The controversy between Türkiye, Sweden, and Finland over NATO membership continues to aid Russia in its war of aggression against Ukraine. With US weapons agreements now caught up in the bid, Türkiye’s opposition has likely narrowed. 

Since the application by Sweden and Finland to join NATO in May 2022, Türkiye’s opposition, especially to Sweden, has been vocal. Türkiye demanded them to cease support for “terrorists (including the Kurdistan Workers Party – PKK) and provide clear security guarantees and lift export bans on Türkiye before joining the alliance.” Following the Trilateral Memorandum, both Sweden and Finland lifted bans on the sale of military equipment to Türkiye, which had been introduced after the country’s military intervention in Syria. Sweden also introduced a constitutional amendment to make tougher anti-terror laws. However, Türkiye expects the full implementation of these changes in the law and “extradition of those individuals in affiliated and inspired groups or networks linked to the terrorist organisations.”

Causes of disagreement 

Following the Memorandum, and counter to expectations, the membership journey of Sweden and Finland did not become smoother. On 13 January 2023, an effigy of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was hung by the protesters in Stockholm. Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, in response, stated that either Sweden “turn a blind eye to this and bow down to it or keep its promises to take action against terror groups.” After the prosecutor in Sweden formally decided that the action was not punishable by Swedish law, tensions between the two countries increased and Ankara’s objections to Sweden’s NATO membership became defiant.

Other demonstrations in Stockholm have added to Türkiye’s opposition. Rasmus Paludan, leader of the Danish far-right political party, led a demonstration in front of the Turkish embassy and burned a Quran. Erdoğan’s reaction was not delayed. “As long as you allow my holy book, the Quran, to be burned and torn, and you do so together with your security forces, we will not say yes to your entry into NATO,” he said. Although the state officials and Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson condemned the protests, these statements have so far not been perceived as adequate responses by Türkiye. Unsurprisingly, news on Russian support for Paludan followed the incident and it was reported that “Paludan’s demonstration permit of 320 Swedish krona (£25, $31) was paid for by a former contributor to the Kremlin-backed channel RT, Chang Frick.”

The hybrid character of war in Ukraine can be seen in various spheres – diplomacy, politics, and economics. Russian’s spreading disinformation is not the only way that hybrid war tactics are employed. Supporting activities, which have a high potential to increase tensions between EU member states and prevent further cooperation among the Allies in NATO, are also part of Russia’s war in Ukraine. At the time of writing, Hungary and Türkiye have yet to ratify the membership bids for Sweden and Finland. While Hungary’s Viktor Orban says they are taking Türkiye’s sensitivities into account, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Peter Szijjarto, has commented on the reaction of Sweden to Paludan’s protest and burning of the Quran, “[s]tating that the burning of a sacred book is part of freedom of speech is just plain stupidity,” suggesting that Sweden should act differently if they wish to join NATO. Although, there is a stable and growing relationship between Türkiye and Hungary, one should not ignore the impact of close ties between Orban and Vladimir Putin on Swedish and Finnish bids. Since the war, Hungary has been reluctant to send military aid to Ukraine or cut its energy ties with Moscow.

Consequences

Given these provocations, Finland’s solo entrance to the Alliance was suggested. Charly Salonius–Posternak, a senior research fellow at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, for instance, has suggested it would be silly to bind Finland’s bid to Sweden’s accession. Currently, the official statements of both countries reject the option of separating the applications, however this position also likely offers Russia a semblance of success as the NATO ascensions drag out and possibly stall.

In other domains, 2023 is an election year for Türkiye. Although it has been suggested that early elections would take place on 14 May 2023, the official declaration regarding the elections has not been made. The devastating earthquake on 6 February 2023 has continued to take its toll on the country, with deaths increasing. The devastation across the ten cities has caused a state of emergency to be declared in the region. As a result, it cannot be said for certain that the elections will be held in May. Constitutionally, the elections should take place in June, and only in the case of war can the elections be postponed.

When one looks at the previous election periods in Türkiye, it is clear that Europe and any matter related to European affairs has been a part of the political rhetoric of the governing party and of the president. In 2017, when the elections in the Netherlands coincided with the referendum in Türkiye on the constitutional amendment, a diplomatic row escalated to the point that Turkish ministers were expelled from the Netherlands. Türkiye responded in kind by suspending high-level diplomatic relations with the Amsterdam, with Erdoğan himself calling the Netherlands a “Nazi remnant.” Experience shows that Sweden’s NATO bid is likely be one of the themes to be used in the upcoming election campaign, illustrating that a rapprochement between the two countries will be increasingly difficult.

While Sweden’s and Finland’s membership to NATO is not directly related to Türkiye’s F16 purchase deal with the US, 29 bipartisan senators wrote a letter to President Joseph Biden saying that “a failure by Türkiye to uphold its commitments made under the Trilateral Memorandum of Understanding between Türkiye, Sweden and Finland should be taken into consideration, as Congress cannot consider future support for Türkiye, including the sale of F16 fighter jets, until Türkiye completes ratification of the accession protocols.” After Türkiye was expelled from the F35 program, the purchase of the F16s became crucial. Considering the dire status of Turkish–American relations, it would not be preferable for the Biden administration to override a no-vote from Congress, which would complicate relations further.

Türkiye’s opposition to Sweden and Finland aims to call for more attention to its legitimate security concerns while reminding all that it is a long-standing ally in the organisation. However, in defending its security concerns Türkiye needs to be cautious of external actors, such as Russia, which have the potential to disrupt diplomatic efforts like the Trilateral Memorandum. Additionally, there is a need to be more vigilant, especially regarding religious sensitivities, which can be utilised easily by populist parties, as the Paludan case shows. Although the membership of two Nordic countries is not directly related to Türkiye’s relations with the US, it is clear that Türkiye is under pressure to rebalance relations with its old allies. Especially as the letter to Biden by the senators reveals that the impact of the anti-Turkish lobbies in the US will be decisive on the position of Congress on the F16 sale – mending bridges becomes more critical.

Dr. Çiğdem Üstün is Associate Professor of International Relations at Nişantaşı University and Secretary General at the Center for Economics and Foreign Policy Research (EDAM), İstanbul. Twitter: @cigdemustun

This article is published under a Creative Commons Licence and may be republished with attribution.