This was always going to be a complicated campaign. Modern wars rarely follow a predetermined plan, especially when conventional armies, proxy networks, and developing technology are involved. While early rounds may include decisive strikes against symmetric targets, the conflict’s trajectory will most likely be decided by less evident elements.
I am always hesitant to remark on ongoing confrontations in real time. It can sometimes feel like an armchair quarterback exercise analysis conducted without complete facts. However, as the current crisis with Iran evolves, many analysts are attempting to make sense of what might happen next. When asked about the conflict, I usually frame it as a tool to consider the variables that influence occurrences rather than a prediction exercise.
Historically, Western forces have demonstrated significant overmatch when attacking conventional infrastructure or command nodes. However, the most difficult aspect of modern conflict is the asymmetric arena in which enemies compensate for technological deficiencies through adaptability, proxies, and low-cost technology.
That is when wars transition from linear planning to what military strategists refer to as branch plans rather than sequels.
Several aspects stand out as being particularly significant in determining how this dispute develops.
The Drone and Missile Equation
One of the most crucial operational aspects to monitor in the fight with Iran is the competition between offensive missile and drone systems and defensive networks aiming to intercept them.
Iran has invested years developing a diverse range of unmanned aircraft systems, including the Shahed-series loitering weapons. These systems rose to prominence during Russian invasion of Ukraine, when Russian forces employed Iranian-designed Shahed drones to attack Ukrainian energy infrastructure and urban targets. Their attraction is straightforward: they are reasonably priced, have a broad operational range, and can be deployed in huge numbers.
The economic asymmetry they generate is critical to their strategic significance. A drone that costs tens of thousands of dollars can force defences to spend hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of dollars per shot on interceptions. Even if interceptions are tactically successful, this imbalance can put a drain on defensive resources over time.
A colleague in the United Kingdom once referred to these drones as “flying IEDs.” The parallel is simplistic, but increasingly accurate: simple, scalable weapons that impose disproportionate defensive costs.
What’s noteworthy is how swiftly this technology has spread beyond state actors.
The Houthis in Yemen have consistently shown this. Since late 2023, they have launched drones and anti-ship missiles against commercial vessels passing through the Red Sea, disrupting one of the world’s most crucial commerce routes. These attacks prompted international reactions, including the US-led Naval Security Initiative known as Operation Prosperity Guardian, which intended to secure shipping waterways.
Similarly, Hezbollah has expanded its drone capabilities along the Israel border. The group has deployed reconnaissance drones and loitering weapons to investigate Israeli air defences and gather intelligence. Many of these systems have been successfully intercepted by Israeli systems such as Iron Dome and David’s Sling, but the frequency of launches illustrates how drones are increasingly being utilised for more than just strikes, such as continual surveillance and psychological pressure.
Perhaps most striking is the degree to which drone technology has spread even among groups with limited industrial capacity.
Militant groups operating in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region are increasingly using commercially adapted drones for reconnaissance and attack. According to reports from Pakistan security officials, terrorists affiliated with Taliban factions and related groups have employed drone-based explosives and surveillance platforms to attack security checkpoints and military positions, mainly in Baluchistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
These achievements point to a bigger trend: the democratisation of airpower.
For the most of modern military history, powers with powerful aircraft and expensive infrastructure dominated the air domain. Today, relatively inexpensive unmanned technologies enable both state and non-state players to compete in that sector.
The essential question going ahead is not whether drones will remain central to modern conflict, they undoubtedly will. The challenge is whether defensive technologies can evolve quickly enough to deal with their growing scale, cost asymmetry, and increased autonomy.
In wars ranging from Ukraine to the Middle East, the battlefield has already begun to provide answers.
Energy Flows and the Strait of Hormuz
The second component, the flow of energy via the Gulf, is both economic and military in nature.
The Strait of Hormuz remains one of the world’s most strategic maritime chokepoints. Approximately a fifth of global oil consumption passes via this small channel that connects the Persian Gulf to the Arabian Sea.
Disruptions in this region have far-reaching consequences.
Historically, the strait has suffered harassment and occasional attacks, although it has never been completely closed. Even during the 1980s tanker assaults during the Iran–Iraq War, shipping remained at high danger.
If marine traffic were severely impeded today, the following repercussions would be immediate:
- Volatility in global energy markets.
- International naval forces face pressure to protect commercial shipping.
- Risk of escalation among regional and global marine coalitions.
If the United States Navy and ally ships are required to defend commerce channels, the conflict could quickly escalate from a regional conflict to a larger maritime security issue.
Kurdish Dynamics
Another factor that demands careful consideration is the role of Kurdish actors.
The Kurds live in various countries, including Iraq, Syria, Turkey, and Iran. Kurdish forces have played critical roles in regional wars, particularly in the fight against ISIS.
Kurdish factions do not form a monolith, and their political calculations frequently reflect intricate local dynamics.
If Kurdish actors adjust their positions, whether through cooperation with external allies or internal political realignments, operational conditions on the ground may change. Such changes could have an impact on border security, regional alliances, and overall stability in northern Iraq and eastern Syria.
In many conflicts, local actors’ actions can have as much influence on events as state decisions.
Information and Religious Influence
Wars are waged not simply with weapons, but also through tales.
Statements made by major religious leaders in the region have the potential to significantly affect popular perception. One such individual is Ali al-Sistani, the Grand Ayatollah of Najaf.
Sistani’s message holds tremendous weight throughout the Shi’a world. While he has condemned violence in the region, he has not published a religious decree specifically calling for attacks on foreign service personnel.
That’s an important distinction.
Religious leaders in the region may rally public sentiment, shape militia behaviour, and influence political narratives. As a result, information campaigns and communication strategies will have a considerable impact on how the conflict is perceived across the Middle East.
In modern warfare, the information domain is as important as the actual battlefield.
Casualties and Political Sustainability
Another important element to monitor is casualty figures.
Casualties influence domestic political mood, coalition cohesion, and governments’ desire to continue military operations. Even minor wars might alter quickly if casualty numbers climb unexpectedly.
Historically, the political viability of military campaigns has been closely linked to their human cost.
Proxy Networks and Regional Escalation
Finally, Iran’s regional network of associated groups adds an extra element of intricacy.
Organisations like Hezbollah and the Houthis provide Tehran with strategic depth, allowing pressure to be delivered across numerous fronts without involving direct state-to-state conflict.
The proxy design makes escalation difficult to foresee. A localised conflict can easily spread across borders, involving more participants.
Regional countries like Israel and Saudi Arabia have their own security assessments and red lines.
This means that if certain thresholds are crossed, the conflict’s geographical scope may extend.
The Real Challenge: The Aftermath
As complex as the current phase of the conflict is, the most difficult period is expected to follow.
Military operations can degrade capacities and damage infrastructure, but they rarely address the underlying political causes of war.
What follows will necessitate ongoing diplomacy, reconstruction initiatives, and prudent statecraft.
In many respects, the real test will be how well the conflict is managed after it has ended.
A Framework for Thinking
Finally, these factors aren’t forecasts. They are simply organising principles for comprehending a dynamic and changing conflict.
Wars create uncertainty. Alliances alter, new parties emerge, and operational plans adjust to shifting circumstances.
The purpose is not to know exactly what will happen, but rather to create a framework for considering what factors may influence what happens next.
Sami Omari is an Afghan-born international relations, diplomatic, and policy consultant with extensive experience working alongside NATO, International Security Assistance Force, and the U.S. Department of State, including the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), as well as diplomatic missions on governance, conflict, and legal reform in fragile states. He previously served as a prosecutor and legal advisor in Afghanistan and later worked as a cultural and security affairs instructor with Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and Australian Defence Forces, delivering training on culture, security, and civil–military relations. Mr. Omari also served as Government Liaison Manager for NATO in Afghanistan, where he worked closely with Afghan government institutions and international partners during key phases of the conflict, including the period surrounding the U.S.–Taliban Doha negotiations and the release of Taliban prisoners.
Now based in Australia, he works as a strategic consultant focusing on South and Central Asian security and strategic affairs and is currently completing a Master’s in International Relations at Flinders University.
This article is published under a Creative Commons License and may be republished with attribution.
