Early last week, Beijing hosted one of its largest and most distinguished security dialogues, the 11th Beijing Xiangshan Forum. The Forum attracted more than 500 delegations from more than 100 countries, including the United States, Russia, and Ukraine, in addition to 200 Chinese delegates, to discuss pressing security issues of our time.

The delegations comprise senior military and government officials as well as academics and analysts focusing on international security. The platform has not only demonstrated Beijing’s increasing significance through leadership in international security but has also allowed China to set the agenda on some of the world’s most pressing issues, such as the war in Ukraine, conflict in Gaza, and security in the Asia Pacific.

With China’s avoidance of such conflict, and with many Western and Middle Eastern nations involved, China is well poised to act as an important mediator, and to develop trust among international partners, as well as positively boosting its image.

The latest 2024 survey from the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute Singapore shows that trust among ASEAN countries in the United States has dropped quite substantively from 54.2 percent last year to 42.4 percent this year. During the panel on ASEAN security architecture, Choi Shing Kwok, the ISEAS director, explained that one of the reasons behind this decline may be because three majority Muslim countries in Southeast Asia—Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brunei—may have been disappointed by how the US has dealt with the war in Gaza.

This declining trust in the United States has created an opportunity for Beijing to develop closer ties with the global south, and particularly Southeast Asian countries, to be able to support Beijing in some of its initiatives. During the keynote speech China’s Minister of Defense once again highlighted Xi Jinping’s proposal for a Chinese-led  Global Security Initiative, a Global Development Initiative, as well as the Global Civilization Initiative. These initiatives provide an alternative to the current Western order, at least that is what Xi is hoping for.

Across the many speeches by Chinese delegates, the importance of a global architecture that equally supports and benefits all countries, whether rich or poor, was emphasised, as well as the point that small and large nations should have equal say in international law. This spirit will resonate with many countries in the global south. This sentiment resonates strongly with the spirit of the Bandung conference back in 1955, hosted then by Indonesia.

Despite such similarities of spirit and motivation, three main challenges threaten China’s efforts. The first is that unlike the post-World War II era, when the newly developing countries gained their independence, international institutional architecture was still emerging. Now a well-established international architecture that is bound by international law is likely to be much more difficult to disassemble. Despite the many criticisms of organisations like the United Nations, International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank, they are driven by international rules and norms, and for the most part they work, however imperfectly. Creating a new global consensus to create or even amend those frameworks will be close to impossible. Nor is it guaranteed the institutions that will replace the current ones will be better.

Secondly, many initiatives and frameworks that were introduced in the post-World War II era have been driven by countries from the global south. The establishment of the so-called New International Economic Order, the creation of the United Nations Trade and Development (UNCTAD), and the negotiations of the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea were very much put forward by developing countries to achieve a more just international architecture. Moreover, currently, there has been a lot of debate on whether China can still be considered as part of the global south.

Thirdly, and the most important element is to get support for those three China’s global initiatives, China should gain trust from the global south, including Southeast Asian countries. Indeed, trust is one of the most important foundations for international cooperation. Without trust, any state will not give up some of its sovereignty to an international mechanism.

This point may become the biggest obstacle with China. Observing China’s attitude towards international law and its behaviour in the South China Sea over the past few years, many of China’s neighbouring countries are likely to view China’s behaviour as, at the very least, distrustful. The escalation between China and the Philippine Coast Guard over islands in the Philippine’s Exclusive Economic Zone serves as a key example. In addition, China’s disregarding of the 2016 International Arbitration Ruling has also shown how China’s interests in international law are selective. With this basis, why would Southeast Asian nations believe that China will keep its commitments to other institutions in international law?

The truth is, the attitude of major powers, including the United States, towards international law has often been inconsistent. If China wants to offer an alternative to the current international architecture, Beijing will need to ensure that the alternatives will truly be equal for all countries. Those from developing countries will not buy any proposal, for fear that the same mistakes will be remade, albeit under different nomenclature.

Therefore, the successful and productive Beijing Xiangshan Forum 2024 may show one step forward in China’s thought leadership and agenda setting in international security issues. However, to gain genuine international trust, China has to show an example by upholding and respecting the rule of international law. Because without that, China’s global initiative proposal will not be successful.

Aristyo Rizka Darmawan, Ph.D. Scholar at the College of Asia and the Pacific, Australian National University (ANU) and a lecturer in international law at Universitas Indonesia.

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