The Japan-Philippines-US (JAPHUS) trilateral is a novelty among Indo-Pacific strategic minilaterals. The Philippines has played a significant role in its formation by linking traditional security issues with economic development while engaging with its two more powerful partners.

By leveraging its US alliance and close ties with Japan, Manila has secured investments in critical sectors like semiconductors and infrastructure. While this partnership strengthens regional security, it also reflects the Philippines’ effort to address economic concerns and navigate an increasingly competitive geopolitical landscape. However, the success of this trilateral initiative hinges on sustained strategic alignment among partners. 

Strategic minilateralism is usually conceived as an endeavour for major Indo-Pacific powers to strengthen their reciprocal security relations amid growing regional threats. However, the participation of “less powerful” partners like the Philippines in such minilaterals allows these smaller actors to play an agenda-setting role in such groupings, particularly by linking strictly security-related issues with other fields such as economic security. The Japan-Philippines-US (JAPHUS) trilateral is an example of this trend, paving the way for future avenues of engagement among US regional allies.  

Rising perceptions of a Chinese threat have prompted several Indo-Pacific actors to explore new forms of security cooperation. In this context, strategic minilaterals have emerged as a tool to address the shortcomings of existing bilateral and multilateral mechanisms, while also mitigating uncertainties surrounding US commitments in the region. Unlike previous initiatives, strategic minilateral groupings focus on tighter forms of security and defence cooperation, explicitly aimed at upholding the regional status quo and balance of power in favour of the US and its allies. While regional powers like Australia and Japan have positioned themselves as “architects” of strategic minilaterals, less powerful nations like the Philippines can also benefit from and contribute to these mechanisms by leveraging their status as US allies and converging interests with other regional powers. In the latest JAPHUS grouping, for instance, Manila was able to leverage both its position as a US ally and its robust relationship with Japan to secure economic support.  

As Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea has mounted, Manila has found itself caught between a paralysed ASEAN and an alliance with Washington lacking clarity and certainty. ASEAN-led initiatives have struggled to address the Philippines’ concerns over the South China Sea. Despite repeated efforts, Manila has been unable to rally ASEAN around a cohesive position on maritime disputes with China, as only some member states are directly involved in these issues. For instance, ASEAN did not take a clear position on the 2016 South China Sea Arbitration ruling in favour of the Philippines until 2020, and negotiations for a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea with China remain stalled. Concurrently, the Philippines’ security relationship with Washington has been contentious, largely due to shifts in Manila’s domestic politics and scepticism over US commitments to defending the Philippines.  

The complexity of this environment has prompted the Philippines to seek alternative options. Far from being a passive player, Manila has actively contributed to the development of trilateral cooperation with Japan and the United States. JAPHUS, while still at its early stages, has been facilitated by Manila’s outreach to Tokyo and its strengthening security ties with Japan, Washington’s closest ally in the Indo-Pacific region. 

Over the past decade, Manila and Tokyo have deepened their bilateral security relationship, forming a robust strategic partnership. While this trend was initiated in the late 2000s under the push of the first Shinzo Abe administration, Manila has since fully embraced and leveraged Tokyo’s overtures, particularly in the realm of maritime security. Notably, this partnership continued to flourish even during downturns in Manila’s relations with Washington under President Rodrigo Duterte.  

The security partnership with Japan has centred on equipment transfers, defence capacity building, joint training, and defence diplomacy. Initially framed as non-traditional security cooperation, it has increasingly shifted toward more defence-oriented collaboration. For instance, through Japan’s ODA (Official Development Assistance) program,Manila has acquired defence equipment for its Coast Guard, including ten patrol vessels, five advanced trainer aircraft, and an air surveillance radar system. In addition, the Philippine Navy became the very first recipient of Japan’s Overseas Security Assistance program, the new Japanese initiative aimed at facilitating the transfer of defence equipment to other like-minded countries. Manila and Tokyo have also accelerated joint exercises and defence diplomacy, launching their first 2+2 meeting in 2022 and signing a Reciprocal Access Agreement earlier this year. A robust foundation for traditional security cooperation has been Japan’s longstanding reputation as a top provider of development assistance to the Philippines, which has undoubtedly contributed to strengthened security ties.  

Beyond bilateral ties, the Philippines has also been proactive in exploring trilateral, and potentially quadrilateral, partnerships (including Australia–referred to as “The Squad”), in an effort to expand and diversify its plethora of security partners. The administration guided by Ferdinand Marcos Jr. has shown a clear intent to recalibrate the alliance with the United States while strategically linking it to Manila’s closer partnership with Tokyo. Shortly after his inauguration, the three nations launched the Philippines-Japan-US Trilateral Defense Policy Dialogue (TDPD), followed by the first trilateral Coast Guard exercise a year later. Subsequent trilateral engagements included the inaugural Philippine-US-Japan ministerial meeting held in Jakarta in July 2023 and the first-ever trilateral summit held in Washington in April 2024. 

The April 2024 trilateral summit was the culmination of such interactions, and with Manila playing a proactive role in setting the trilateral agenda. Crucially, the summit’s statement pays a great deal of attention to strengthening the Philippines’ economy. In fact, it contains mainly pledges of investment in critical sectors such as open radio networks, semiconductors, supply chains in critical minerals, and clean energy, and the commencing of trilateral commerce and industry ministers’ meetings. Moreover, it announced the Luzon Economic Corridor: an infrastructure development initiative aimed at connecting the port of Subic, located north of Metro Manila, to the southern province of Batangas, to transform the whole region into an economic and commercial hub. It is evident that Manila’s interest in exploiting this partnership to strengthen its economic security heavily impacted the statement.   

Such attention to the Philippines’s development may be justified by the other two partners’ strategic vision of providing a valid regional alternative to Chinese-led Belt and Road Initiative investments. Notably, infrastructure development is part of other minilaterals’ priorities, such as the Quad. However, it can be also traced to the Philippines’ efforts to link traditional security issues with economic development. Cognizant of the risks of joining a Japan and US-led security initiative, including the potential enmeshment in a Taiwan contingency, Manila has requested pledges of economic support and investment as part of such a bargain. It is no mystery that one of the grievances held by the Philippines to its main security provider, the US, is indeed the lack of the latter’s attention to investing in the overall development of the Philippines. This has caused friction in the past, as shown by Duterte’s presidency, during which he sought to pivot to China—enticed by Chinese pledges of infrastructure development assistance under the banner of the BRI.  

Unlike other strategic minilaterals, primarily focused on “high security,” the agency of the Philippines in JAPHUS has ensured that this novel minilateral links both “high” and “low” facets of security. However, in an increasingly competitive Indo-Pacific, such issue-linking endeavours may succeed only when close bilateral relations are underway among partners, with strategic alignment serving as the real currency behind such deals. Obviously, such an arrangement remains a frail one, heavily dependent on who’s going to sit in the White House in 2025. Nonetheless, JAPHUS can pave the way for future trilateral strategic interactions among partners and may serve as a platform to strengthen intra-allied security beyond the narrow confines of alliance obligations.  

Matteo Piasentini is a Senior Lecturer at the Department of Political Science, University of the Philippines Diliman, where he’s also pursuing his doctoral studies in Political Science and International Relations. He holds a Master’s degree in Law at the University of Padua (Italy) with a specialization in International Law. He is a former Official at the Italian Ministry of Defense, currently residing in Manila. He is also an analyst of the China and Indo-Pacific desk at Geopolitica, an Italian think-tank. His primary research interests encompass Philippine foreign Policy, Indo-Pacific minilateral agreements, analysis of military cooperation agreements and arms transfers. 

Alice Dell’Era is Assistant Professor in the Department of Security Studies & International Affairs at Embry Riddle Aeronautical University, Daytona Beach Campus. She is also a Research Fellow at the Italian Center for Geopolitical Studies Geopolitica.info, where she coordinates their China and Indo-Pacific Desk. Her research interests include Japan’s foreign and security policy, security discourses, and the U.S. alliance structure in the Indo-Pacific region. 

This article is published under a Creative Commons Licence and may be republished with attribution.