The war in Gaza has resumed with Israel recommitted to the destruction of Hamas, unimpeded by a proposed UN Security Council resolution that called for an immediate humanitarian ceasefire, which the US alone vetoed on 8 December. But despite this, the US is pressing hard for a “day after plan,” a two-state solution that delivers long term regional stability and peace.

The US most probably concluded it had no option to the veto to prevent the serious consequences between Israel and the UN itself, and regional countries especially, by pointedly rejecting the resolution and continuing its war on Hamas. This way the US retains some influence with Israel both relating to its actions during the war and weaving through the multiple obstacles to find a formula that meets the “post-war” requirements of both the Israelis and Palestinians.

Discussions I had some years ago with a then recently retired Israeli security official provided insights about Israeli regional thinking which remain very relevant today. The context of discussion was Israel’s continuous hostility towards the Palestinians and Arab states generally. Why didn’t Israel adopt positive “hearts and minds” policies and practices towards the Palestinians especially, seek to win them over or at least neutralise their active or passive support for Islamic terrorist groups such as Hamas. To do so would serve both Israeli and Palestinian security and broader national interests.

The retired official explained Israel’s position as conditioned by the Holocaust. Jews throughout Europe had been subjected to persecution, then genocide, both before and during WWII. Millions suffered, and were murdered, partly because they were not organised to actively resist, and partly because other, especially Western countries did not prevent these horrors.

He emphasised the physical and ideological significance of Israel’s establishment in 1948 as a safe and free homeland for all Jews, the Zionist state, to be defended at all cost and by any means against actual and potential threats, internal and external.

He dismissed outright a one-state solution. Israel could not include very large numbers of non-Jewish Palestinians for two reasons. The first was Israel would lose its “Jewish identity.” The second was internal stability and security. He feared increased civil unrest due to inevitable religious and racial tensions between Jews and Muslims, and Arabs and non-Arabs. He specifically noted the vulnerability of Israel to potential subversion by its non-Jewish citizens or residents targeted by regional anti-Jewish Islamic organisations, both state and non-state.

He described Israel as a state “continuously at war” since established in 1948. In addition to major wars in 1948, 1967, and 1973 it experienced two “intifadas” which commenced in 1987 and 2000 respectively, other serious military conflicts with its neighbours, and unceasing cross-border lethal insurgency actions. He claimed the aim of aggressors in almost all cases was to destroy Israel as an independent state, adding even those regional countries that recognised Israel, preferred Israel did not exist. He sidestepped whether Israeli policies or actions had contributed to any of these events.

Israel’s endgame, he said, was its survival as a Jewish state. He dismissed “hearts and minds” as impractical because that involved time and trust, and Israel had neither. Survival depended on a superior Israeli military, superior intelligence, and a readiness to strike hard, preemptively, overtly and covertly as necessary, to dominate the “battle space,” strategically, tactically and psychologically. He noted aggressor tactics were brutal and often targeted civilians. Israel willingly matched violence with violence, and used fear as both a strategic and tactical factor.

He emphasised that Israel simply didn’t trust its regional neighbours, however notionally positive a bilateral relationship may be, nor did it trust traditional friends and allies, notably European countries and the US, to unconditionally commit to Israel’s defence.

Internationally, he said Israel has successfully used the Jewish diaspora to pressure foreign governments politically to support Israel, or at least deter adversity. Israel also used the psychological tactic of neutralising much opposition to its government’s policies and actions by the implication that such criticism was antisemitism.

The retired official made two observations about a two-state solution. Firstly, the pre-1967 boundaries were simply not practical. Israel would want to keep most of the land it (illegally) occupied in the West Bank and East Jerusalem (described by the UN as “Occupied Palestinian Territories” (OPT). Secondly, Israel had to have the right of “security domination” over Palestine territory, in other words the IDF’s right of entry into Palestine to protect Israel from Palestinian threats. Israel needed this safety net because it couldn’t rely on the Palestinian government, with or without the support of a multinational peacekeeping force, to prevent cross-border hostilities.

If the above accurately reflects a majority of current Israeli thinking, which I believe it does, there are several immediate conclusions. Israel will do whatever it takes and take however long is necessary to destroy Hamas, at least as an effective military force. But it is expected to survive politically. The IDF will only leave Gaza when satisfied an interim governing body, supported by some regional or international peacekeeping force, can meet Israel’s basic security needs. However, Israel will still insist on maintaining “security domination.” Israel will not be responsible for the reconstruction of Gaza.

On 2 December, during a visit to the COP28 UN Climate Summit in the Middle East, US Vice President Kamala Harris stated at a press conference that, in the context of a two-state solution, the Palestinian Authority (PA) should govern both West Bank and Gaza, and its responsibilities must include security. She acknowledged that to fill this role the PA “must be revitalized, driven by the will of the Palestine people.” In sum, the PA’s existing incompetent and corrupt leadership must be replaced by a new, competent and popularly elected leadership that represents the Palestinians in both enclaves. It was implicit that current PA president Mahoud Abbas would be forced to hold elections to enable a new leadership by legal process.

Potential new PA leaders include Mohamad Dahlan, a former Fateh security chief exiled in 2011 to Dubai by Abbas, Hussein al-Sheikh, Secretary General of the Executive Committee of the PLO who has sound links with both Israel and the US, and Marwan Barghouti, a former Fateh West Bank Secretary General, militant, and “Mandela-like” figure detained by Israel since 2002. All have strengths and weaknesses, but none have strong political constituencies across both enclaves.

Besides ensuring their next government has the right leadership, the Palestinians have demanded that any new state has genuine freedom, full equality of rights and citizenship, and is not subject to continuing Israeli suppression, colonialism, or siege. Achieving this will also demand changing Israel’s leadership to ensure an accommodating mindset.

Another major challenge to any two-state solution would be agreement about state boundaries. Based on recognised pre-1967 borders, there are more than 700,000 Israelis in illegal settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, and in a great many cases Israeli occupants believe these will be legally annexed sometime in the future. The related issues of competing claims of sovereignty, forced displacement, resource control, contiguity of land mass and borders, and related civil unrest, pose very significant challenges. In the post-war period, illegal settlements may prove the biggest obstacle to achieving a two-state settlement.

Ian Dudgeon is a senior international affairs analyst and former president of AIIA’s ACT branch.

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