Social media platforms such as Telegram and VK have become central to how Russians understand and engage with the war in Ukraine. Through algorithms, repeated exposure and online participation, these platforms are increasingly shaping public perceptions of the conflict.
In Russia, much like the rest of the world, social media is no longer just a source of entertainment; it has become one of the main ways people encounter and interpret information. That information rarely arrives fact-checked or free of politics, especially when it is about the conflict in Ukraine. Search for “war” and you will not find neutral news.
Instead, users encounter state outlets such as RT and Sputnik, which flood feeds with official updates and interviews with generals. Alongside them are grassroots volunteers, war correspondents (voenkory) and military bloggers (“milbloggers”), who use these platforms to organise activities and share updates from the frontlines. Diaspora channels run by Russians abroad also post their own perspectives while trying to avoid bans on Western platforms.
From Entertainment Platforms to Political Arenas
How the war is followed in Russia is closely tied to the population’s everyday digital habits. VKontakte (VK), one of the country’s largest social networks, has more than 90 million monthly users, while Odnoklassniki, popular with older Russians, has around 34.2 million. As of 2024, 51 per cent of Russians used Telegram, and many reportedly continue to access it despite the nationwide block imposed in April 2026. For many users, the war is less something they follow through formal news than something they encounter constantly on these platforms.
This shift accelerated after social media sites like Facebook and Instagram were banned following the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, pushing users toward domestic platforms. As of 2025, Russia had around 106 million social media user identities, roughly 74 per cent of the population. Platforms such as VK and RuTube have grown in prominence, as has Dzen (formerly Yandex Zen), a longer-form blogging and news aggregation platform VK acquired from Yandex in 2022.
Users rarely rely on a single platform. They check updates in one place, follow discussions in another and read longer interpretations elsewhere. Some still access banned Western platforms, staying connected to the wider world and posting Russian perspectives there. Bots and channels promoting state positions and views also play a major part in this ecosystem.
Telegram channels play a particularly important role. Nearly half of Russians read Telegram news channels at least weekly, even after the block. Channels such as Rybar, which specialises in maps and analysis, and WarGonzo, run by war correspondent Semyon Pegov, publish battlefield reports and commentary that users return to throughout the day. Research suggests Telegram has become one of the key spaces for political communication during the war. This habit of constant checking means that, for many users, the conflict can feel less like distant news than an event followed in near real time.
Algorithms, Repetition and Familiarity
Repeated exposure also shapes how opinions develop. Platform algorithms are not neutral: if users repeatedly view certain types of content, recommendation systems such as VK’s make similar content more visible in their feeds. Understanding is not formed instantly but built through repetition, and when similar narratives appear many times a day, they begin to feel true.
Comment sections illustrate this. Many responses are short and almost automatic, with some users simply signalling their presence, while others question information in detail or compare channels. This does not mean users do not think critically, but it suggests that familiarity often substitutes for verification.
Military bloggers add another layer. Their posts are direct and emotive, and are widely shared across Telegram. Studies show the number of such bloggers and influencers grew during key phases of the war. Their posts generate large discussions in which users agree, question and argue with one another, but these disagreements largely take place within the information environment users already inhabit. People are engaging actively without necessarily stepping outside it.
Age tends to shape these patterns. Russians aged 18–34 are more likely to use social media and Telegram for news, while older Russians rely mostly on state media. Younger users also use these platforms to discuss the war, process information about it and question it. Because content circulates across Telegram, VK and other spaces, research shows these platforms form overlapping discussion spaces, and responses within them are far from uniform, ranging from concern and support to fatigue.
Hashtags, Images and Collective Action
Hashtags shape how people express themselves online. Phrases such as #МыВместе (#MyVmeste, “We are together”) and #СвоихНеБросаем (#SvoikhNeBrosaem, “We don’t abandon our own”) recur across posts and, over time, carry a shared meaning. Users do not just read them; they reuse them as a simple signal of alignment.
Visual content reinforces this. Studies indicate that images and videos, especially of conflict scenes, have played a critical role in constructing Russian identity during the war, amplified by social media echo chambers. Such content provokes pride, support or concern, fuelling nationalist sentiment and a sense of togetherness that mobilises support for the war.
Social media is also used to raise donations for military equipment and to organise volunteer activities. Taking part builds networks of collective action and strengthens ties between participants.
Regional patterns differ. In Belgorod, on the border with Ukraine, local VK groups centre on everyday life, with residents discussing drone attacks and how the war has changed their lives. These groups help locals coordinate and share updates, but they also bring the conflict closer to users across Russia’s vast territory, making it feel more immediate.
Neither Controlled Nor Open
The same speed that keeps users connected also creates problems. Information spreads before it is independently checked, and different platforms can present different versions of the same event, breeding confusion and misinformation. Some users might cross-check, but many trust familiar channels completely. Content that provokes stronger reactions spreads further, shaping what becomes visible regardless of accuracy.
The result is neither complete acceptance nor full scepticism, but something in between. Opinions form gradually, less through deliberate choices than through repeated exposure, interaction and everyday engagement. Russia’s online space is neither fully controlled nor fully open.
This matters for outside observers. Headline polling on “support” for the war captures only part of the picture. Efforts to reach Russian audiences with alternative information will struggle if they treat Russians as people who simply accept the information presented to them or critics waiting for the facts. In Russia’s digital ecosystem, opinion is shaped by habit and belonging as much as by belief.
Kajal Mishra is a PhD research Scholar at Center for Russian and Central Asian Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. Her research focuses on indigenous community governance in the Arctic with a broader interest in climate change, environmental governance, governance and policy making, and Russian Foreign Policy.
This article is published under a Creative Commons Licence and may be republished with attribution.
Photo: Mvs.gov.ua, CC BY 4.0
