Since the establishment of their diplomatic relations in 1974, Australia and Maldives have established close bilateral cooperation. Over the years, Canberra has become an important development partner, helping to build human resources through higher education cooperation and the development of good governance, infrastructure, and security.

For this and other reasons, Maldives has respected Australia’s foreign and regional policies and supported defence and security engagements in the Indian Ocean. Further, Australia is considered an indispensable partner in the promotion of a free and open Indo-Pacific by working with Indian Ocean states.

However, Maldives has also been shifting partnership preferences between India and China, with jockeying between the two nations for new infrastructure development projects creating new challenges. Understanding how the island state has navigated relations with traditional partners, such as India, as well as new ones, such as with China, is important for Australia’s efforts to enhance cooperation with Malé.

Shifts in Maldives foreign relations 

In recent decades, Maldives governments have launched land reclamation projects, strengthened critical infrastructure like the international airport, and expanded maritime security capabilities to build a more resilient environment against external shocks and natural disasters. However much needed, these projects have led to expanded debt challenges. The reclamation of land in Hulhumalé (residential) island, for instance, cost over AUD$400 million initially and cannot be covered by the national budget alone. For this reason, the new government in Malé has sought to enhance aid cooperation as an important component of the government’s development planning.

Some of the funding for large development projects were secured during the period between 2013-2018, when Maldives’ former president Abdulla Yameen expanded aid and investment cooperation with China. A loan was provided under the Chinese Belt and Road initiative (BRI) and included AUD$1.2 billion to expand the international airport, build public housing in Hulhumalé, and construct an ocean bridge connecting the capital city Malé, the airport island, and Hulhumalé.

These and other expensive projects, however, have come with an accumulated foreign debt; as of 2024 Maldives owed China about US$1.37 billion or 40 percent of its public debt. Monetary implications, naturally, have become part of the government’s concerns. But others have raised geopolitical and economic concerns due to China’s increased presence in the region and potential influence over the islands. Maldives and its territory lay within what amounts, geopolitically, to India’s sphere of influence and China’s growth in this territory has caused New Delhi to rethink their regional presence.

During Yameen’s time in office, existing political, cultural, and security connections between Maldives and India did not change. However, for Malé, China’s growing presence was important for  supporting its economic development, including initiating investment opportunities to support community development and the tourism sector. As political connections between Malé and Beijing developed, however, concerns were raised in New Delhi about China’s potential influence in the internal affairs of Maldives and the affect this would have on India’s traditional role as the net security provider for the country. For India, minimising China’s engagement in Maldives was a sensible policy choice.

These anxieties for New Delhi were allayed somewhat when Yameen lost the election to former president Ibrahim Mohamed Solih in November 2018. Solih’s Maldives Democratic Party (MDP) aligns strongly with most Western and other Indo-Pacific partners and less with Chinese interests. Between 2018-2023, Solih formed an India-First policy that sought to strengthen ties with India and reviewed, if not halted, key projects with China that upset Maldives-India agreements. Malé secured a large cache of loans from India to help the nation meet its Chinese debt obligations. In turn, India would go onto fund other large infrastructure projects including a half million dollar bridge to connect Malé, the international airport island, and various islands.

A new government, led by President Mohamed Muizzu, took office in 2023, defeating Solih’s “India-pro” administration. In the 2023 election campaign, Muizzu assured the public that he would prioritise national interests in forming foreign partnerships. During the campaign, public concerns were raised about India’s undue influence in Maldives internal affairs. Solih’s failure to explain to the public the continued presence of an Indian military contingent based in Maldives contributed to his defeat.

Political thinking here is that depending too heavily on one country, namely India, can limit potential opportunities with other countries. Muizzu’s policy has so far focused on expanding aid cooperation with all willing partners, including China. In 2024, both governments signed as many as 20 agreements to support development and security cooperation, including one on expanding BRI presence.

Maldives and Australia

China’s inroad with the country does not limit chances for Australia to enhance its own engagements. And indeed, Australia has an opportunity to engage more strategically with Maldives. One area where both states could collaborate more together is in human development via higher education opportunities. Over 700 Maldivians have been trained in Australian universities, and in 2023 alone 142 Maldivian students studied in Australia. Other areas can include technical cooperation to build society and institutions. Most recently, this took the form of assistance for COVID-19 related measures on the island, as well as supporting blue economy, climate action, and sustainable development. These engagements can be further improved to better connect with local grassroot actors and community in Maldives.

The Australian High Commission in Malé, opened in 2023, has already begun building community and business relationships, including establishing closer cooperation between Australian authorities and Maldivian people. For example, the Maldives-Australia alumni group, an association composed of Maldivians who have studied in Australia, have helped to promote shared interests between the two countries. The groups have contributed to ongoing community-based engagements, such as “Mindfest,” a community wellbeing event organised by the Australian High Commission across local island and institutions.

A localised approach would even be important for improving ongoing military-to-military exchanges. This would build greater confidence in Australia’s role in Maldives as a defence and security partner. By way of defence diplomacy, the Australian military could engage with local identities related to security issues such as the climate crisis, and incorporate those issues into defence and security engagements related to search and rescue operations, maritime security strategy dialogues, and maritime surveillance.

As Australia and the Pacific Islands seek to host COP31, working with Maldives could help smoothen the COP31 journey. At the same time, climate action and advocacy would be a key lens through which aid partners can make better sense of what development and security cooperation can mean for Maldives.

Athaulla A Rasheed is a PhD scholar at The Australian National University. His focus is on international relations and security of small island developing states (SIDS). He is a former foreign service officer and diplomat at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Maldives, and holds a PhD in political science from University of Queensland, Australia.

This article is published under a Creative Commons License and may be republished with attribution.