Research Council (ARC) published a research security framework to guide its grant-award decisions. At the same time, the Education Minister refused thirteen ARC grants because of issues pertaining to Australia’s national security, defence or international relations. Then only a week ago, the Foreign Minister exercised rarely-used foreign relations powers to cancel agreements between the prestigious Australian National University (ANU) and the University of Queensland (UQ) respectively. The Foreign Minister has also introduced legislation to Parliament that will permit ASIO to perform covert security assessments on university deals.
Australia has been taking steps to embed the national interest as a precondition to academic collaborations. Those steps will likely require universities to become more comfortable with engaging in counterinfluence and counterintelligence – either on their own or in conjunction with the government. This poses the question, however, of where the next steps lie in achieving a result that effectively balances research security, national security and academic freedom.
Defending Australia’s Research from Foreign Intelligence and Interference
Earlier this month, the Foreign Minister terminated two Australian university partnerships with Chinese universities on national security grounds. Those cancellations were effected under the Foreign Relations (State and Territory Arrangements) Act 2020, legislation which allows the Foreign Minister to cancel arrangements contrary to Australian foreign policy. Wong’s cancellation of two key partnerships (one between ANU and Shandong University, and one between UQ and the Chinese Academy of Sciences) are the first under this Act to Australian universities. They are also highly significant because they frame the Minister’s decision around research cooperations contrary to Australia’s foreign policy and national security. Some reporting suggests that the detention of Australian academics in China had something to do with these decisions.
Not surprisingly, China responded with consternation, accusing the Australian government of ‘overstretching the concept of national security to restrict and suppress normal cooperation’. Australian universities then announced that they would comply with the government’s directives, while some voicing fears of critique of the risk of overreach.
It is noteworthy that Australia’s tougher stance on academic collaboration is in response to the US Department of War’s blacklisting of foreign academic institutions in China, Iran and Russia on national security grounds and announcing a national audit of domestic research collaborations with blacklisted foreign academic institutions. Australia’s tightening of research security appears – at least in part – to be driven by a desire to align research security across its Five Eyes allies. Those concerns are taking up increasingly importance given the intended joint development and fielding of advanced military technologies under AUKUS Pillar 2including artificial intelligence, underseas robotics, quantum technology and hypersonics.
ASIO Counterintelligence and research security
Under current Australian law, ASIO can only perform a security assessment in relation to ‘prescribed administrative action’, which includes a variety of decisions made by Australian government departments. Similarly, ASIO must notify the person (including a university) who is the subject of the security assessment where the advice is ‘adverse’ or ‘qualified’. However, the amendments before Parliament exempt Australia’s foreign arrangements legislation from these requirements. This means ASIO can perform a security assessment of a university research project or collaboration, in secret, and inform the Foreign Minister so he or she can exercise their foreign arrangements powers.
Further, changes proposed by the Opposition will embed a ‘national interest’ test into the foreign arrangements legislation, whilst also requiring universities ‘to identify research projects conducted by researchers they employ or engage who are working with researchers “employed or engaged by foreign entities’’’. Those requirements will push universities to undertake more enquiries of their researchers: what they are working on, and who they are working with.
Earlier this year, we published research on the impending rise of counterintelligence in the higher education environment. We concluded that our Five Eyes allies (the US, UK, Canada, and New Zealand) are pushing universities towards actions more associated with counterintelligence operations: screening, monitoring, and enforcement. At the same time, we recognised the need for higher education counterintelligence to be bespoke in nature so as to protect academic freedom, innovative development, and global collaborations.
Previously, screening and vetting of research was usually done by the government, and by ASIO in only the riskiest of cases. These new legislative amendments put universities on notice that they are now required to take a much stronger counterintelligence stance than at any time in their past. And this isn’t limited only to Australia – the US continues to struggle with research security and counterintelligence obligations even despite numerous Congressional inquiries which have demonstrated foreign interference in even the most prestigious universities. Otherwise, the scientific and technological advancements being publicly funded may result in technologies being acquired by authoritarian countries for military or weapons development.
The recent decisions by Australia’s government to become more involved in research security has seismic implications for the higher education sector. University Chancellors, Councils, and executives will no longer be able to claim ignorance of the geopolitics of their institutions. Nor can researchers honestly believe that every collaboration will be a “good” collaboration. Instead, universities will need to develop, enhance, and maintain their ability to protect themselves from foreign interference and influence – or the government is likely to do it for them, and they may not enjoy the experience.
Sascha-Dominik (Dov) Bachmann is a Professor in Law at Canberra Law School, University of Canberra. Extraordinary Reader (Docent) in War Studies, Swedish Defence University (FHS), Stockholm; he was a Fellow at NATO SHAPE, Hybrid War, and Lawfare Pacific until 2025 and is a Research Fellow with The Department of Strategic Studies, Faculty of Military Science, Stellenbosch University.
Dr Brendan Walker-Munro is A/Prof (Law) with the Faculty of Business, Law & the Arts at Australia’s Southern Cross University. Brendan’s focus is on “research security”, the use of law and policy to protect university research from national security threats such as espionage, foreign interference, hacking, and technology transfer.
This article is published under a Creative Commons License and may be republished with attribution.
