A sea change in the foreign policy of Türkiye looks poised to occur, with a chance for rapprochement between Ankara and Western capitals. This is likely to spell trouble for Russia and China, particularly as competition for influence in Central Asia looms large on the agenda of the government. 

Over the past weeks, the electoral results in Türkiye have garnered much discussion and conjecture on what the eventual outcome will mean for regional and international relations. When the news reported a victory for the incumbent president Recep Tayyip Erdogan, many surmised that Türkiye would begin heading towards a broader union with the Sino-Russian bloc. However, the newly formed cabinet and the leadership of the ruling circle (parliament and the People’s Alliance) invariably signal a more Western-leaning change, with substantial implications for regional security.

For now, Hakan Fidan is the foreign minister, Ibrahim Kalin is the Head of Turkish Intelligence, Yaşar Güler is Defence Minister, and Akif Çağatay Kılıç is the president’s chief advisor with the title of ambassador. These people are Erdogan’s confidants and constitute the foreign policy team driving Turkish foreign policy. They have all embraced the Blue Homeland Doctrine (Mavi Vatan), a revisionist position arguing for Türkiye to take a dominant and coercive position over the East Mediterranean and Black Sea.

These “notables” of the foreign policy elite also support the “Century of Türkiye”, a vision of the new Türkiye that aims for aggrandisement to great power in global politics. Other programs, such as the Asia Anew Initiative and the New Middle East policy, will undoubtedly continue to serve their ultimate purpose: to extend Turkish influence and power in East Asia and the Middle East. The expectation, therefore, is that Turkish foreign policy is poised to become more assertive.

Improving the relations with the European Union and the US is another critical priority for Erdogan’s cabinet. Most new ministers and key foreign policy officers have had either experience or working relations with the US and European countries. They are also keen to repair what has become an estranged relationship between the Western countries and Türkiye.

Akif Çağatay Kiliç, for instance, is an experienced diplomat and well-known figure in the European and American political communities and is renowned for his strong interest in cooperating with Western counterparts, particularly concerning NATO. Placing Akif Çağatay Kılıç as a chief advisor with the power to influence Turkish foreign policy is an unmistakable signal that Türkiye seeks to repair its ties with the West.

Accordingly, it is expected that the relationship between Türkiye and the West will improve despite their differences around the EU accession talk, the controversy over F16/F35 sales, and the existing tension between Türkiye and Greece due to their conflicting maritime and territorial claims in the eastern Mediterranean Sea.

Russia and China, by contrast, can expect little more than what Türkiye has already offered, although Ankara may look to maintain bilateral cooperation in economic areas. Most factions and parties inside the ruling coalition, the People’s Alliance, show a negative attitude towards Beijing. To be sure, most inside the coalition are also sceptical of their counterparts in the European Union. For the time being, at least, the mainstream inside the coalition is more distrustful of China.

An increasing number of administration insiders are ardent Turkish nationalists with strong sympathies for the plight of the Chinese Uyghurs. Moreover, they share a determined front in countering Chinese influence. These positions have recently dominated Turkish politics, forcing the incumbent president to change his foreign policy approach towards China.

Devlet Bahçeli, the leader of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and the speaker of the Grand National Assembly in Türkiye, and his party have a long history of anti-China posturing. Their affiliated far-right paramilitary and political movement, the Grey Wolves (Ülkü Ocakları), actively supported the East Turkestan Independence Movement. Their supporters have attacked Chinese tourists several times over the years. Along with the Great Unity Party (BBP) and the nationalist faction inside the main ruling party, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) is also calling for change, placing Erdogan under significant pressure to adjust foreign policy towards China.

Türkiye is facing the possibility of a growing strategic rivalry with China in Central Asia as the vacuum of a retreating Russia fills the region. This competition is likely to spread further over trans-continental integration. For instance, in the wake of China’s much-advertised Belt and Road Initiative, Türkiye announced its Middle Corridor Initiative in a competing vision for local and regional connectivity.

Although Ankara and Beijing have made several attempts to cool suspicions about the possibility of competition between these initiatives, concerns have remained. Indeed, the prospect for greater competition is increasingly likely as Chinese activities in Central Asia and the Persian Gulf – highlighted by Türkiye as its sphere of influence – increase. The Asia Anew Initiative and the growing Turkish footprints in Southeast and East Asia further prove that resistance from Türkiye is forthcoming. This comes at a time when the geostrategic environment in East Asia is intensifying due to Sino-US confrontation in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea.

Hence, it is expected that Türkiye-China relations may begin to go backwards as Ankara boosts its presence and relations in East Asia, Southeast Asia, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia over the next five years.

Looking at Russo-Türkiye relations, the emerging expectation is that the status quo of the bilateral relationship is unlikely to change despite their differences and strategic rivalry in Central Asia and the South Caucasus. Türkiye still needs Russian tourists and Moscow’s cheap offer on gas and oil to support its domestic economy. In contrast, Russia needs Türkiye not to impose sanctions.

Moving forward, it will be difficult for Türkiye to maintain the delicate balance between confrontation and cooperation with Moscow. The current situation in the Russo-Ukraine War proves that Russian power and influence are rapidly declining both globally and regionally. While Russia maintains some influence in Central Asia, leaders in Eurasia have already begun searching for security alternatives with Türkiye at the top of their lists. It is a chance for Türkiye to replace Russia in this pivotal region – an opportunity Ankara will find difficult to ignore.

Finally, Sweden’s bid to join NATO is a critical challenge for Türkiye and its NATO counterparts. The pressures are growing on Ankara to ratify Sweden’s accession ahead of the Vilnius Summit in July. NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg attended Erdogan’s inauguration ceremony with the former Swedish prime minister, Carl Bildt, and other leaders from Central Asia and the South Caucasus last week. Later after the ceremony, Erdogan received Stoltenberg in Ankara to discuss Sweden’s membership bid in a closed-door meeting. While Stoltenberg felt positive about Sweden’s accession chances, given that Stockholm has already satisfied the demands requested by Ankara, Fidan does not share such a viewpoint. The protest last week in Stockholm, organised by supporters of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and People’s Defense Units (YPG), groups that are designated as terrorist groups in Türkiye, has one again caused Ankara to hold off on its decision to ratifying Sweden’s membership. The coming weeks are critical for Sweden, Türkiye, and NATO as a compromise on a deal must loom.

Cheuk Yui (Thomas) Kwong is a research assistant at the Australian Institute of International Affairs. He is pursuing an advanced master’s in Middle East and Central Asian Studies at ANU. His field of interest is diverse but includes Turkish Foreign Policy, Gulf Strategic Environment, Red Sea Geopolitics, Politics in Hong Kong, Chinese History, Energy Security, Political Science, and International Relations in the Middle East. You can find him at https://linktr.ee/k_cyui 

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