The end of MINUSMA is bad news of Mali’s civilians, who are increasingly targeted by Malian forces and mercenary groups in counter-terrorism efforts. These forces are likely to further fuel the expansion of jihadist violence.

It is very unusual for a UN Peace Operation to leave before its mandate is complete. Yet this is precisely the situation faced by the UN Multidimensional Integration Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). The premature departure of such operations have severe implications for both the stability of the host state and the safety of its citizens.

MINUSMA deployed to Mali in 2013, meaning the mission has been in place for just over a decade. During that time, it has helped turn back an Islamist insurgency that threatened to overthrow Mali’s government, protected civilians, helped the country hold elections, weathered the withdrawal of the supporting French forces, and negotiated a comprehensive peace agreement.

Two military coups in 2020 and 2021 strained Mali’s already fraying relationship with the UN and Mali’s major security ally, France. Mali’s military Junta distanced itself from the UN and its traditional western allies, bristling under repeated calls for a return to democratic leadership and mounting concerns around the conduct of the Malian Armed forces. Coup leaders found a willing new security partner in the form of Russian Wagner Mercenaries.

Working alongside Wagner “advisors,” Malian troops have begun conducting heavy-handed counter-terrorism activities with little regard to human rights. Reports by MINUSMA noted that from the end of 2021 to the beginning of 2022, abuses by the Malian Defence forces increased roughly 100 percent. In one particularly notable instance, Wagner and Malian forces killed approximately 500 civilians over the course of several days in the city of Moura. Wagner even attempted to frame French Forces for war crimes by murdering civilians and burying them near a recently vacated French military base. In response, France abandoned all activities in Mali in February this year, even those related to counter-terrorism. The European Union suspended its activities in the country in April.

MINUSMA was the last military force to remain in place, and it struggled to carry out its duties in the face of increasing opposition from the military leadership. The Junta began to see MINUSMA as an impediment to its ability to undertake what it deemed necessary military operations. The final straw was MINUSMA’s report on the incident in Moura which resulted in sanctions being applied to two high-ranking Malian officers who played a major role in the massacre. The Malian authorities contested the findings of this report, claiming that the activities in Moura were legitimate counterterrorism operations. Shortly thereafter, in June of this year, Foreign Affairs Minister Abdoulaye Diop formally requested the MINUSMA be withdrawn. Observers believe that the Malian government’s request for MINUSMA to leave was facilitated by Wagner’s late-leader Prigozhin, who wanted to “further Wagner’s interests” in the country.

Powerless to remain in country without host-state consent, the UN Security Council has ended MINUSMA’s mandate, with plans to draw down the force over six-months, with the mission concluding in December of 2023. The UN country team and various humanitarian agencies will remain in the country, but their ability to operate in it will be greatly reduced.

It is almost inevitable that the mission’s departure will have a negative impact on Malian civilians. The current Malian government is entirely focused on counterterrorism, to the exclusion of the safety and security of the average Malian citizen. The Junta’s main ally, the Wagner Group, receives roughly 10 million USD a month to protect Mali’s current regime. To ensure its continue relevance – and the associated pay check – the Wagner Group actually has incentive to ensure that Mali remains unstable.

MINUSMA provided both direct protection to civilians under imminent threat of violence and deterred violence through its monitoring and reporting mechanisms. Without these measures, all armed actors – including Wagner, the Malian Armed Forces, the jihadists, and the armed groups from the 2012 uprising – will have no one to hold them accountable for violations of the peace agreement or human rights violations.

News of the mission’s withdrawal has already led to a worsening of the security situation. Mohamed Ag Ousmane, who works for a local NGO, believes that “It will impact the security situation and it will amplify the human rights violations already perpetrated by radical armed groups.” But it isn’t just the armed groups he fears. “If the UN leaves now and they leave us in the hands of the military, there is going to be only killing and slaughtering,” he said.

Without the UN as an interlocutor, the tense detente between the Malian military and the armed group signatories of the existing peace treaty is likely to be further strained or even fail, resulting in renewed fighting with civilians caught in the middle. Many of the signatory groups in the north disapproved of the Wagner Group’s arrival, believing – potentially correctly – that the mercenary group would target them on orders of the Malian government.

In addition, without UN peacekeepers or the French counterterrorism force, radical armed groups in the north will face no organised resistance. The Wagner mercenaries currently deployed in the north are poorly trained, lack key capabilities such as advanced logistics and intelligence, and have little experience in the counterterrorism activities required to address the Jihadist threat. Unable to meaningfully engage the jihadists in the past, Wagner mercenaries have chosen instead to target civilians in jihadi strongholds in an effort to coerce the local population. The Armed Conflict Location & Event Date Project (ACLED) noted that, when it comes to operations involving Mali’s military and Wagner, the “distinction between civilians and combatants is increasingly blurred.” The continued use of heavy-handed and indiscriminate counterterrorism tactics, alongside the failure of governance reforms, will only fuel the expansion of jihadist violence. Indeed, Jihadist violence in the North has only gone up since the deployment of Wagner, with particular growth of the Islamic State.

Spiralling violence by the Malian Military, Wagner mercenaries, and the multiple armed and Jihadist groups in Mali paint a grim picture for civilians. Often targeted simply because of where they live or their ethnic group, the withdrawal of the UN peacekeeping mission in Mali further reduces what limited protections civilians may have had.

Dr Shannon Zimmerman is a Lecturer in Strategic Studies at Deakin University. She received her PhD from the University of Queensland in 2019 and her MA in Conflict Resolution from Georgetown University in 2012. 

This article is published under a Creative Commons Licence and may be republished with attribution.