Australian Outlook

In this section

Will the Centre Hold? A look at Europe at the Start of the New European Commission’s Term

05 Dec 2024
By Dr Ivana Damjanovic
European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen came to the European Parliament in Brussels to deliver her first State of the European Union address. Source: European Parliament / https://t.ly/4XjtI

A new European Commission—the executive arm of the European Union, which proposes and implements EU law—has just been approved, starting the second term of Ursula von der Leyen as the Commission’s President. Amid external pressures, the rise of populist parties and political fragmentation, can her Commission provide much-needed leadership and direction for Europe?

Much has happened since the European Parliament’s elections in June. A victory for the centrist parties (European People’s Party, the Socialists, and the Renew liberals), the new composition of the Parliament reflects the consistent rise of Eurosceptic parties. A pragmatic approach, aimed at ensuring continuity and stability, first led to the reappointment of Ursula von der Leyen as the European Commission’s president with the European Council’s and Parliament’s support, and after much political manoeuvring, also of her College of Commissioners.

Von der Leyen’s Commission is the result of the deal between the three major centrist groups who pledged to adopt “a constructive approach” in working together, with the combined support from archconservatives on the right to the Greens on the left. This gives hope that a workable pro-European centre can prevail, but can it also be effective?

The re-election of Donald Trump spells bad news for Europe, which is bracing for the prospect of a strained transatlantic relationship and wider strategic and economic impacts of his policies. Internally, the political erosion is not limited to the EU; it is also manifested in the Member States, with deepening polarisation between the right and the left, and the “thinning” of the centre, from the South to the North. The most worrying is the decline of the centrist parties in Germany and France, the EU’s strongholds. France faces political uncertainty following the no-confidence vote against Prime Minister Michel Barnier and his centre-right government. Germany will be heading to federal elections early next year, following the collapse of Olaf Scholz’s centre-left coalition. Its divisive political landscape makes consensus building increasingly complex.

The lack of consensus already manifests itself in the lack of leadership and direction at a time when Europe needs decisive action. Disagreements between Germany and France on how Europe should protect itself from global threats are driven by domestic politics, but is von der Leyen’s authority sufficient to generate a sense of urgency and much-needed European consensus?

More central power and engagement with citizens

The structure of the new Commission will strengthen von der Leyen’s position at the top of the College of 27 Commissioners (one per Member State) introducing a more streamlined hierarchy with fewer layers of command. Von der Leyen has also managed to accommodate “problematic” Member States by assigning their candidates to less important portfolios (e.g. Hungary’s candidate to health and animal welfare), thus securing their support while downplaying their influence.

The European Commission represents the hardcore of EU bureaucracy, and is either unknown to most voters, or detested by populist voters. Results of elections across Europe demonstrate deep discontent with EU and national policies, including migration, the declining welfare state (often seen as interrelated), energy and climate change, economic stagnation, cost of living pressures, and even support for Ukraine. The rise of extreme parties and populist politicians demonstrates the same anti-establishment attitude witnessed in the recent US elections.

Von der Leyen seeks to breach this gap through more citizen engagement and better integration into the Commission’s work. However, it remains unclear how exactly that would be achieved. The Commission will have to do better in explaining lengthy reports that provide the roadmap for its policies, in particular the 400-page-long Draghi report on EU competitiveness and the Letta report on the future of the Single Market. It is also important that the Commission coordinates and facilitates more, and regulates less, providing more leeway to the Member States, in line with the principle of subsidiarity.

From geopolitics to security

In 2019, Von der Leyen’s Commission endorsed a narrative of geopolitics and “strategic autonomy” in EU external relations. This vision of geopolitical power implied economic power and EU regulatory standards, not military means. This Commission envisages a transformation of the EU into a security actor, focusing particularly on European defence. The idea being to leverage the EU Single Market to support the defence industry, not to replace NATO. A newly established Commissioner for Defence and Space should serve this purpose.

The establishment of the new position does not mean that the EU will have a common army. Rather, the efforts will focus on overcoming fragmentation of the EU defence industrial sector, the implementation of the common defence industrial strategy, promoting collaborative projects, and joint procurement. Its success will ultimately depend on financial means and the willingness of Member States to contribute more defence funding in the new EU budget, at the expense of other policies, such as cohesion or even agriculture. Issuing common defence bonds has also been proposed. However, these are complex and sensitive issues that will require significant political manoeuvring.

From European Green Deal to Clean Industrial Deal

The first von der Leyen Commission came to office on a wave of climate change activism and ambition, promising a “brave new green world” in the form of the European Green Deal (EGD). The appetite for climate policies has declined, and European farmers have protested about low food prices, creeping environmental regulations, and EU trade agreements (e.g. with Mercosur). Green parties have been the biggest losers from elections, reflecting voter dissatisfaction with how the green movement has shaped its agenda.

However, the second Von der Leyen Commission will abandon the EGD. It will instead emphasise economic rather than environmental benefits of the green transition, aligning decarbonisation with competitiveness. The idea of the Clean Industrial Deal is to foster competitive industries, clean technologies, and circular economy to support the EU’s economic growth and autonomy, and simplification of bureaucratic procedures to lower the compliance burden of EU regulations. The new Commission will likely be focused on implementing and reviewing the adopted EGD legislative acts, which have already delegated significant power to the Commission, rather than insisting on new regulations. The digitalisation of the EU economy, which has also seen substantial progress during the previous legislature, will remain equally important to the Commission’s agenda.

The new Commission could be more inward-looking and less willing to pursue classical trade agreements. The challenge for the Commission will be to facilitate consensus between divergent German and French “foreign economic policy” visions on key issues. This includes the Draghi Report’s proposal for joint borrowing to fund additional annual investment needs (estimated at over 800 billion euro – five percent of EU GDP), which Germany does not support; the EU’s approach to trading with China, which is an important export market for Germany but not France; and the trade agreement with Mercosur, which Germany sees as an important strategic move to secure the EU presence in Latin America, but is vehemently opposed by French farmers.

Following the re-election of Donald Trump, there is no doubt that Europe must boost its competitiveness and, even more existentially, take more responsibility for its security. The narrative is there but the sense of urgency is still lacking. Ursula von der Leyen and her new Commission will have to act quickly to foster a minimum European consensus on how to get the EU’s act together.

Dr Ivana Damjanovic is a Senior Lecturer at the Canberra Law School and a Visiting Research Fellow at the ANU Centre for European Studies. This research is supported by the Erasmus+ Programme of the European Commission: 101047753 – OzEUGG – ERASMUS-JMO-2021-HEI-TECH-RSCH. The views expressed are solely those of the author and are independent of sources providing support.

This review is published under a Creative Commons Licence and may be republished with attribution.