Economic sanctions have long been used as a nonviolent foreign policy tool to influence the behaviour and policies of targeted states. While they are often effective in prompting policy changes in democratic countries, they frequently fall short in altering the course of authoritarian regimes.  

How are economic sanctions expected to work? 

Economic sanctions, whether targeted or comprehensive, are generally intended to exert pressure on key decision-makers, ultimately pushing them to enact policy changes. In democratic settings, sanctions can be effective; politicians are incentivised to shift their policies to avoid being voted out, and citizens can hold them accountable at the ballot box. 

In authoritarian regimes, however, the mechanism is assumed to work differently. The aim is to generate economic grievances among citizens as well as the elites who support the regime, thereby inciting popular unrest and reducing elite support for the incumbent government. Yet, this process often fails in non-democratic contexts. If sanctions fail to achieve their goals, then some part of this expected mechanism must be disrupted. Either the sanctions do not create sufficient grievances, or these grievances fail to mobilise citizens and elites into a collective force capable of driving policy change. Understanding why this breakdown occurs is the focus of my recent studies. 

The case of Iran and economic sanctions 

To understand this breakdown in action, we can look at Iran’s experience as a case study of the limitations of sanctions against non-democratic states. Since the 1979 Revolution, the country has faced numerous economic sanctions. Initially, the United States imposed unilateral sanctions, which persisted from 1979 until 2006. Despite these measures, Iran managed to counterbalance the impact by strengthening its economic ties with Asian and European nations. However, mounting international concern over Iran’s nuclear program led to a shift from unilateral sanctions to a coordinated, multilateral sanctions regime. 

In 2006, after nuclear negotiations failed, the UN Security Council adopted its first resolution, urging states to restrict supplies of materials that could support Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Over the next four years, the Security Council imposed six more resolutions, culminating in comprehensive measures that included an oil embargo, freezing the assets of Iran’s central bank, and, critically, cutting Iranian banks from the SWIFT international payment system. 

This intensified pressure eventually contributed to Iran’s decision to negotiate, resulting in the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or Iran Nuclear Deal. Yet, when the Trump administration withdrew from the deal in 2018 and reinstated the “maximum pressure” campaign, Iran’s response was the opposite of what was intended. Rather than curbing its nuclear and missile activities, the Islamic Republic accelerated its nuclear program, advanced its missile capabilities, and strengthened its regional proxies. 

Economic sanctions and food consumption in Iran 

Analysis of food consumption in Iran from 1991 to 2021, using Iranian Household Income and Expenses datasets, illustrates that sanctions reduced food consumption across income groups, with the economically vulnerable bearing the brunt. During periods of intensified sanctions, Iranians were forced to shift toward cheaper and less nutritious food options, such as replacing red meat with bread. This decline in dietary quality reflects a significant reduction in quality of life, disproportionately impacting those who were already struggling. 

Notably, while sanctions were intended to pressure the government and elites, ordinary citizens are shown to bear the costs, with higher-income households—likely closer to the state—experiencing these hardships minimally. Despite widespread economic grievances among lower-income and middle-class families, protests over economic hardship, especially after the 2018 reimposition of sanctions, failed to garner opposition elites inside the country. This failure can be argued to be largely due to the brutal repression of these popular uprisings. However, there is also another reason: political elites and activists, including those critical of the regime, were inclined to rally around the flag during times of sanctions rather than supporting domestic grassroots protests. 

Rallying around the flag: nationalist sentiments amid sanctions 

The concept of “rallying around the flag” refers to a surge in public support for an incumbent government during times of foreign crisis. Originally coined by John Mueller in the context of US presidential support, this effect has been observed in authoritarian contexts as well. In another paper, we argue that sanctions can be perceived as an affront to national sovereignty, especially among nationalist citizens who may otherwise be critical of the government. Using supervised machine learning, we analyzed nearly two million tweets from over 1,000 Iranian influencers to track sentiment shifts toward the Iranian government in response to sanctions imposed by the Trump administration. Our findings show that reactions vary based on the type of sanctions and the influencers’ political views. Comprehensive sanctions created a rally around the flag effect even among the state’s moderate opposition. Yet, the extent of the rallying effect in response to targeted sanctions depends on the specific politician or organisation targeted. 

Conclusion 

Analysis reveals the unintended consequences of economic sanctions in non-democratic states and highlights the nuanced relationships between sanctions, public sentiment, and elite dynamics. Comprehensive sanctions primarily harm economically vulnerable populations, who face heightened food insecurity and a diminished quality of life. Elites, however, often remain insulated, and their support for the regime may not waver as a result of sanctions. Sanctions can also foster nationalist solidarity, even among regime critics, creating a disconnect between citizens’ economic hardships and the political discourse dominated by opposition elites. As a result, sanctions may inadvertently strengthen the regime’s position and dampen prospects for a successful collective mobilisation to achieve change. 

For policymakers, these insights emphasise the importance of a tailored approach that accounts for the local political landscape to avoid the pitfalls of rallying around the flag and the structural intensification of repression in non-democratic contexts. For sanctions to be more effective against non-democratic regimes, it is essential to design them so that the economic burden falls on political and economic elites, who wield the political leverage to press for change. Successful sanctions must also allow the general populace to voice their discontent while ensuring that their grievances resonate with political activists and opposition elites. The discussed findings highlight that policy design can benefit from deeper consideration of local dynamics without diminishing the strategic aims of those implementing the sanctions. 

This article’s insights are drawn from a larger analysis published in the journal International Studies Quarterly.

Dr Babak RezaeeDaryakenari is a Senior (Tenured) Assistant Professor of international relations at the Institute of Political Science, Leiden University, with a research focus on political violence and conflict. Currently, he is working on how social media affects the dynamics and outcomes of state-dissident online and offline interactions. He also studies different aspects and consequences of foreign interventions, such as economic sanctions during civil conflicts. 

This article is published under a Creative Commons License and may be republished with attribution.