European security experts sometimes assume that NATO-style multilateral institutions should be the gold standard for defense cooperation everywhere, but the Indo-Pacific operates differently. Thomas Wilkins’ new book offers a rigorous examination of “strategic minilateralism”—small groupings like the Quad and AUKUS that are reshaping regional security in ways that bridge the gap between bilateral alliances and larger multilateral forums.
Over the past few years, I have attended a number of security conferences in Europe, where I am often asked to comment on security arrangements in the Indo-Pacific and the potential for cooperation with European actors.
Embedded as they are in NATO, and in geography that encourages strategic unity, many European experts insist that large, formal, and treaty-based institutions should be the default in organising defence and foreign policy, a mode that actors elsewhere, including in the Indo-Pacific, should embrace. It’s a view that has arguably influenced recent proposals for NATO-like arrangements in the Indo-Pacific.
To gain a better understanding of the situation in our region, they should read Thomas Wilkins’ new book, Strategic Minilateralism and the Regional Security Architecture of the Indo-Pacific. This is a rigorously academic work, but one that is directly relevant to policymakers, analysts, and anyone seeking to understand how the security landscape of our arguably more complex region is evolving.
The book rejects a simple comparison of the security structures of NATO “multilateralism” and a “hub-and-spokes” model of our region that is often prevalent in the literature. Instead, it frames the security architecture in the Indo-Pacific as a triple-layered system. Multilateral bodies such as the ASEAN Regional Forum and the East Asia Summit provide platforms for dialogue but are often limited in their ability to deliver substantive outcomes. Bilateral alliances link the United States with its partners across the region, and are the usual focus of analysis. But this book’s focus is minilateralism: small groupings of states that bridge the space between bilateral and multilateral arrangements.
Specifically, Wilkins distinguishes between “functional” minilateralism, which might deal with technical cooperation or niche issues, and “strategic” minilateralism, which is concerned with high politics, power balances, and responses to strategic competition from rivals. Given that the book focuses on frameworks that include the US, this means, above all, China.
To evaluate how these groupings operate, he offers an analytical framework based on three dimensions: design, function, and solvency. In other words, he asks how they are set up, what they are meant to do, and how durable they are likely to be in the face of shifting political and strategic pressures.
The bulk of the book comprises three case studies, each of which involves both the United States and Australia. The first is the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or Quad, which brings together the United States, Japan, India, and Australia. Wilkins traces the Quad’s evolution from ad hoc cooperation during the 2004 tsunami relief effort, through a period of dormancy, to its revival as a key strategic grouping—at least until the time he was writing. According to Wilkins, the Quad has become a forum for both practical cooperation—such as naval exercises and dialogues—and normative signalling, particularly the promotion of a “free and open Indo-Pacific.”
The second case is AUKUS. Wilkins treats AUKUS as a qualitatively different form of minilateral, centred on deep defence cooperation and technology sharing. He argues that AUKUS is designed not only to strengthen hard power balancing against China, but also to reaffirm trust and alignment among allies with existing deep connections.
The third case is the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue, which links the United States, Japan, and Australia. This grouping has received less attention than the Quad or AUKUS, but Wilkins demonstrates how it has steadily institutionalised trilateral cooperation over two decades. Unlike the more dramatic announcements around AUKUS, the TSD has grown incrementally, quietly reinforcing bilateral alliances and helping to adapt them to contemporary strategic challenges.
Taken together, these case studies illustrate both the diversity of minilaterals and their growing importance in Indo-Pacific security. Some are flexible and open-ended, like the Quad; others are highly focused and ambitious, like AUKUS; still others are durable and steady, like the TSD. Each operates differently, but all serve to supplement bilateral alliances and fill gaps left by multilateral institutions.
The value of Wilkins’ book lies not only in these detailed case studies, but also in the way he situates minilateralism within the broader Indo-Pacific order. He shows that while bilateral alliances remain the foundation of the region’s security and multilateral forums remain diplomatically useful, it is in minilaterals that much of the innovation and adaptation is currently taking place. They are nimble enough to respond to strategic competition but structured enough to provide continuity and reassurance.
For those interested in Indo-Pacific security, particularly an Australian approach to the region, this book is essential reading. Understanding how these arrangements function, and how they complement or complicate other layers of the regional architecture, is vital for grasping Australia’s strategic environment.
Crucially, Wilkins does not treat minilateralism as a vague buzzword, and the distinction between functional and strategic forms he provides lends his book analytical clarity. This analytical framework, along with its focus on solvency or durability, enables him to compare different minilaterals effectively and assess their strengths and weaknesses. The research is also empirically rich, drawing on interviews and primary sources to provide detailed accounts of how these groupings emerged and evolved.
If there is a weakness, it lies in the scope. By focusing only on minilaterals that include the United States and Australia, the study overlooks other potentially illuminating cases, such as Asian-led minilaterals without Washington or Canberra, Chinese-led experiments in regional cooperation, or groupings like the France-Australia-New Zealand trilateral, which is an effective mechanism in the South Pacific.
As Wilkins notes, however, this is a deliberate choice, and one that gives the book analytical focus. However, it does mean that the picture presented is, by necessity, incomplete. Another limitation is that the book is more diagnostic than prescriptive. Wilkins explains how minilaterals work and why they matter, but offers fewer concrete policy recommendations.
One aspect I would have liked to see highlighted more is the exclusive nature of minilaterals, which has been the focus of other scholarship. I tend to think that if our European friends, for example, are serious about their desire to craft Indo-Pacific approaches, they should propose more practical and specific arrangements to a limited number of actors in the region, and be more clear about what they—whether the European Union or its singular member states—can bring to these arrangements.
This would be more effective than attempting to engage Australia in vaguely defined security partnerships-for-partnership’s-sake or mapping out broad guidelines and “strategies” which focus on “promoting multilateralism” and list buckets of activities that Europe is already doing in the region.
Indeed, some European countries have shown that they can embrace minilateralism, for example, with AUKUS or the Global Combat Air Program, an Italian, British, and Japanese venture to develop new fighter aircraft. Looking at a project like this, which includes neither Australia nor the United States might have been a useful comparison for Wilkins’ book.
Still, these are relatively minor criticisms of what is otherwise a significant contribution to our understanding of Indo-Pacific security. Wilkins’s rigorous book explains well why minilateralism has become such a prominent feature of the region’s order and provides tools for thinking about how these groupings may develop in the future.
Audiences across the Indo-Pacific will find this book a valuable guide to the dynamics reshaping their neighbourhood. Others can also learn much from it, as they seek to understand how security cooperation in this region differs so fundamentally from their own models. For anyone interested in how the Indo-Pacific works—and how it is likely to evolve—Wilkins has provided a clear and compelling account.
This is a review of Thomas Wilkins’s Strategic Minilateralism and the Regional Security Architecture of the Indo-Pacific
(Palgrave Macmillan., 2025)
Dr Bryce Wakefield is the CEO of the Australian Institute of International Affairs and a Visiting Fellow at the Australian National University. He has lived, worked and researched in the United States, Japan, Europe and New Zealand. He trained as a political scientist with particular expertise in International Relations and the international affairs of East Asia.
This article is published under a Creative Commons license and may be republished with attribution.
