Africa, with its vital resource endowments and market potential driven by its growing population, has recently become a strategic location in the great power rivalry between traditional Western powers and emerging middle powers.
The Great Power competition (GPC) is often framed as a contest for power and influence among major states. For aligning or host states, however, it can present an opportunity to extract economic benefits, security guarantees, and developmental gains from competing powers. Amidst the uncertainties and dynamics associated with the Thucydides trap, smaller states may hedge or ally with a dominant power in favour of another to avoid risks and maximise potential gains from inducements or guarantees offered by a more favourable partner. In this context — where smaller states seek to maximise utility and stronger states pursue expanded influence — an important question emerges: does strategic alignment with one great power over another necessarily translate into tangible benefits for smaller states?
In the post-colonial era, states, regardless of size, are expected to exercise full sovereignty and possess sufficient capacity to address their own domestic challenges. However, most relatively weak states are overly reliant on great powers for assistance. Such dependence on external actors for assistance in addressing domestic issues deepens their vulnerability, while also providing global powers with space to compete for influence. Growing evidence of global insecurity and fragility, however, suggests that the cycle of alliances and influence at times does not yield positive results for host states. This raises an important question: Does it truly matter which competing power engages with a smaller state, region, or the continent if it does not strengthen local independence or build internal state capacity?
This problem warrants a closer practical examination and scholarly attention. Drawing on evidence from the Sahel region of Africa, we argue that reliance on shifting great-power alignments without a corresponding expansion in state capacity puts the host country at a disadvantage, regardless of which external power is involved.
Africa, with its vital resource endowments and market potential driven by its growing population, has recently become a strategic location in the great power rivalry between traditional Western powers and emerging middle powers. The Sahel region, with its growing insecurity, the resurgence of military juntas, and evidence of a great-power scramble, has become a global tinderbox.
The recent military coups in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger led to symbolic shifts in public preferences toward external influence. In recent years, some citizens from the aforementioned countries thronged to the streets with Russian flags to jubilate over the removal of a constitutional government that allegedly had failed to address the endemic terrorist threats and insecurity. The putschists, after seizing office, ordered a cessation and expulsion of major French and American counterterrorism operations, while pivoting to Russia and China, signalling their changing preference on ‘who should have an external oversight’. For decades, France’s Operation Barkhane and major U.S military installations in Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso were presented as bulwarks to quell the terrorist activities by the Islamic State for the Greater Sahel (ISGS) and Al Qaeda syndicates like the Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) in the Sahel. However, the insecurity worsened, signalling a failure of the joint security mission by the Western bloc and prompting local actors to turn to alternative players.
The security vacuum created, partly due to Western disengagement, paved the way for Russia to expand its security footprint through paramilitary and mercenary groups like Wagner and, more recently, the Africa Corps. China, through its Global Security Initiative (GSI), has also signed counterterrorism-related agreements with several African countries, including the newly established Alliance of Sahel States (AES). Given Russia and China’s engagement, the central question is whether this geopolitical pivot from Western influential guards to new players, such as Russia and China, has improved the security situation in these countries.
Available evidence suggests limited improvements. For instance, on 30 January 2026, a suspected jihadist attack on an airport in Niamey, Niger, resulted in casualties and injuries. In September 2025, the Malian junta was also compelled to close schools after the militant group JNIM blocked all imported fuel from neighbouring countries into the landlocked state. This blockade not only triggered a severe humanitarian crisis but also had significant economic consequences for Mali. These developments have raised concerns about Russia and China’s effectiveness in filling the security vacuum left by the West. Sensing the deep engagement of most African military juntas with Russia and China, the U.S. has begun to re-engage by toning down its anti-coup rhetoric, which may have contributed to earlier expulsions.
Have competing external influences and shifting strategic alignments produced positive outcomes? Evidence suggests that fixation on great power competition and the rotation of external security partners as a solution to insecurity in the Sahel may instead exacerbate already fragile conditions, regardless of which external actor is involved. As a result, many African states risk remaining marginal actors within broader geopolitical competition, where stronger powers contest influence while shaping the developmental trajectories of smaller states.
Reliance on successive great power partnerships can therefore become a self-reinforcing cycle, in which competing external actors offer promises of stability and support, yet structural dependence persists. Breaking this cycle is challenging but not impossible. Meaningful progress depends on smaller African states prioritising domestic governance challenges and strengthening internal capacity rather than relying on external actors as a decisive solution. At the same time, African governments can navigate great power competition more strategically by leveraging external engagement to advance their long-term national interests.
Daria Blinova is a PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at the University of Delaware. Her research interests include broad topics related to authoritarianism, Russia, and environmental politics. She can be reached at blinovad@udel.edu
Baffour Agyeman Prempeh Boakye is a PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at the University of Delaware. His research interests span democracy, US-Africa relations, and the politics of critical minerals. He can be reached at baffour@udel.edu
