The 14 May election in Türkiye shocked many analysts who believed the opposition candidate, Kemal Kilicdaroglu, would defeat the incumbent President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. For the first time, Türkiye will conduct a run-off for the presidency.

Also unexpected was the news that Erdogan only received 49.5 per cent of the vote, outperforming his peers, but not by much. Similarly, his electoral alliance beat other opposition parties in the parliamentary election. The ruling coalition, the People’s Alliance, retained a simple majority (322/600 seats) in the parliament.

Undoubtedly, this outcome disappointed many in the opposition alliance, and others, who assumed the victory for Kılıçdaroğlu and his coalition was a sure thing. The presidential candidate received endorsements from six major opposition parties and many Kurdish groups and outperformed the ruling coalition and Erdogan in many polls.

For now, Erdogan is in a solid position ahead of the run-off. His simple majority in the parliament owes to the outperformance of his allies, the MHP (Nationalist Movement Party) and the New Welfare Party. The result has buoyed Erdogan and his supporters, and he is in a position to take full advantage and convince the public to vote for him and avoid a political stalemate.

While Erdogan will still need to work hard to maintain his slight lead, getting to 0.5 percent or more to win the election will be much easier than what his challenger is facing. Some help will undoubtedly come from Sinan Ogan supporters, mainly far-right and centre-right voters with a strong anti-refugee and Kurdish background. According to the data from Anadolu Agency, these supporters came initially from Erdogan strongholds in Central and Northern Anatolia and the key swing electorates of Istanbul, Ankara, and Balikesir.

These voters have been dismayed by Erdogan’s policies towards the Syrian refugees and his alignment with the Free Cause Party, a Sunni Kurdish party formed by Islamists. By voting for Ogan, many were seeking to display their disappointment. But in a run-off, they are unlikely to vote for Kılıçdaroğlu given the leftist and secularist leaning with which he has built his campaign. Erdogan, by contrast, is at least a nationalist and a religious conservative.

For Kılıçdaroğlu, finding a way to attract these voters and expand his core base will be difficult. While there are many reasons to be dispirited by the high inflation and unemployment rate, Erdogan’s personality, agenda, experience, and ideological orientation are still at the heart of conservative Islamist and nationalist values. If Kılıçdaroğlu shifts his position more to the right, there is a risk of losing his left-leaning voters, and the history of the 2011 parliamentary election will likely be repeated.

According to the Middle East Eye, Erdogan’s campaign team is already ahead in its strategy for the run-off. Exploiting the control of major television channels to increase Erdogan’s appearance through live interviews and broadcasts is a straightforward thing now. His electoral alliance and election team have also mobilised to organise rallies and play new social media advertisements with a more strident and nationalist narrative. In contrast, Kılıçdaroğlu does not have a coherent strategy. His non-appearance to the public on Monday and the late finalisation of the election roadmap further disappointed his supporters, demotivating them to rally for a run-off election.

A final positive for the incumbent president is the potential for conflict within the opposition alliance. The so-called Nation Alliance comprises six major opposition parties from across the political spectrum, all with different ideological orientations. Before the Sunday election, the parties had problems nominating candidates, formulating an electoral manifesto on specific areas like foreign policy, and positions on Kurdish issues, such as whether to receive endorsements from the left-wing Kurdish parties and further include them as part of the alliance.

Now, the coalition is in a state of trouble. Onursal Adiguzel, the deputy chairman of the CHP (Republican People’s Party) technology team and the member for tracking votes submitted his resignation on Sunday night. Other members of Kılıçdaroğlu’s campaign team have shown both desperation and silence when assessed on their confidence to win the run-off. Kilicdargolu also ended the contract with Ali Kiremitcioglu and Akan Abdulla to manage his election campaign. Quite reasonable, then, questions on whether key figures in Kılıçdaroğlu’s campaign team and the electoral alliance will continue campaigning for Kılıçdaroğlu have been raised by observers.

In looking forward to 28 May, when the run-off occurs, the two key groups to look out for will be the “housewives” and “nationalists.” The nationalist influence, as mentioned above, will be critical, and for the time being look to offer Erdogan a considerable push. They occupy 25 percent of the total vote. The Kurdish vote, by contrast, will still be necessary, but on their own, not enough to win the presidency. The Sunday elections demonstrated that point for Kılıçdaroğlu, who struggled to get above 45 per cent.

Furthermore, the alignment with pro-Kurdish parties like the HDP (People’s Democracy Party) may discourage nationalists from voting for Kılıçdaroğlu in the run-off. Erdogan will likely use this to his full advantage by campaigning on the theme that a vote for Kılıçdaroğlu will mean support for PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party), a Kurdish militant political organisation and armed guerrilla movement.

There is little mention of how housewives vote in Türkiye, although 11 million are expected to vote in the elections. They are mainly religious conservatives and maintain a low profile in the public sphere. A majority of them are likely to support the incumbent president. That being said, the withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention, an international treaty to protect women from domestic violence, and the country’s economic mismanagement have put Erdogan at risk with this crucial group. This does not necessarily mean that Kılıçdaroğlu will be able to win them over. His attraction among them is limited by his seeming detachment from their religious-conservative values.

There is a need for the world and Australia to prepare for an outcome that Erdogan may retain his presidency. Türkiye is active in the Middle East, South Caucasus, Central Asia, and Eastern Europe. The election will undoubtedly impact Turkish foreign policy, with broader implications for the strategic environment. Türkiye may approve Swedish membership in NATO, but Stockholm should expect a prolonged and arduous negotiation.

In the Indo-Pacific region, states should expect a more assertive Türkiye, driven by nationalist and Islamist discourses. The Asia Anew Initiative, a foreign policy program to enhance Turkish relations with East and South Asian countries and extend Turkish influence in the Indo-Pacific, will continue and may advance further by bolstering relations with Malaysia, Brunei, and other countries in Southeast Asia.

Cheuk Yui (Thomas) Kwong is a research assistant at the Australian Institute of International Affairs. He is pursuing an advanced master’s in Middle East and Central Asian Studies at ANU. His field of interest includes Turkish Foreign Policy, Energy Security, Political Science, and International Relations in the Middle East. You can find him at https://linktr.ee/k_cyui

This article is published under a Creative Commons License and may be republished with attribution.