Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan aims to position Türkiye as a security guarantor for Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, amid regional tensions from the Israel-Hamas conflict and potential shifts under a Trump-led presidency. Rather than replacing the US, Türkiye seeks a more active role in the Middle East, focusing on the Persian Gulf as a stabilising partner.  

Under Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s leadership, Türkiye has come to view the Persian Gulf’s security and stability—or lack thereof—as integral to its own strategic interests. Türkiye perceives the Gulf as vital to its long-term economic, political, energy, and security objectives, positioning Türkiye as a stabilising force, a reliable security partner, and a prominent Muslim power among Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) leaders and the broader Muslim world. In the last two decades, Ankara has laid the groundwork for more robust security ties with GCC countries, including Saudi Arabia and Qatar.  

Since President Barack Obama introduced the “Pivot to East Asia” strategy to counterbalance China’s influence and reduce its footprint in the Middle East, the region has faced a widening power vacuum and growing insecurity. While some states see this as an opportunity to assert greater regional influence, many GCC members feel increasingly vulnerable to traditional threats, such as Iranian influence, and non-traditional threats, including terrorism, radicalism, and maritime piracy. This evolving power dynamic has prompted GCC states to reassess their security and diplomatic strategies, leading to greater military engagement and new alliances. Consequently, the GCC has turned to other global powers—including China, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, India, Israel, and Türkiye—for alternative partnerships.  

For Türkiye, the shift in US policy presents an opportunity to solidify its role as a critical regional power in the Gulf. It has proposed establishing a military presence in Saudi Arabia and extended similar offers to Qatar, with Qatar ultimately agreeing to host a Turkish military base.  However, Türkiye’s close ties with Qatar and its endorsement of the Muslim Brotherhood has stirred concerns among other Gulf monarchies, particularly the Saudi-led bloc, who view these associations as a potential threat to their own security and regime stability. 

Nevertheless, these perceptions have shifted with recent waves of de-escalation and rapprochement across the Middle East, such as the Saudi-Iranian reconciliation brokered by China. This regional thaw, and concerns over potential policy shifts following President Joe Biden’s electoral victory and the ongoing Israel-Hamas conflict, have created new opportunities to resolve past tensions and forge partnerships between many GCC states and Türkiye. 

The reasons for Türkiye’s growing appeal are clear. Consistent support for allies, such as Qatar and Azerbaijan, in times of need—regardless of their economic situation—has bolstered its reputation among GCC states as a reliable ally capable of deterring foreign threats.  

In the event of a direct threat from Iran or escalating regional conflicts, Türkiye’s reliability, combined with its advanced defence technology capabilities, makes it an attractive security partner in the region. Türkiye’s advanced defence capabilities—particularly in drones, armoured vehicles, and tanks—enhance its appeal, positioning it as a vital partner for the GCC. Turkish drones, such as the Bayraktar TB2, have demonstrated their effectiveness in various conflicts, offering precise strike capabilities at competitive costs that align closely with the security priorities of GCC nations. Furthermore, Türkiye’s investments in the “Steel Dome” multi-layered air defence system, and advancements in long-range missile technology, underscore its expertise in developing comprehensive solutions tailored to the growing concerns of GCC states over Iranian missile threats to their energy infrastructure, logistics hubs, and business centres. These advancements elevate Türkiye’s strategic importance and reinforce GCC leaders’ confidence in its ability to provide reliable and effective defence support amidst the region’s growing volatility. 

Now, as the Middle East faces an escalating Israel-Hamas conflict, which has expanded into a broader confrontation between Iran and Israel, regional stability is further undermined, sparking concerns of a wider Middle East war. Amid this turmoil, the return of Donald Trump to the White House could introduce significant shifts in US foreign policy, adding complexity to an already volatile landscape. 

A renewed Trump presidency would likely signal a return to a hardline stance on Iran and the strengthening of alliances with key Gulf states and Israel. Four years on, however, Trump faces a different Persian Gulf landscape, where many leaders now prioritise de-escalation and have taken steps to reduce hostilities with Iran. Some Gulf states may even lobby Trump to pursue a more diplomatic approach with Iran.  

Regardless of Trump’s strategy, Türkiye remains a crucial player in Gulf security architecture and the broader landscape of US Middle East policy. If Trump pursues diplomatic engagement with Iran, Türkiye can play a valuable role in facilitating dialogue or offering third-party insights, drawing on its unique experience of balancing competition and cooperation with Tehran. Conversely, Türkiye can be an indispensable ally if Trump wants to rebuild an anti-Iran coalition that addresses GCC and US concerns while aligning with Türkiye’s strategic objectives. Its involvement would amplify the coalition’s impact, enabling Trump, the GCC states, and Türkiye to maximise mutual benefits and deter Iran effectively. 

Similarly, GCC states and Iran need Türkiye as their partners. Türkiye’s support strengthens the GCC states’ security framework and counterbalances Iranian influence, particularly as US commitments in the region shift. Additionally, the GCC can leverage its partnership with Türkiye as a strategic signal to the US to indicate that the Gulf is prepared to diversify its alliances if American support and security guarantees become unstable. Meanwhile, for Iran, maintaining an adversarial collaboration with Türkiye can help ease pressures from the GCC, Israel, and the US, reducing the likelihood of facing multiple fronts. 

In conclusion, Türkiye’s unique positioning enables it to serve as a critical security partner for the GCC states and the US, while simultaneously managing collaboration with Iran. This dual role makes Türkiye indispensable in navigating the complexities of Persian Gulf and Middle Eastern politics, offering a stabilising presence amid shifting alliances and regional tensions.  

Cheuk Yui (Thomas) Kwong is a columnist for The News Lens Media and a political analyst at the Hong Kong Thinkers Company Limited. He was a research assistant at the Australian Institute of International Affairs. He holds an advanced master’s degree in Middle East and Central Asian Studies from the Australian National University. For more information, you can contact him here. 

This article is published under a Creative Commons Licence and may be republished with attribution.