In the third year of Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine, the war has shifted to a brutal test of endurance. Each side is fighting for not just territory, but for legacy.
The Australian Institute of International Affairs Queensland welcomed Peter Tesch: Former Australian Ambassador to Russia and Adjunct Professor in the School of Languages and Culture at the University of Queensland for a night of discussion.
From the Kremlin’s invasion of Ukraine to its growing alignment with authoritarian regimes, Mr Tesch asks a question with far-reaching implications: is the international community dealing with Vladimir Putin or a Russia problem?
Mr Tesch argued that focusing solely on President Vladimir Putin risks overlooking the deeper, structural and cultural forces driving Moscow’s expansion into Western Europe, particularly the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Drawing on decades of diplomatic and academic experience, he examined Russia’s history, political culture and strategic ambitions, warning that the challenge may endure well beyond Putin’s tenure in power.
“He who controls the past controls the future”
Mr Tesch argued that Vladimir Putin has set Russia on a course to restore its former greatness known as Eternal Russia. This doctrine is characterised by enduring traits found in the nation’s history of authoritarianism, spiritualism, exceptionalism, and internal convulsion.
Authoritarianism is expressed through a state-centric and militaristic system rooted in the legacies of former rulers. In an interview in the days after the 2022 Russia’s invasion of Ukraine – Minister of Foreign Affairs to Russia, Sergei Lavrov said, “Putin has three advisors: Ivan the Terrible, Peter the Great and Catherine the Great” who all embodied despotic control. This is in reference to when Ivan the Terrible subdued the Tatars, thus establishing Moscow’s power and authority. While “Catherine’s territorial acquisitions (in Poland, the Lithuanian Commonwealth, former areas of Ukraine and the Caucasus) are particularly pertinent in the situation we find ourselves in today.” This is evidence of Putin’s vision for the future of Russia, with rebuilding the former Russian Empire at the forefront.
Spiritualism continues through the Russian Orthodox Church, which holds a near monopoly over religious life. While it can be argued that faith competes with Putin’s politics, also vying for power and status, they have a symbiotic relationship together. The Patriarch – who is the highest authority in the Russian Orthodox Church – legitimises the state’s policies and lends moral authority with its God ordained position with the responsibility of preserving the True Faith after the fall of Rome and the Sack of Constantinople. Mr Tesch referred to a poem from Fyodor Tyutchev:
Russia cannot be fathomed with the mind; she knows no measurable bounds; she possesses a singular quality; one can only believe in Russia.
“It really does get to this ultimate position where when you set aside logic, you simply have to have faith” and “you must believe in Russia, that there is a greater force at work” Mr Tesch said. Consequently, spiritualism plays a major part in Russian identity, with nationalism in Russian roughly translating to a “deep spiritual belonging.” This close relationship between Church and state feeds into Russia’s sense of exceptionalism, reinforcing the belief that the nation has a unique, divinely sanctioned role in history and the international order.
Exceptionalism has long defined Russia’s worldview, casting the nation as the “bulwark of civilisation” and entrusted with maintaining the “repository of superior values by divine decree.” This idea is embodied in the concept of Dyerzhava, a term connoting a great power or superpower status, derived from the verb “to hold after an act of seizing” – a reminder of Russia’s identity as something seized and defended. “The Cult of 1945” – victory over Nazi Germany – has been instrumental in legitimising Putin’s rule and expansionist foreign policy. The narrative of exceptionalism also draws on past grievances, framing Russia as “unrequited, slighted and opposed.” As Tsar Alexander III famously declared “Russia only has two allies: her army and navy,” a line that Putin himself quoted in 2015, warning that “all others fear our vastness and, at the first opportunity, will unite against us.” Yet this deep-rooted sense of exceptionalism is paired with a recurring pattern of upheaval – cycles of crisis and collapse that have come to define Russia’s convulsions throughout history.
Lastly, convulsion is a defining feature of Russia’s history, marked by cycles of upheaval, collapse and reinvention that continues to shape national identity and political trajectory. Mr Tesch highlighted the instability before Putin’s rise to power in 2000, the early 1900s brought the humiliating defeat to Japan in 1905, resulting in the destruction of the Imperial Russian Navy at the Battle of Tsushima. This was followed by the devastation of World War I, the abdication of Tsar Nicholas II in 1917, and the Bolshevik Coup later that same year. Under Stalin, the Great Terror unleashed purges against society, his own party and even institutions including the military, while World War II caused significant losses on both soldiers and civilians. The post-war era too, was marred by recurring turbulence and internal convulsions. This included the East Berlin Workers Uprising, the suppression of reformists movements in Czechoslovakia, “Western fermented” colour revolutions that took over former Soviet states such as Kyrgyzstan, Georgia and the first Maidan in Ukraine. Given this tragic history, loss has become an enduring threat in Russia’s lived experience. According to Soviet archives, the state executed approximately 800,000 people for crimes, real or perceived, from 1921 to 1953. “Those are numbers that defy comprehension in our complacent, benign environment” Mr Tesch observed, stressing the importance of recognising that “what deters us does not necessarily deter others.” Though such a tragic past, loss has etched itself into the very fabric of Russia’s lived experience – a truth that continues to shape the nation’s present identity – a truth highlighted by Vladimir Putin, who described the collapse of the Soviet Union as “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century.” This shows how historical convulsions continue to shape Russia’s worldviews and ambitions.
What does Russia want?
One of the primary goals of the Kremlin is to create a multipolar global order and end United States hegemony and restore their sphere of influence.
“Putin believes that the United States is a decaying entity, and Russia, in connivance with China, can supplant it,” Mr Tesch said.
He highlighted that the desire to restore Russia to its former glory is personal to Putin, with the leader turning 73 in 2025. This is evident in his speech in the Munich Security Conference in 2005, “… a unipolar world… is a world in which there is one master, one sovereign. And at the end of the day this is pernicious.” In other words, Putin is seeking to achieve the same greatness as his predecessors once did, which is “a past imperial glory, that I think is unrecoverable and that neo-imperialism lies in the heart of the challenge we face in dealing with contemporary Russia.”
Goals of Russian active measures and information operations
Foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) is an area where the Kremlin is highly skilled and deeply experienced, and one in which Australia faces ongoing challenges. Mr Tesch believes that Russia poses a greater threat than China, not because it is infallible, but because it understands how to exploit the inherent dissonance and division within democracies to undermine the government’s legitimacy. While capable of serious misjudgements – as seen in Putin’s mistaken belief that Ukraine would fall within four or five days – Russia has consistently shown its ability to sow instability and uncertainty in adversary nations. One of the most prominent events of FIMI in action is the interference of the US Presidential Election in 2016. Russian objectives were to undermine the confidence of Americans in their electoral system by sabotaging Hilary Clinton, boosting the campaign of Donald Trump and increasing political and social discord as a result. Additionally, Mr Tesch warned of Russian disinformation infecting artificial intelligence chatbots with 10 leading chat bots repeating Kremlin disinformation 33 per cent of the time. As Tesch notes, Russia’s disinformation campaigns are not simply background noise, but deliberate statecraft, specifically to weaken adversaries from within. For Australia, this poses a direct challenge: we are not only on the periphery of Russia’s ambitions but firmly situated in what Moscow considers the “adversary camp.” Understanding how Russia projects power through manipulation and distortion is therefore essential to grasping the scale of the threat Canberra must contend with.
Australia’s challenge with Russia
Australia’s challenges with Russia cannot be viewed in isolation, Mr Tesch argued, as they have forged relationships and form part of alliances. “Australia has not been an ‘either or’ player,” he said, but now it needs a “reawakening” to the fact that Europe matters. Europe accounts for 15 per cent of global GDP and is the third largest provider of overseas development assistance in the Indo-Pacific, making it a critical partner in balancing Russian influence and supporting regional stability. By strengthening ties with Europe, Australia not only broadens its own strategic choices but also helps ensure that European partners retain options “when they come under pressure from China.” Mr Tesch also believes that Australia needs to strengthen its vulnerabilities especially with space, cyber, infrastructure and energy security. He said, “They [Russia] are exploiting vulnerabilities – we have seen sabotage against seabed infrastructure in the Baltic Sea with both energy and telecommunications. For a country like Australia, which is almost overwhelmingly dependent on seabed infrastructure, this is a source of alarm.” Ultimately, standing up to Russia means Australia must recognise Europe as an essential partner while remaining self-reliant to safeguard global stability.
Russia’s path under Vladimir Putin is shaped by deep historical currents—authoritarianism, spiritualism, exceptionalism and convulsion—that continue to drive its ambitions and destabilising behaviour. From the Kremlin’s weaponisation of disinformation to its quest to upend the global order, these traits pose challenges not only for Europe and Ukraine but for Australia as well. As Peter Tesch argued, Canberra cannot afford indifference: the contest with Russia reaches our shores through information warfare, strategic pressure and the choices of our allies. Meeting this challenge demands not only vigilance at home but also renewed partnerships abroad—especially with Europe, whose resilience and resolve remain central to countering Moscow’s reach.
Edited by Deborah Bouchez
Written by Chloe Leung
Currently in her third year of a double degree in Communications/Journalism and International Relations at Griffith University, Chloe Leung is passionate about intersectionality in global development – particularly centring the voices of marginalised communities.
