Significant changes in Finland have been made to national security with a stronger focus on the hard power attributes of deterrence. This has occurred alongside the strategic minimization of soft power and diplomacy in its engagement with Russia amid the War in Ukraine.  

The Russia-Ukraine War has caused Finland to fundamentally shift its national security strategy by increasing the national defence budget and joining the North Atlantic Organization Treaty (NATO) as a full member. This recent development marks the latest dynamic shift in Finland’s post-Cold War security strategy vis-a-vis Russia, which took place across three pivotal eras: 1992-2013, 2014-2022, and the Russia-Ukraine War era.

Since its independence in 1917 from the Russian Empire, Finland has had a strained relationship with its neighbour. Finland’s strategic loss in the Winter War (1939) and the Continuation War (1941-1944), which it fought against Russia’s preceding entity, the Soviet Union (USSR), during World War Two, forced it to take a neutral policy amid the Cold War. To avoid a direct conflict with its grand neighbour and to preserve its independence, Finland successfully balanced its relations with the USSR and the West. The policy was led by Finnish Presidents Juho Paasiviki and Urho Kekkonen, who the Soviets pushed to sign in 1948 the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance (FCMA), a deal known as “Finlandization,” which standardised their relationship. At the same time, Finland had to give up its desire to become part of the pro-West architecture, namely joining the Marshal Plan and the European Union (EU), not to mention the NATO alliance.

All this changed after the dissolution of the USSR in 1991. The end of the Cold War freed the Finns from the rivalry of the great powers and enlarged their room for manoeuvring. Under these new circumstances, Finland could finally join the EU in 1995 and abandon its formal neutral policy.

The new global and security architecture under American hegemony brought Finland, between 1992-2013, to carefully pivot into a new security orientation. Under the presidencies of Mauno Koivisto (1982-1994) and Martti Ahtisaari (1994-2000), Finland leveraged its unique European geopolitical position, actively engaging in diplomacy and employing soft power based on its peaceful image from the near past and its values, towards the EU, which Finland perceived as a security guarantor, and toward Russia.

Finland’s approach bolstered the EU’s institutional structure and elevated Finland’s reputation as a diplomatic broker. This aligned with Russia’s relative weakness, resulting in its readiness to compromise with the United States (US) and the West on core security issues, including the START II agreement and Operation Desert Storm. In this background, the Finns chose not to fully join NATO, which from their perspective could deteriorate its relations with Russia and the whole security atmosphere in Europe. Instead, the Finns preferred to bring the EU and Russia closer by initiating cooperation on economic issues in energy, tourism, border security, and other areas. The most prominent example is the Northern Dimension Initiative (NDI), taken under Finland’s leadership and supported by the EU to improve ties between Russia and its neighbours. This development was accompanied by the hope that Russia would transform into a more reliable and moderate actor, possibly resulting in liberalisation and democratisation.

However, the mid-2000s saw Russia’s resurgence in military and economic might ending the relatively peaceful era and prompting Finland to recalibrate its strategy. The assertive Russian foreign policy, culminating first in the invasion of Georgia in 2008 and later during the annexation of the Crimea Peninsula and the outbreak of the East-Ukraine War in 2014, heightened Finland’s insecurity. The new situation prompted Finland to gradually shift toward hard power measures to adjust and influence EU decisions on implementing diplomatic measures against Russia, including joining the economic sanctions regime. By adhering to the EU policy, Finland tried to prevent a situation where it stayed without any allies or better options to protect itself. Yet, under President Sauli Niinistö’s leadership, Finland decided the time to bid for a full NATO membership hadn’t come, and it strengthened its security cooperation with the US, the EU, and its Nordic neighbours. At this time, Finland still tried to maintain a certain degree of correct relations with Russia, hoping it could pave the way for a constructive dialogue in the future and find a diplomatic solution to the Ukraine crisis.

The eruption of the Russia-Ukraine War at the beginning of 2022 marked a critical juncture in Europe, causing many nations including Germany, the UK, and France, to adjust their security policies. Finland’s experience in engaging with Russia and its proximity to its border brought it’s threat perception and insecurity to its highest level since the end of the Cold War.

Fearing Russia’s aggression could drop Finland into a new armed confrontation with its neighbour, the Niinistö government expanded the 2024 defence budget to €6.2 billion and has planned to acquire advanced weaponry, including F-35 stealth jets at €8.4 billion and Israeli air defence system, David’s Sling. Finland also started building hundreds of kilometres of fencing across its 1,300 km eastern border to prevent Russia from weaponising the immigration flows against it and bolstering its security relations with the US, the EU, and its Baltic and Nordic allies. Notably, the most critical move was joining as a full NATO member in April 2023. The strategic pivot marked Finland’s final abandonment of its neutral policy and adherence to hard power instruments in its national security strategy. The change was also expressed in the relative shrinking of Finland’s use of soft power and diplomacy in general and vis-à-vis Russia, though it does not mean Finland ultimately gave them away. Finland’s dedication to maintaining a robust national defence and fostering strong alliances with Western partners, along with unwavering support for Ukraine, is expected to persist under the leadership of the recently elected president, Alexander Stubb, who formerly served as the nation’s prime minister and foreign affairs minister.

By joining as a full NATO member, Finland has become part of the Alliance’s collective defence architecture protected by Article Five. Integrating strategic plans with all allies is another implication of Finland’s membership, which could enlarge its security and deterrence against potential Russian aggression.

From NATO’s perspective, Finland is expected to expand the Alliance’s military and civilian resilience due to Finland’s self-defence capabilities, leaning on 900,000 defence personnel, including 280,000 combatant soldiers. Finland might also contribute to NATO’s technological advancement since Finland is a highly expert nation in cyber security, IT, and telecommunications. Additionally, Finland’s membership bolstered NATO’s geographic presence in key areas, mainly in the Baltic Sea, the Arctic, and around St. Petersburg. Nevertheless, Finland should expect the intensification of hybrid warfare launched by Russia against it, and worse, be exposed to nuclear threats from their neighbour.

In sum, Finland provides a good case study of a relatively small state that has succeeded in dealing with a powerful neighbour through pragmatic policy adoption. Since the fall of the Iron Curtain, Finland’s approach has undergone a careful and gradual shift from employing soft power to a growing leaning on hard power instruments in its security strategy. Finland might be presented as a role model for small states that live in challenging security environments, for instance Taiwan, Singapore, Estonia, and others, and which strive to avoid a great power rivalry that could result in disastrous consequences. The current geopolitical turmoil is leaving no better choice for these nations other than to advance military buildups or join and enhance alliances. At the same time, small states still must make responsible decisions that don’t provoke great-power neighbours into militarised confrontation.

Doron Feldman is a PhD candidate in the School of Political Science, Government, and International Affairs at Tel-Aviv University. Doron is also a national cybersecurity strategies researcher at TAU’s Yuval Ne’eman Workshop for Science, Technology, and Security.

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