Since coming to power in 2013, Xi has recentralised authority in the hands of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Unlike earlier “integrated” authoritarian models where the party-state remained somewhat distinguishable from society, embedded authoritarianism enmeshes CCP networks at all levels, from foreign policy to the military, energy, and technology.

For decades, analysts described China’s governance as “fragmented authoritarianism” —a system where policymaking was shaped by competing bureaucracies, local governments, and state-owned enterprises (SOEs), often resulting in disjointed or incoherent policy outcomes. This model reflected the post-Mao era strategy of decentralisation, as Beijing deliberately delegated authority to provinces and ministries in the 1980s–90s to spur economic innovation. Under Xi Jinping, however, this fragmented, bargaining-driven order has been fundamentally transformed. Since coming to power in 2013, Xi has recentralised authority in the hands of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and emphasised dingceng sheji—“top-level design” —in nearly every realm of governance. Power has been fused into the Party apparatus itself: the CCP now reasserts control across all major sectors, from foreign policy to the military, energy, and technology.

This evolution can be understood as a shift toward embedded authoritarianism, in which the Party is deeply embedded within state institutions and society. Unlike earlier “integrated” authoritarian models where the party-state remained somewhat distinguishable from society, embedded authoritarianism enmeshes CCP networks at all levels. The Party no longer stands above or apart from the bureaucracy and populace—it is woven throughout them. The result is a top-down system that is more coherent and centralised yet still allows tactical flexibility. Xi’s central leadership now defines broad strategic goals and strict “red lines,” but grants operational autonomy to lower-level actors to carry out these goals within unwritten but well-understood boundaries. In short, whereas China’s governance was once characterised by fragmentation and bureaucratic bargaining, today it is better described as centrally orchestrated and Party- “embedded,” with the CCP actively guiding outcomes in both domestic and foreign arenas.

Party embedded in society: COVID-19 and consolidated control

China’s handling of the COVID-19 pandemic starkly illustrated the CCP’s embedded authoritarianism on the domestic front. As the crisis unfolded, the state dramatically expanded its presence at the grassroots, embedding Party networks throughout society. During the pandemic, the Party shifted from more direct, top-down control (“integrated domination”) to a strategy of “embedded” domination that penetrated communities in an almost cellular fashion. In practice, this meant an aggressive infusion of Party authority into everyday governance in order to mobilise resources and enforce compliance. Key features of this approach included:

• Ad hoc Party branches: Temporary CCP branches were set up in neighborhoods, workplaces, and volunteer groups to supervise and enforce virus control measures.
• “Sinking” of cadres: Thousands of Party cadres were dispatched downward into communities (xiachen ganbu) to lead front-line pandemic efforts, a campaign-style tactic to ensure local adherence to central directives.
• Mobilisation of residents’ committees: Grassroots residents’ committees (居民委员会) were empowered as on-the-ground enforcers—checking temperatures, monitoring travel, and controlling movement—thereby acting as visible units of state control in what was propagandised as a “people’s war” against COVID-19.

Through these measures, the CCP effectively merged with civil society during the crisis. By embedding Party cells and personnel into community life, the state could indirectly control society in a more pervasive way than through overt coercion alone. This embedded approach allowed the regime to marshal social forces as extensions of the Party-state. Indeed, Beijing managed to mobilise ordinary citizens and local organisations for Party objectives and state security, blurring the line between voluntary civic action and Party mandate. The result was a consolidation of political control: grassroots governance became an arm of CCP authority, significantly boosting the Party’s influence over both state and society. In effect, the COVID-19 response provided a model for deeper state–Party penetration into daily life. Embedded authoritarianism proved effective in overcoming fragmentation—any early disarray or local unresponsiveness (“dispersed” domination) was corrected by tightening the Party’s grip at the community level. By the end of the crisis, the CCP had substantially reinforced its vertical control, extending its presence into the lowest levels of society and further entrenching the principle that the Party leads everything.

Evolution of embedded authoritarianism

In the post-COVID era, some of the emergency practices from the COVID-19 response have indeed been routinised or absorbed into regular governance. Notably, the enhanced role of residents’ committees (RC) appears to be enduring. RCs have become institutionalised and routinised as an important unit of social control even in non-crisis times. Grassroots Party-building efforts continue, and the expectation that RCs act as the eyes, ears, and hands of the Party-state in communities is now normalised. Similarly, the cadre accountability system—exemplified by swift punishment or dismissal of local officials who fail to carry out directives—has been reinforced under Xi and was intensified during COVID; this too seems set to continue as a governance norm. On the other hand, some pandemic measures have been rolled back. The high-tech Health Code surveillance system, for instance, was scrapped after COVID and not made a permanent fixture. While temporary Party branches proved useful in crisis, they remain a non-institutionalised (ad hoc) tool—likely to be activated in future emergencies or campaigns, but not an everyday structure. In essence, parts of the embedded approach have been absorbed into the regular party-state toolkit, while others await the next campaign to be deployed.

Going forward, an important question is whether the CCP will lean on embedded authoritarianism beyond public health crises, applying it to other challenges, from economic recovery to social policy implementation. The “policy memory” of COVID-19—the lessons of successful grassroots control—may incline authorities to use similar tactics whenever high-priority objectives are at stake. If so, Chinese governance could become more campaign-driven and participatory (in a controlled sense) even in normal times, with frequent mobilisation of communities. Alternatively, sustaining such intensive Party involvement in society may prove difficult without the unifying threat of a pandemic. It is also possible that public tolerance for invasive control will be lower in peacetime, acting as a brake on the expansion of embedded tactics.

What is clear is that Xi’s tenure has redefined authoritarian governance in China, making it more embedded, expansive, and adaptive. The CCP’s “nexus” with society—once relatively loose—is now much tighter, as Party dominance extends through networks that penetrate everyday life. This has solidified the Party’s grip, but it also commits the Party to addressing social demands more directly, since it has positioned itself as the architect of grassroots governance. The legacy of this embedded authoritarianism will likely shape China’s party-state-society relations for years to come, blurring boundaries in ways that strengthen the regime’s capacity but also generate new expectations and uncertainties. Xi Jinping’s China has moved beyond fragmented authoritarianism into a new era where power is both concentrated at the top and diffused throughout the social body via the Party’s embedded presence—a development that will continue to be studied as China navigates its post-pandemic future.

This article draws on the author’s peer-reviewed research published in the Journal of Contemporary China: Kam, Stefanie (2025) Embedding the Party in State and Society: From Integrated to Embedded Domination During China’s COVID-19 Crisis. The Journal of Contemporary China. [Online] 34 (152), 271–294.

Stefanie Kam Li Yee obtained her doctoral degree from the Australian National University. She is Assistant Professor at the China Programme, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies at Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. Her articles have appeared in International Affairs, Asian Perspective and Journal of Contemporary China.

This article is published under a Creative Commons License and may be republished with attribution.