India’s connectivity diplomacy is making ground, as the recently announced India-Middle East Corridor (IMEC) at the G20 illustrates. Offering a chance counter China’s influence through the Belt and Road Initiative, IMEC nonetheless faces several challenges, including regional instability.

The establishment of IMEC has the potential to benefit India greatly. This corridor connects India with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan, Israel, and the European Union via a sea-rail-sea route that could accelerate trade by 40 percent. A strategic initiative, IMEC will strengthen India’s diplomatic ties and economic engagements with the Middle East and Europe through enhanced connectivity. This corridor will facilitate trade and investment while fostering cultural exchanges and people-to-people interactions.

India’s announcement of the IMEC is driven by two factors –  a desire to showcase its accomplishments in improving connectivity, and develop diplomatic ties with important regions. It does this while also aligning, conveniently, with the upcoming 2024 general elections. Considering China’s absence from the summit, the introduction of the corridor may not entirely be coincidental. The strategic competition between India and China has intensified since Xi Jinping came to power and since clashes at Galwan in Ladakh have heightened, with the building of strategic infrastructure taking place on both sides of the Line of Actual Control (LAC).

Connectivity diplomacy is a strategic tool employed to enhance national networks of roads, rail, cargo transport hubs and others to promote and strengthen political, economic, and cultural engagement with key regions. The reason for states to undertake connectivity diplomacy is to establish regional cooperation. This concept is not a new one and is a phenomenon that states have undertaken for centuries. For example, During ancient times, India connected with the rest of Asia through the silk road. During the colonial era this connectivity dramatically declined. In the post-Cold War period, globalisation increased the need for connectivity for economic development, bringing India’s relationship with reginal economic localities full circle.

The counter example of connective diplomacy is China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), part of China’s strategic foreign policy approach to relationship building along economic and cultural lines with the different states that are part of it. India’s undertaking of such connectivity projects can be considered the strategic challenger to the BRI, and with America’s support, it will seek to provide a buttress against China’s increasing geopolitical presence.

For India, connectivity diplomacy is also the expansion of its own economic growth in search of new and key infrastructure projects. These aims seek to capture new and different strategic regions, including India’s immediate neighbourhood of South Asia through its Neighbourhood First Policy. Such examples here include the Bangladesh-China-Myanmar-India (BCIM) economic corridor and the Bangladesh-Bhutan-India-Nepal Motor Vehicle Agreement which are both operational.

India’s regional cooperation with Southeast and East Asia is illustrated through the Look East Policy, which was enhanced further through Act East Policy. What has emerged are connectivity projects like the Trans-Asia Railway, The ASEAN-India connectivity project, and the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway Project (70 percent of the project is completed). The India-Myanmar Kaladan Multimodal Transport Transit project is partially finished, with some parts already operational.

India has also initiated, with Japan, the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor  to enhance connectivity between Asia and Africa.

To increase connectivity with Central and West Asia, India has developed a Connect Central Asia policy to build an International North-South Transport Corridor connecting India, Russia, Iran, Central Asia and Europe. While the agreement has been signed, the project is yet to commence. The Delhi-Tehran-Istanbul-Europe corridor, by contrast, has created the Trans Asia Railway, with some links pending completion. The new IMEC will allow India to reach the Middle East and Europe faster than the existing corridor.

It is essential to acknowledge that despite India’s efforts in launching connectivity projects in different regions, several of these endeavours are still far from completion, with some speculation about whether some will be completed at all. One accusation is that India initiates new connectivity projects, seeking to create diplomatic linkages with regional states without following through on material outcomes.

One important factor is the funding arrangement. New Delhi emphasises private-public funding for most projects. But what emerged is the issue of fund reallocation within different ministries to cater for the projects. While the current BJP majority in parliament can do this, it has come with criticism from the parliamentary standing committee regarding the foreign ministry’s squeezing of funds for the Chabahar port, among other projects.

Meanwhile, the large number of stakeholders, leading to “too many cooks in the house,” has led to delays in decision-making and the broader operational process. Another factor of delay, for the IMEC at least, is the current conflict in the Middle East between Israel and Hamas.

Another factor at play is trust and the notion of security between the states who have agreed upon projects. Large and expensive  project need to be looked into carefully, less India be subjected to accusations of debt trap diplomacy, much as the BRI has been smeared.

There are many factors at play in India’s connectivity diplomacy, the least not being regional geopolitical aims and strategic manoeuvrings. The potential for ongoing instability in the Middle East, further, raises questions as to whether this initiative will be re-routed or shelved entirely, becoming nothing but a castle in the air or kept aside until the conflict ends.

Marilyn Kwan Kharkongor is a PhD candidate at the Discipline of Government and International Relations, The University of Sydney, where her research interests lies in Indian Foreign Policy.

This article is published under a Creative Commons License and may be republished with attribution.