Israel’s recent assassinations of Hezbollah and Hamas leaders have brought the Middle East to the brink of broader hostilities, including potentially war. Any meaningful solution necessitates imaginative and influential leadership.

The assassination in late July, presumedly by Israel, of Hezbollah’s senior leader Fuad Shukr in Beirut and of Hamas’ political leader, Ismail Haniyeh, in Tehran, has conveyed four clear messages about Israel’s “self defence” modus operandi to both foes and friends alike.

Firstly, targeted assassination, especially of the leadership of Israel’s “enemies,” remains very much a part of Israel’s revenge, retaliation, and deterrence tool box. And their modus operandi includes killing in selected third countries, if that provides access.

Although Israel has not admitted responsibility for Haniyeh’s assassination, I accept the universal assumption they were. Haniyeh was a key member of the Hamas leadership, all of whom became high priority targets following the 7 October attack against Israel. That he was killed in Tehran, in an Iranian government guest house, under Iranian protection, during a high-publicity visit to attend the inauguration of Iran’s new president, Dr Masoud Pezeshkian, was at the very least a major embarrassment to the Iranians. The only other known casualty in that attack was a body guard of unknown nationality, staying in the guesthouse.

Different versions exist as to how Heniyeh was killed; by a rocket fired from outside the building, or a bomb placed in his room some months previously, and detonated remotely. Either way, targeting was precise.

Hamas has since announced Yahya Sinwar, one of the 7 October planners, as Heniyeh’s replacement. An Israeli Defence Force (IDF) spokesman has since confirmed Sinwar is an Israeli target.

Also in early August, no doubt to maximise related publicity, Israel claimed to have killed Hamas’ military leader, Mohammed Deif, in Gaza during a targeted aerial attack in mid-July. The Israels could not confirm Deif’s death at the time, but now base this on their “assessment.” Hamas has denied Deif’s death, but it’s now up to them to prove he’s alive. Gaza’s Health Ministry allege some 90 Palestinians were killed and 300 injured in the July attack, half of whom were women and children. As the ministry is controlled by Hamas such an exceptionally high number of collateral casualties is questionable. If Deif was killed, it reportedly ends a 20 year Israeli man-hunt which has incurred the death of close family members, including his wife and two children, in past attempts.

Shukr’s assassination in Beirut, which also killed three and wounded 74 others, was Israel’s response to their attribution of Hezbollah’s responsibility for the deaths of 12 non-Israeli Druze children by a missile in early August in the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights. Hezbollah have denied responsibility for the attack. Who fired the rocket, and whether the targeting was deliberate or accidental, is perhaps irrelevant. Israel readily used this offensive as an excuse to assassinate Shukr.

Israel’s assassination policy remains on-going. Hamas and Hezbollah leaders are the primary focus. Senior members of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) were no doubt part of Israel’s targeting of Iran’s Damascus consulate in April, but as tensions increase, more IRGC targeting is probable. Given the IRGC’s influence in government, this comes with a risk, less willingness on Iran’s part for any compromise to lessen future tensions. While assassinations have occurred in third countries, there are associated positives and negatives that need to be weighed up. In Haniyeh’s case, the former, especially psychological positives, outweighed the latter.

Secondly, Israeli human and technical intelligence is excellent, both in terms of the whereabouts of and access to targets. Counter-intelligence, and other measures to minimise vulnerabilities, will be a very high priority among known and potential targets. However, while disruptive, assassinations have not reduced target country or organisational capabilities other than in the short term, and arguably, they can increase rather than reduce tensions.

Thirdly, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has been emphatic that Israeli national security interests come first and foremost. In particular, he has demonstrated his willingness to take very high risks in terms of approving actions that border on war but he assesses will fall short of precipitating broader conflict. This risk-taking often defies constraints advised by the US and others, including national and international stakeholders.

In Iran’s case, Netanyahu’s authorisation of Heniyeh’s assassination in Tehran was a calculated provocation challenging a put-up or shut-up response from both Iran’s IRGC and President Pezeshkian’s new “moderate” government.

Iran doesn’t want to go to war. Neither does the US. In all likelihood Netanyahu did not advise the US beforehand of Heniyeh’s proposed assassination in Tehran, gambling that the US, for a range of domestic, regional, and wider international political/strategic reasons would have no option but to protect Israel from broader conflict with Iran. The US mobilized its regional forces accordingly.

Iran is well aware its credibility is on the line over how it responds. It had no option but vow to retaliate for Heniyeh’s assassination in Tehran. The IRGC’s senior commander, Major General Hossein Salami, has stated that Israel “will receive punishment in due time.” This, at least potentially, gives time for a negotiated face-saving outcome rather than rush into armed conflict. Iran and other stakeholders, including especially the US, are actively exploring diplomatic options to avoid escalated hostilities. For Iran, options cannot be a one-way compromise.

The key parties to any real outcome are Israel and the US. Netanyahu will resist any compromise. His political credibility is at stake. He will also resist any pressure that could threaten his continuity as prime minister; loss of office could expose him to outstanding charges of corruption. The US is the only country that can influence Netanyahu to step back from his hard-line brinksmanship.

What are the pressure points? US options could include their weakening of political support for Netanyahu personally, threatening his tenure of office, a possibility given the dislike between president Joe Biden and Netanyahu. Others could be military related: revisiting the supply of US weapons to Israel used to inflict such high levels of civilian casualties, and those that are “offensive” versus “defensive.” In the latter case, US regional forces would have to commit to offensive back-up, not dissimilar to current realities. While not ideal, at least the US would be better able to shape regional events, ideally in a way that Iran can “accommodate.”

Fourth, nothing above suggests any willingness by the present Israeli leadership to commit to a two-state solution or accept Hamas as part of any future unified Palestinian authority. Netanyahu remains committed to the total destruction of Hamas, however realistic this might prove in the context envisaged.

In sum, the situation in the Middle East is very unstable, with limited time and options to bring tensions back from the brink of broader conflict. Finding a formula that can wind back those tensions and facilitate some progress towards stability, and genuine peace, will require imaginative and influential leadership among stakeholders

Ian Dudgeon is a former president of the AIIA’s ACT Branch.

This article is published under a Creative Commons License and may be republished with attribution.