A group of quantum scientists recently published a manifesto warning about the growing militarisation of quantum research, drawing parallels with the nuclear age and cautioning that universities risk becoming extensions of national security establishments.
The statement did not dominate global headlines, yet it highlighted a deeper structural problem now emerging: quantum science is shifting from laboratory curiosity to the core of economic power, defence strategy, and geopolitical competition.
The critical question today is not whether quantum technologies will serve military ends, but whether governance structures evolve fast enough to ensure that this transformation does not harden into a new global divide rooted in algorithmic advantage and technological exclusion.
The mid-2020s are a pivotal inflection point. Quantum technologies, once speculative, are becoming foundational. Since 2013, governments worldwide have announced public commitments totalling $54–55 billion to quantum science and technology. China is widely assessed to have invested more than $15 billion in embedding quantum within its 15th Five-Year Plan, with a focus on superconducting systems, quantum simulators, and precision measurement. The European Union’s Quantum Technologies Flagship has mobilised €1 billion and launched a Quantum Grand Challenge to anchor sovereign capacity. Japan’s quantum investment is estimated at $7.4 billion, and Australia has directed hundreds of millions toward national initiatives. Private capital is consolidating around credible hardware and software leaders, with roughly $2 billion in venture funding in 2024 alone and projections that the global quantum market could expand from a baseline of $3.52 billion in 2025 to $97 billion by 2035.
Innovation metrics tell a similar story of concentration. International patent families for quantum technologies have increased fivefold over the past decade, with quantum computing patenting alone rising nearly sixtyfold since 2005. The US is investing heavily in quantum technologies, but much of the centralised state financing is. A European Commission report finds that China now accounts for roughly 46 per cent of global quantum patent filings, the United States about 23 per cent, and the European Union around 6 per cent. While more than 4,500 firms are active in quantum domains, fewer than 1,000 qualify as “core” quantum companies; the remaining 80 per cent are established conglomerates integrating quantum solutions into existing product lines.
The socio-economic stakes are clear. Quantum computing promises to transform industrial optimisation, supply chain resilience, and financial modelling. Molecular simulation, in particular, carries outsized implications for health outcomes, potentially shortening drug discovery cycles that now span more than a decade and directing value into treatments for diseases where classical computation struggles. In materials science, quantum simulations could accelerate the development of efficient catalysts, advanced batteries and corrosion-resistant infrastructure. In energy systems, quantum algorithms support the integration of renewable energy and grid optimisation. These applications intersect with global infrastructure priorities and Sustainable Development Goals, especially where traditional computational methods have reached practical limits.
At the same time, quantum’s military relevance is expanding. Quantum key distribution networks are already being deployed in orbit and on terrestrial fibre, promising communication channels resistant to interception. China has publicly claimed progress toward quantum radar that can detect stealth platforms and is experimenting with advanced quantum sensors mounted on unmanned aerial systems. Whether these systems are fully operational or largely experimental remains debated, but the strategic impetus is unmistakable. Comparable defence interests in quantum technologies across the United States, Europe, Japan, and allied networks highlight that states view quantum technologies as integral to future security environments.
Securitisation, however, has consequences for access. In 2024, the United States extended export controls to critical quantum computing systems and production items, a move mirrored by allies including the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Japan. These restrictions reflect a broader push toward “quantum sovereignty”: efforts by states to control their entire quantum stack, from design and fabrication to deployment, and to restrict the diffusion of dual-use technology to strategic competitors. The result is emerging zones of cooperation among trusted partners and restricted exchange with others, particularly in advanced hardware components and sensitive research.
This dynamic risks deepening what many analysts now refer to as the “quantum divide,” a systemic disparity in access to quantum technologies, expertise and infrastructure. Unlike earlier technology gaps in mobile telephony or internet connectivity, quantum advantage scales exponentially and requires specialised ecosystems of cryogenic hardware, advanced control electronics, and high-level scientific talent. More than 150 countries still lack formal national quantum strategies, and UNESCO has explicitly framed this divide as a structural challenge rather than a temporary lag.
In such a scenario, algorithmic power becomes a proxy for national autonomy. Countries that rely on foreign quantum-as-a-service platforms or externally controlled cloud infrastructure face strategic dependencies that undermine autonomy in encryption, economic forecasting and scientific innovation. This reality is compounded by the fragmentation of global cooperation mechanisms, particularly as geopolitical tensions drive the formation of exclusionary technology blocs rather than open technology systems.
Despite these structural tensions, the divide is not predestined. Governance mechanisms are emerging alongside competition. UNESCO’s Global Quantum Initiative for 2026–2030 seeks to build capacity, expand equitable access to shared infrastructure, engage civil society, and anchor ethical frameworks around quantum development. The World Economic Forum’s Quantum Economy Network provides roadmaps for regional ecosystems aligned with economic growth and responsible innovation, linking quantum applications to goals in health, energy, climate and industry. At CERN, the Open Quantum Institute is advancing a science diplomacy model centred on access, application, awareness and advancement, explicitly orienting quantum development toward shared global benefit rather than narrow competitive advantage.
Yet governance must keep pace with competition. The 2026 World Economic Forum Global Risks report highlights that geo-economic confrontation and “values-at-war” dynamics continue to prioritise long-term exclusion in favour of short-term security advantage. Export controls and sovereignty drives, if unchecked, could fragment knowledge flows, raise the costs of cooperation, and lock out a generation of scientists and engineers in underserved regions.
The policy implications for the 2030 horizon are profound. If quantum development remains confined to blocs of advanced states, early adopters will consolidate algorithmic dominance, shape global standards, and extract disproportionate economic rents. If governance frameworks evolve to promote broader capacity building, shared infrastructure, and transparent standards participation, quantum could support sustainable development in areas as diverse as drug discovery, climate modelling, industrial optimisation, and secure communications.
Competition is inevitable, but technological isolation need not be. The choices being made now about export regimes, alliance formation, standards governance and inclusive capacity building will determine whether quantum becomes a narrow strategic asset or a broadly shared engine of economic and scientific progress. Physics determines what quantum systems can achieve. Governance will decide who benefits.
Zohaib Altaf is Associate Director at the Centre for International Strategic Studies Azad Jammu and Kashmir (CISS AJK), Pakistan. His work focuses on nuclear strategy, deterrence stability, and emerging military technologies. He has written for the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, the Stimson Center, The Diplomat, and the South China Morning Post. He is also an alumnus of the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies (NESA), National Defense University, Washington, DC.
This article is published under a Creative Commons License and may be republished with attribution.
