The UAE’s decision to license satellite broadband should be read as more than a telecommunications development. It demonstrates how states can strengthen digital resilience by diversifying the physical routes on which their economies, governments and critical infrastructure depend.
On 28 August 2026, the United Arab Emirates’ Telecommunications and Digital Government Regulatory Authority (TDRA) granted SpaceX’s Starlink Satellite Communications LLC a ten-year General Space Services Licence, authorising it to establish and operate a public satellite communications network and provide broadband satellite internet services in the country. The announcement matters not because satellites are about to replace terrestrial or undersea infrastructure, but because they add another route to a national system that increasingly depends on uninterrupted connectivity.
That distinction is strategically important. The global digital economy still depends overwhelmingly on infrastructure most users never see. The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) says submarine telecommunications cables carry more than 99 per cent of international data traffic. Financial transactions, cloud services, government communications, logistics systems and critical business operations all rely on these physical arteries beneath the oceans. They are efficient and indispensable, but indispensable infrastructure can also become a strategic vulnerability.
Connectivity Has Become National Infrastructure
The traditional view of internet connectivity as a commercial telecommunications service is no longer sufficient. Modern states cannot separate connectivity from national resilience. Government services, ports, airports, hospitals, energy companies, financial institutions, emergency authorities and increasingly AI-enabled systems depend on continuous access to digital networks. A serious communications failure therefore does not remain a telecommunications problem for long; it can quickly become an economic, security and governance problem.
This is especially relevant in regions where geography intersects with geopolitical competition. The Gulf offers a clear illustration. Recent disruption around the Strait of Hormuz has again shown how dependence on narrow physical corridors can expose entire sectors to strategic pressure. Reuters reported on 28 August that Gulf states are accelerating investment in alternative energy and trade routes to reduce reliance on the chokepoint. The lesson is broader than shipping or energy: where critical flows depend on a small number of routes, resilience requires alternatives.
The same logic applies to data. This does not mean assuming that a particular cable will be attacked. Cable faults can result from anchoring, fishing, natural hazards, ageing infrastructure or other accidents. The more useful security question is what happens when disruption occurs at the same time as geopolitical tension, restricted access or delayed repair. Undersea cable routes can become geopolitical chokepoints because international connectivity is often concentrated along a limited number of routes and landing points; traffic and repairs may also depend on jurisdictions, landing stations or infrastructure outside the country itself. The ITU’s 2026 International Advisory Body on Submarine Cable Resilience specifically warns that concentration along limited cable routes and geographic chokepoints can create systemic vulnerabilities when disruptions occur. Resilience planning should therefore focus on consequences, not depend on correctly predicting the cause.
From Redundancy to Strategy
The UAE’s regulatory approach makes this case particularly interesting. Earlier in August, TDRA renewed the licences of the country’s main telecommunications operators with explicit requirements covering network resilience, backup capacity and international connectivity. Licensees are required to geographically diversify international connections through multiple terrestrial systems and submarine cables, aiming to eliminate single points of failure and maintain tested disaster-recovery mechanisms.
The Starlink licence fits naturally within this initiative set by the UAE. Satellite broadband creates a new communications layer that is physically different from terrestrial fibre and submarine cables. If one layer is disrupted, another may preserve at least part of the connectivity required for critical functions. That is not substitution; it is diversification.
Nor are satellites invulnerable. European Union Agency for Cybersecurity’s assessment of low-Earth-orbit satellite communications identifies threats across user, control, gateway and satellite-specific segments, while NOAA’s Space Weather Prediction Center notes that severe space weather can disrupt satellite operations, radio communications and navigation. Satellite systems also create operational, commercial and regulatory dependencies of their own. Moving dependence from the seabed to space would therefore simply exchange one concentration risk for another. The objective should instead be layered connectivity: submarine cables, terrestrial fibre, mobile networks, satellite systems, redundant data centres and alternative routing arrangements designed to support one another.
A Wider Lesson for Digital States
The UAE case offers a wider lesson for governments pursuing digital transformation. Many states still measure digital progress mainly through speed, coverage, service adoption and the number of transactions moved online. Those indicators matter, but highly digital societies must ask an additional question: how well does the system continue to function when something goes wrong? The OECD’s 2025 report on communication-network resilience stresses that societies are increasingly dependent on connectivity and highlights redundancy, diversity, disaster preparedness and business continuity as core elements of network resilience.
The more successful a country becomes at digitalisation, the greater the consequences of connectivity failure. This creates a paradox: digital transformation increases efficiency while also increasing dependence on the infrastructure that makes that efficiency possible. Telecommunications resilience therefore deserves the same strategic attention traditionally given to energy, water and transport security.
That means mapping dependencies, identifying geographic and technological concentration, establishing alternative routes, testing emergency communications and determining which services must remain operational during severe network disruption. It also requires cooperation across government, telecom operators, satellite providers, ports, energy companies, financial institutions and emergency authorities. Digital resilience cannot be delivered by a telecommunications regulator alone because digital failure does not respect institutional boundaries.
The Next Chokepoint May Be Digital
For much of modern strategic planning, states have focused on securing physical routes for energy, trade and transportation. The next phase must include the routes through which data travels. The significance of the UAE’s latest move is therefore larger than Starlink. It reflects a principle that other digital states should consider: do not wait for a chokepoint to fail before building an alternative.
Submarine cables will remain the backbone of international connectivity. Satellites will increasingly complement them, while terrestrial networks continue to connect both. The strategic advantage will belong to countries that understand that these systems should not compete with one another but reinforce one another. In an age of geopolitical uncertainty, the safest internet connection may not simply be the fastest one. It may be the one with another route available when the first route disappears.
Abdulla Saeed Alhebsi is a UAE-based security, risk and leadership practitioner, independent researcher, and author. His work focuses on security governance, institutional resilience, risk management, leadership, heritage security, and the implications of emerging technologies for national and organisational security.
This article is published under a Creative Commons License and may be republished with attribution.
