Recent announcements of the integration of the Papua New Guinea Defence Force into the Australian Defence Force provide opportunities for a considerable capability boost; given structural failings and colonial legacies, however, those same developments threaten sovereign control over the force.
The modern Papua New Guinea Defence Force traces its origins directly to the colonial enterprise of Australia in the territories of Papua and New Guinea. Initially conceived of as an integral component of the Australian military the PNGDF of the colonial period remained the only organ of the state not to be managed by local authorities, but rather centrally by Army leadership in Canberra, right up until the transition to independence beginning in 1972. As a result of this condition, the PNGDF developed along somewhat unbalanced lines and, at the dawn of independence some fifty years ago was not sufficiently adapted to stand as an independent and self-sufficient military force; rather, the PNGDF at independence consisted of two battalions of the Pacific Islands Regiment based in Port Moresby and Wewak, a battalion of engineers based in Lae and a nascent combat support and combat services support capability dispersed across these units, though primarily based in Murray Barracks, Port Moresby. Supported by a small maritime element which operated two Balikpapan-class landing craft heavy and five Attack-class patrol boats, all received as gifts from Australia, and a small air element which consistently failed to maintain sovereign air capabilities the PNGDF at independence was a fundamentally light infantry oriented force incapable of little more than domestic deployments.
Fifty years on from independence the PNGDF is possessed of two infantry battalions of the Pacific Islands Regiment based in Port Moresby and Wewak, these two battalions are supported by an understrength engineering battalion and are enabled by a vestigial combat support and services support capability which has suffered from historic neglect. The maritime element of the PNGDF is primarily composed of Guardian class patrol boats provided by Australia as well as a small landing craft of civilian make which was, similarly, provided by Australia. The air element of the PNGDF has improved in terms of capability over recent years, having received a small number of PAC750XSTOL aircraft for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance duties across the country as well as light troop lift. The present breakdown of troops shows approximately 3,992 personnel employed by the force, of these only 200 are assigned to the maritime element and only 100 to the air element. The force is overwhelmingly light infantry oriented and, due to constraints on logistical capability arising from neglect of non-infantry duties is only capable of conducting domestic deployments in support of policing operations.
The recent announcement of a bilateral treaty between Australia and PNG which will enhance defence relations between the two forces provides considerable opportunity to remedy those shortcomings which have been faced by the PNGDF over the years through boosting enabling capacity within the PNGDF. At the same time the long floated notion of recruiting capable PNG candidates into the ADF during a recruitment and retention crisis is undoubtedly set to buoy the morale of several concerned strategic planners. Despite this, however, comments made to the ABC by the PNG Minister for Defence, Dr Billy Joseph, that ‘We’re not talking about interoperability, we’re talking about totally integrated forces, Australian Defence Force and PNG Defence Force both working together closely, using the same equipment … fighting together, defending our sovereignties as an integrated force.’ Ought to spark considerable concern in the minds of PNGDF senior officers.
While it has been noted by Australian observers that enhanced integration could result in increased costs for the PNGDF, or more likely Australia, in providing equipment for their PNGDF counterparts these concerns are, ultimately, minimal in the face of the threat of a potential total loss of organisational identity for the PNGDF.
It is not the size of the PNGDF nor the character of its equipment which poses a threat, but rather their lack of independent organisational capacity. Having failed to implement score after score of reform initiatives over the course of decades the present structure of the PNGDF is all but identical to that of the force at independence, a force designed as integral to the broader Australian military of the time. Existing as it does as an overwhelmingly light infantry oriented force with minimal support capability it is likely that the primary area of Australian support will be at a foundational logistical level, and in so doing there is a high degree of risk that the PNGDF will be subsumed by the ADF through the simple fact of convenience and reliance. This process is not likely to be instant, and it is not even necessarily likely to be conscious in nature, rather, the force runs the risk of being swallowed whole by the ADF on the simple grounds that such a path would feel natural. It would represent, in many ways, a return to origins of the force. Origins from which, after fifty years of independence, it has failed to further develop.
Curtis O’Toole is a PhD candidate with the Australian National University’s Department of Pacific Affairs and a graduate of UNSW Canberra, where his research focused on civil-military relations in South East Asia. Curtis’ current research focuses on the provision of security in Papua New Guinea with reference to the relationship between the PNGDF and RPNGC.
