Australia is recognised as a leader in implementing comprehensive biosecurity measures, as outlined in the Australian Biosecurity Act 2015 and the National Biosecurity Strategy Implementation Plan 2022-2032. Despite their proactive approach, these efforts face challenges due to insufficient funding, which threatens the effectiveness of their protective measures against invasive species and diseases.

In this post-COVID-lockdown world, we all know that the term biosecurity is used in relation to “the methods that are used to stop a disease or infection from spreading from one person, animal, or place to others.” With the growing frequency of biosecurity breaches, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations is taking a systemic approach by now defining “biosecurity as a strategic and integrated approach to analysing and managing relevant risks to human, animal, and plant life and health, and associated risks to the environment.”

Our world is facing multiple crises, including the latest cost-of-living crisis and growing national debts; therefore, it is crucial that biosecurity measures yield a sustainable return on investment. For this to occur, biosecurity must be accompanied by management practices that reduce overall risk. For example, our food system policies must increasingly promote the production and distribution of food that is both good for us (in terms of safety and nutritional quality) and good for our ecosystems (including promoting biodiversity and agrobiodiversity gains and reduced pollution).

Internationally, Australia and New Zealand are cited as the countries frequently recognised for their active implementation of biosecurity programs, especially in relation to aquaculture, environmental, livestock, and plant health. The Australian Biosecurity Act 2015 provides the framework for managing biosecurity threats and highlights that effective biosecurity is a shared responsibility involving Federal, State, and Territory Governments, industry, and the community. Looking beyond Australia, the National Biosecurity Strategy Implementation Plan 2022-2032 recognises the vital importance of working with partners in the Indo-Pacific region to identify and mitigate biosecurity risks before they arrive and implement capacity building activities to further our biosecurity, trade, security, and national interests.

The Act and Implementation Plan are excellent documents, however, as with all policies, they yield limited benefits without the adequate funding required for effective implementation. Inadequate funding has contributed to recent biosecurity breaches; with the ongoing spread of fall armyworm since its detection in North Queensland in 2020, the arrival of the Varroa mite in NSW in 2022, and the not-so-recent detection of fire ants in Queensland in 2001, being but three examples that illustrate that our current level of investment in biosecurity is inadequate in relation to existing threats. This funding shortfall has lead to the proposal to introduce a biosecurity levy to be paid by those who benefit from biosecurity, i.e. taxpayers, importers, international travellers, and producers.

The foot and mouth disease outbreak in Indonesia is a high-profile consequence of inadequate resourcing of biosecurity agencies and frontline actors, including farmers in the region.  The situation of low-income, food deficit countries, such as Timor-Leste, is even more challenging as they are reliant on food imports but lack adequate resources to ensure that the food imported does not carry pests and disease that further reduce local food production. The recent incursions into Timor-Leste of fall armyworm, African swine fever, and plant nematodes are impacting food security and disrupting socio-cultural practices. These and other diseases and pests of public health and economic importance have spread across many countries in the Indo-Pacific, assisted to a large degree by inadequate resources and commitment to control them at source.

To achieve sustainable development, we must develop smarter, synergistic policies that address our short-term needs for food and nutrition security and natural fibre production without adding to our long-term problems. Firstly, biosecurity-related policies and guidelines elaborated by international organisations must be equitable and feasible across all member countries. The recent delay in reaching agreement on the WHO Pandemic Treaty provides an opportunity for all member states to agree that reducing pandemic risk at the global level requires delivering best policy practice for all, not just for those who can afford it. Similarly, how can biosecurity risks be reduced if “good” practices are only feasible in high-income countries? When we leave diseases rumbling on long enough in low-income settings, they will eventually come back to bite us as is the case of fall armyworm in Australia and avian influenza H5N1 in dairy herds in the US. When the avian influenza H5N1 started to spread in the early 2000s, the widespread culling of infected poultry without compensation in many low- and middle-income countries contributed to producers losing trust in veterinary services, resulting in non-reporting of subsequent outbreaks. Additionally, insufficient funding for most national veterinary services also results in inappropriate carcass disposal (contributing to environmental contamination) and improper vaccination coverage (which can promote virus mutations).

Secondly, we must broaden our focus to look beyond pathogens and pests to assess the systems that allow them to flourish. This more systemic approach is important as disease can only occur when a pathogen or pest encounters a susceptible host in an environment that facilitates infection. So, in addition to studying and conducting surveillance for pathogens, we must also: i) seek to raise animals and plants that are resistant or tolerant to a greater range of infectious agents; and ii) ensure healthy environments. Our laudable global push to deliver global “freedom from hunger” has resulted in the development of genetic lines of livestock and plants with physiologies that prioritise growth and production over robust immune systems. This means that these high producing plants and animals are generally more susceptible to a range of infectious agents than the indigenous breeds and varieties from which they were derived. In addition, the promotion of these high producing genetic lines has significantly contributed to a loss of agrobiodiversity, making our food systems less resilient. One benefit of moving to livestock and plants genetic lines that possess an optimal balance between production and immune system function can be the improved natural nutrient profile of the resulting product, especially when produced in conjunction with healthy soils.

Delivering healthy environments yields multiple benefits for human, animal, and plant health. “For example, healthy soils and clean water can prevent the spread of diseases, and clean environments in slaughterhouses, preservation of natural habitats of animals and biodiversity can contribute to fewer disease infections in animals and humans.” Additionally, the geographical location of farms, especially intensive livestock production units, must take into account proximity to other relevant agricultural enterprises and wildlife habits (e.g. not locating intensive poultry units nearby wetlands where wild birds congregate).

Given the complexity of our global systems, how can we reset our food systems and the way food and fibre are traded to reduce the need for significant investment in the management of biosecurity risks? Hope lies in a move to circular and sustainable bioeconomies that factor in biosecurity risk management across all key sectors: human health; animal and plant health; ecosystem health; trade; transport and infrastructure; education; and communication. We need resilient systems that yield economic, social, and environmental outcomes that give national budgets a breather in the short-term and give all the species on our remarkable planet a fighting chance in the long run.

Robyn Alders AO is an Honorary Professor at the Development Policy Centre and Institute for Climate, Energy and Disaster Solutions, Australian National University, Canberra.

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