Bangladesh’s interim government, under Dr Muhammad Yunus, faces a pivotal moment to reshape its Myanmar policy amid evolving dynamics in Rakhine. By addressing the Rohingya refugee crisis and leveraging strategic ties with the Arakan Army alongside international partners, Dhaka can strike a balance with Myanmar’s State Administration Council while asserting regional leadership

The fall of Sheikh Hasina’s 15 years of “unchallenged” reign in Bangladesh through a popular revolution has garnered widespread debate on the country’s foreign policy trajectory under a new interim administration. Although much of that discourse has been centred around the country’s relationship with India, Bangladesh’s new interim government, headed by Dr Muhammad Yunus, must not ignore its issues with its southeastern neighbour Myanmar. As his foreign adviser, Touhid Hossain, remarked at the beginning of this year, “Dhaka shares a small border but a big issue with Naypyidaw.”  More than 18,000 Rohingyas have newly crossed the border into Bangladesh. The prospect of susbtantial ethnic violence in Rakhine is more likely than ever.

The geopolitical shift in power and control in Rakhine, Myanmar, and the ongoing gridlock in facilitating the voluntary repatriation of about a million Rohingya refugees in Cox’s Bazar of Bangladesh highlights just some of the challenges. Since Operation 1027 in late 2023, the Arakan Army (AA), also known as the Arakha Army, has successfully defeated the Sittat-led State Administration Council (SAC) forces. AA now controls more than half of the townships in Rakhine and has primarily achieved control over towns adjacent to the border of Bangladesh. They have effectively established their governance in those areas and have successfully eliminated the Junta loyalist forces.

Since the coup of 2021 and the removal of the quasi-democratic government in Myanmar, the SAC has been reluctant to establish a serious discussion with Dhaka on the voluntary repatriation of Rohingyas from Bangladesh. As SAC became more embroiled in a nationwide civil war, relations with Bangladesh diminished. In Dhaka, leaders failed to pursue agreements with either India or China to exert diplomatic pressure to resolve its Rohingya Refugee Crisis. These states, to be sure, had their own geopolitical interests in dealing with SAC. Now, as AA asserts its dominance in Rakhine, the repatriation issue will lie more on Dhaka’s relationship with the AA.

Despite such necessities for negotiating an agreement, Sheikh Hasina’s administration failed to grasp these changes. Her government stood firm on not upsetting the SAC by refusing to open a line of communication with AA. Dhaka even repatriated SAC border troops who fled from AA’s offensive, which is an apparent favour to the Junta and a subtle signal of disapproval of AA’s role as a critical actor in the Rakhine.

With AA’s success following Operation 1027, experts like Touhid Hossain and Shakawat Hossain urged Hasina’s administration to establish contact with the group. However this fell on deaf ears. Now, both hold positions as advisers to the new administration, and it likely that they will encourage the government to establish informal ties with AA. This would help both parties on several vital issues. It will put pressure on SAC to restore talks on voluntary repatriation of the Rohingyas and provide a warning not to incite Rohingyas against AA to create ethnic tensions in Rakhine. Subsequently, it will help Dhaka to grow a mutual understanding with AA. Dhaka will have to informally accept the de facto rule of AA in Rakhine. It may also refuse to repatriate any SAC troops fleeing to Bangladesh unconditionally. This will strategically benefit AA. Informal trade and commerce with Rakhine can also be facilitated, which will be economically lucrative for AA and the state.

In exchange, Dhaka can demand an agreement to facilitate the voluntary repatriation of Rohingya refugees by AA. This should be conditioned by ensuring safe environments for Rohingyas inside Rakhine and cessation of alleged persecution of Rohingyas by AA. Besides this, Dhaka can pursue AA to deny any haven to the Kuki Chin National Front, an insurgent group based in Bangladesh’s Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT). Through such facilitation of mutual interests, both Dhaka and AA can benefit strategically if both sides agree to cease hostile or destabilising activities against each other.

That being said, Dhaka should not go too far in dismissing its relationship with the SAC, which de jure represents Myanmar internationally. Bangladesh seeks to become a Sectoral Dialogue Partner of The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). It may also portray its issues with Myanmar to ASEAN states on humanitarian grounds and as a domestic issue that has a spillover effect on Bangladesh. Dhaka should also be careful not to push ASEAN too much due to its internal view on the Rohingyas.

Bangladesh’s policy of neutrality favours a balanced approach to international diplomacy, providing it grounds for establishing contact with AA. On this basis, Dhaka should not fear SAC’s retaliation, particularly since it is already isolated domestically and internationally. Leaders can also deny such allegations by SAC of domestic interference in Myanmar’s affairs since these are likely to amount to “informal ties,” the same relationship structure that India and China also share with AA. Additionally, utilising its deepening relationship with the USA, which is the largest foreign donor to Rohingya refugee expenses, would be beneficial. Washington can diplomatically assist with any emergency resolution on the Rohingyas as one of the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and provide technical support to strengthen border security. There are also like-minded partners in Australia, Japan, and South Korea, all of whom favour a solution to the Rohingya Refugee Crisis and stability in Myanmar. These countries can also support Bangladesh with humanitarian aid for the refugees and much-needed diplomatic support on UN platforms.

In sum, Hasina’s demise has allowed Bangladesh to reform its foreign policy toward Myanmar. The previous administration’s policies towards the SAC and the rebels has left inedible challenges for the interim government to address. Given the territorial changes and the prospect of ethnic tensions brewing in the Rakhine, the Yunus administration must initiate communication with the AA and broaden cooperation with partners like the US, Australia, Japan, and South Korea. After seven years of gridlock on the Rohingya Crisis, and the fall of the Junta in the Rakhine, it’s high time Bangladesh focused on implementing changes to its foreign policy on Myanmar.

Khandakar Tahmid Rejwan is a Research Data Analyst at the Bangladesh Peace Observatory, Centre for Alternatives. He was previously a Research Associate at the World Bank. He holds a Bachelor of Social Science in International Relations from the University of Dhaka, Bangladesh, where he graduated as valedictorian. He has published in The Diplomat, China Brief, Terrorism Monitor, Militant Leadership Monitor, South Asian Voices, The Strategist, 9DashLine, and ISDP Voices. (tahmidrezwan94@gmail.com).

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