Vladimir Putin’s grand strategy to gain control of Ukraine has degenerated into an inextricable military morass and a vicious cycle of sunk costs. He has entangled Russian society in an endless war that he cannot win and cannot afford to end. Like a fly caught in amber, Putin rules over a rigid war economy he dare not dismantle and a political landscape that’s slipping out of his control. He has no viable way forward to a total victory and cannot pull back or accept a compromise without facing catastrophic repercussions, political instability, and a collapse of Russia’s economy.
For him, the war has become a means of governing rather than an instrument of foreign policy. As a mechanism for marshalling society, Putin uses the war to justify repression, censorship, restrictions on communication, the movement of individuals and goods. To end it would mean pulling apart an apparatus that is now the central organising force of his regime. To maintain it means to further ossify a regime system that is already brittle and dependent upon conflict in order to prevail.
He has taken Russia hostage and will need to exploit the country further if he hopes to see himself through the inevitable instability that lies ahead. He rules over the most sanctioned country in the world. Its technological and economic deficit versus the West has been a long-standing material fact. Since the beginning of the war R&D-to-GDP ratio has deteriorated only further. A state of affairs that can be in great part attributed to Putin’s political purge and suppression of Russia’s intellectual and scientific community.
While the average wage in Russia is now over 70% higher since the beginning of the war, annual inflation has eaten into the cost of living at a rate of almost 10%. Last year, The Moscow Times reported that the country’s financial reserves of the national welfare fund were on track to run out by the end of 2026. Several large Russian banks have also warned they might need emergency funding this year.
As major banks seek relief, direct foreign investment (FDI) has dropped to its lowest level in 15 years. This deleveraging has turned the Russian market into an isolated fortress-state while its economy becomes more import-dependent. Compounded by haemorrhaging capital flight, high borrowing costs, and budget deficits, the structural strain on the economy is reaching an exhaustion point.
Putin’s quest for strategic dominance has, dichotomously, isolated Russia and lowered its geopolitical status – leaving it to rely on allies like North Korea and Iran. In desperation, he is forced to turn to China for 90% of its sanctioned high-tech and war-critical technology needs.
Russia’s dependency on China for semiconductors, lasers, and telecommunications networks, etc. has turned its “partnership” with the PRC into a near-total reliance.
“The seeds of their own destruction”
If Putin decides to abandon his egregious conditions for a truce and accept an agreement that allows him to claim some face-saving victory, it could still undo him. The opportunity costs of war are steep and result in fractal out-turns. War spending does not represent final goods and does not generate more funds. Investments do not produce sustainable economic growth. The government would have to step back from being the primary consumer and enterprises would need to adjust their business models to responding to market signals rather than filling state orders.
A demobilisation from war would plunge his economy in total chaos. The pivot back to a peacetime economy takes years. Retooling factories to service consumer markets requires time and funding. Workers have to be re-trained. New supply chains have to be built or reconfigured – upstream and downstream. During the time lag many workers and veterans would find themselves displaced – bitter and broken.
Oligarchs would see their defence related assets devalued and demand mechanisms for new graft and corruption streams. Dismantling the war economy will be resisted by the elite, particularly, the security services. A sea-change in the economy could potentially set off an internal power struggle.
Several major corporations have established private militias. Presumably, these units protect company assets and can be counted upon as a reserve force available for deployment to Ukraine.
However, their true objectives remain vague. Further, the number of ethnic and mercenary paramilitary groups have grown rapidly. Since they officially operate as “volunteers” under the Ministry of Defence, their actual mission remains undefined and their loyalties appear opaque.
At the moment, the possibility of any large-scale civil uprising appears remote. But in unstable environments the potential for conflict is ever present. These events are spontaneous. They happen when they happen. The enthusiastic reception that greeted Yevgeny Prigozhin in Rostov during his short-lived rebellion in 2023 may have been an example of history as prelude.
Russian national identity is a “vast construct” extending over long historical timelines and multitudinous ethnic and cultural components. Conflicts between regions, political movements, social divisions, ethnic and power clans have the potential to kindle grievances and incite action. As the war effort erodes the regime’s ability to provide employment, social services, maintain critical infrastructure, and protect its own citizens from attacks – the state’s legitimacy withers. Systems cannot tolerate voids.
By all accounts, Putin has no intension of backing down. He either understands that a demobilisation is not an option, or he is delusional in thinking that a victory over Ukraine is achievable. A third belief is that with China’s material support he can outlast, not just Ukraine, but the entire NATO alliance.
In an amber dome, of his own choosing, Putin rues the fall of the Soviet empire. He sits frozen in a living moment trapped in a strategic disaster he can neither win nor from which, he can safely withdraw.
Dr Jack Jarmon served as USAID Technical Advisor for the Russian government during the mid 1990s. He has taught international relations at the University of Pennsylvania and Rutgers University where he was Associate Director and Research Professor at the Command Control and Interoperability Center for Advanced Data Analysis. He is currently editorial board member and contributor at PostPravda.info, a Ukrainian and Polish news organisation.
This article is published under a Creative Commons License and may be republished with attribution.
