A more independent foreign policy would help to reconcile Australia’s political and economic configurations with emerging international changes. How such a policy and identity shift may come about is yet to be determined, but it is clear that America’s decline and China’s regional impact are likely to influence what comes next.

A constant theme in discussions of Australian foreign policy is the question of how much influence Australia has in the international environment. Does the country exert an influence beyond what one would expect or is it generally subordinate to its “great and powerful friends,” meaning the US in current times? Is Australia essentially “deputy sheriff” to the US? Or does it play a more independent role as a “middle power,” focused not just on its own interests but acting as a “good international citizen” in support of a better world?

These themes feature in recent books on Australian foreign policy, such as those by Clinton Fernandes and Michael O’Keefe. In Sub-Imperial Power: Australia in the International Arena (Melbourne University Press, 2022) Fernandes argues that the key to understanding contemporary Australian foreign policy is Australia’s subordinate position in relation to the United States, allowing also for Australia to have its own “imperial” role in the South Pacific. For O’Keefe in Australian Foreign Policy: Relationships, Issues, and Strategic Culture (Bloomsbury Academic, 2023) the emphasis is on strategic culture, with the historical “fear of Asia” leading to a concomitant dependence on a major power protector, primarily the US since the 1940s.

With both interpretations the focus is on Australia’s dependence, not excluding some independent role, but minimising it. What has the reality been, and how might one explain it?

Historically, the Australian colonies increased their weight in the British Empire by federating as the Commonwealth of Australia in 1901. With the outbreak of World War I in August 1914, there was no question that Australia would support the “mother country.” Australia contributed to the failed British strategy to force open the Dardanelles, and then provided a useful component of British forces on the Western Front in France. From the perspective of global histories of World War I, however, Australia was a very minor player. The entry of the US into the war in April 1917 was far more significant. Similarly, Prime Minister Billy Hughes, representing Australia within the British Empire delegation at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, had some minor influence. At the time, Australia advocated for a harsh peace with Germany, while offending Japan by successfully opposing the inclusion of a racial equality clause in the Covenant for the League of Nations. Within the Imperial context Australia had more influence because of its war effort.

While Australia’s international role gradually expanded in the interwar period in contexts such as the League of Nations, by the time Britain declared war on Germany in September 1939, Prime Minister Robert Menzies was ready to state that, as Britain had declared war on Germany, “Australia [was therefore] also at war.” While Australian forces contributed to Allied campaigns across Europe, North Africa, the Middle East, and later in the Southwest Pacific, again the Australian role in World War II taken as a whole was minor. Labor Prime Minister John Curtin was able to assert Australian priorities by insisting on the return of Australian forces to the country and the adjacent region in 1942, concurrently turning to the US for support. Australia became one of the bases for the US in its campaign to defeat Japan. This did not give Australia significant influence with the US, with the entrée for Australia always remaining better in London than in Washington. The Canberra Pact (ANZAC Pact) of 1944 was a plaintive cry by Australia and New Zealand for greater influence in the South Pacific.

While Australia’s role as an independent actor advanced in the context of World War II, the perception that Australia had to pursue its interests in conjunction with its “great and powerful friends” remained. The United Kingdom continued to be significant in this respect until at least the late 1960s (especially in relation to Malaya/Malaysia and Singapore), but clearly the focus shifted to the US, with the ANZUS Treaty of 1951 being symbolic. Over the postwar period Australia looked more and more to the US, supporting its ally in wars in Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan. The US alliance became a central pillar of Australian foreign policy. It should be noted, however, that in various contexts (the Vietnam war being a good example) Australia tried to influence the US to pursue policies in Australia’s interests rather than simply following the Washington line. From a global perspective, however, Australia’s role vis-à-vis the United States in these contexts was relatively minor. Some Australian leaders have differed with the US, with Foreign Minister Herbert Evatt campaigning for greater recognition of the small powers at the founding conference of the United Nations in San Francisco in July 1945 being a good example. More recently, climate change issues have seen differences between centre-right governments in Australia and Democratic administrations in the US (Howard’s differences with Clinton in the late 1990s most obviously).

While Australia has mostly followed the lead of the US in the postwar period, its subordination in that respect has been self-imposed rather than coerced. That subordination has coexisted with a willingness to try to influence the US in Australia’s favour and at times to pursue policies that are different from those of the US.

How do we explain the dynamics?

Recalling the interpretations of Fernandes and O’Keefe, the former draws attention to ideology and the economic underpinnings of the imperial system, whereas the latter focuses on attitudes particularly as reflected in strategic culture (similar to Fernandes’s argument about ideology). In my view, perceptions as played out through domestic politics are central. This means giving due attention to the key domestic political actors in government, including the bureaucracy, noting also the way in which any one actor’s influence relates to the broader society. Structural factors such as the configuration of the economy and the role of the media come into play here. The international context, in turn, is an influence on the outcomes reached in the domestic political context. The US as Australia’s major ally is most important here, but Australia is also influenced by (and tries to influence) international developments.

While I have been critical of any “big noting” of Australia’s role in international politics, that does not mean that Australia should not try to maximise its influence. Factors that are important include the quality of the country’s diplomacy (including leaders who can contribute on the big international issues), having defence forces that are fit for purpose, and the ability to translate Australia’s economic power (ranked 20th in the world by GDP with the PPP measure) into influence, not just on the world economy but on broader political issues. As well as giving due attention to the “great and powerful friend,” Australia needs to work with other like-minded countries, both great and small, both bilaterally and multilaterally (including the United Nations). It also needs to engage with countries where there are significant differences.

I favour a more independent role for Australia. In terms of my own argument and that of the authors to whom I have referred, a shift in this direction would entail a modification of currently prevailing attitudes. I am not sure whether this is likely to come about through changes in the domestic environment. More likely, perhaps, is that Australia will have to respond to significant changes in the international environment, especially the shift to a more pluralistic world order, the decline of the US, and a stronger international role for China.

Derek McDougall is a Professorial Fellow at the School of Social and Political Sciences at the University of Melbourne.

This article is published under a Creative Commons Licence and may be republished with attribution.