In China, the deprivations precarious workers suffer go beyond the labour market to impact family relations, social participation, and mental and emotional health. Even if policy has made some attempts to reduce precarity in recent times, there is still significant room for improvement.

With dramatic socioeconomic transformations taking place since the late 20th century, precarious employment in China has been normalised. The rapid expansion of precarious employment is not a phenomenon unique to China, nor is China the first to “encourage” precarious employment. Indeed, although China’s political, economic, and cultural contexts are starkly different from the West, globally more and more people have to resort to, or even “voluntarily” choose to, do precarious jobs. As of 2021, statistics show that more than 200 million workers are engaged in flexible forms of employment in China.

Precarious employment is still a source of income, and as such is preferable to unemployment. Some people also treat precarious employment as a temporary steppingstone to stable, “good” jobs. Nevertheless, the risks of holding precarious employment should not be underestimated given its core uncertainty and thus insecurity. More importantly, such risks concern not only one’s work, but also extend to other aspects of life.

Precarious employment and precarious life

One of the most direct consequences of having precarious employment is the high probability of in-work poverty. Unskilled and older workers may only be able to access low-wage jobs and face a higher risk of losing them. Even if skilled or younger precarious workers can sometimes earn higher wages than the local average, the instability of the income and insufficient social protection often creates financial strain. To maximise their earnings, workers tend to work overtime. To save as much as possible, so as to create a buffer for the future, they try to reduce spending—including their contribution to pensions, which some workers value highly. As a result, the material deprivations they suffer while employed are likely to endure into their retirement.

The financial strains may be more significant for middle-aged workers because of the provision of intergenerational support. In Chinese culture, it is a family’s responsibility to support the older generation, but not the adult children. However, as these children also have precarious jobs, the parents tend to provide downward support. As parents themselves may have experienced precarious employment and are familiar with its difficulties, they are willing to do so even at their own expense (keeping their own living standards low).

Unstable income, irregular work schedules, and high geographic mobility presents significant barriers to marriage and fertility. For many workers, particularly men, these conditions have delayed entry into marriage, with some remaining unmarried well into their late 30s. Others have experienced divorce, often linked to a decline in socioeconomic status. This is further exacerbated by increased family conflict, which tends to arise when partners spend less time together due to irregular working hours. Although the current population policy encourages families to have three children, most workers choose to have only one due to the limited resources, energy, and time they have left for family after work.

Disadvantages may further extend to their social interactions. While these workers depend on their existing social networks to find work and address other kinds of hardships, they are generally isolated in society. For them, tapping into broader social networks is difficult; not only due to the lack of time, resources, skills, and power, but also because of a distrust of the unfamiliar, and because previous negative experiences lead them to avoid social interactions. Social ties are a kind of capital. When lacking powerful broader social circles, workers’ existing ties (which are generally people from a similar background) can hardly be helpful for improving their circumstances. This it not to mention that these social capital-related interactions tend to involve a reciprocal exchange, which means they may have to “return the favour” at a later date.

Living in such circumstances, it is implausible to say that workers are “happy.” They may not express negative emotions; however, their acceptance of hardships and struggle, the lowering of their aspirations to a better life, and aversion to risk are evidence of the powerlessness they feel about changing the external environment. The downward adaptation to deprivation becomes a defence for them to resist structural harm.

The state’s responses

If China’s precariat was at first the product of a series of state reforms on land, work unit systems, job allocation arrangements, labour laws and so on, then nowadays complex forces such as economic crises, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the development of digital economy all contribute to the continuous expansion of precarious employment. Even as flexible forms of employment have been encouraged as a way to combat unemployment, China’s government also highlights high-quality employment in their more recent agenda.

The goal of high-quality employment requires the creation of more job opportunities, which to a large extent depends on economic development. New quality productive forces, digital economy, silver economy and so on have become buzzwords in business, media, and academia. These economic measures may destroy low-level jobs, but they also can create jobs in mid- and high-end industries. Time will tell if they are worthwhile strategies.

While the focus is put on industrial transformation and upgrading, the government is also working to improve labour market protections and social security systems. For example, in July 2022, Occupational Injury Protection for Workers in New Forms of Employment was piloted, and as of June 2024 about 8.86 million workers had participated. In November 2023, the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security issued three policies to protect workers with new forms of employment, such as workers fulfilling Internet orders (such as transporting, delivering, and home services). These policies require organisations to ensure workers’ legal working and leisure hours, job rewards, labour union participation, and so forth.

However, from the economic field to the social, one inevitable problem is regional differences and inequalities. Especially in the less developed areas, the market is limited, which means creating more jobs is rather difficult. Without financial support from the upper-level government, the effective coordination of economic and social goals is a challenge. In addition, the groups targeted by these policies are still narrow. Other categories of precarious workers, such as those holding professional or management positions or those in the higher education industries with “up-or-out” systems, have not been fully considered. There is still much room for policy improvement.

Xueyang Ma is currently conducting her post-doctoral research at the School of Political and Public Administration, Wuhan University. More detailed discussion can be found in her recent book, The Precariat in Western China: Poverty, Risks, and Influences (Routledge, 2024). She can be reached at xueyangma@yeah.net.

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