Australia’s economic diplomacy in Africa remains tied to its mining activities, with limited engagement in public and cultural diplomacy–the kind that contributes to deep, respectful and time-tested relations. It must be wary also of being embroiled in a resources race, where local African populations are exploited for Western gains. 

Overlooking the Sydney Harbour Bridge in New South Wales, Australia, is Blues Point—a harbour named after Billy Blue. Billy was among the 12 black Africans who arrived on the first British Fleet in 1788. The story of Billy and his compatriots is often told when analysing relations between Australia and Africa.  

The currents flowing past Blues Point are not swaying towards Africa, but down under them lies a history of unfulfilled promises and missed opportunities—of Australian foreign policy planners and commentators passionately preaching increased engagement with Africa, a prayer that has minimally materialised. Despite government officials waxing lyrical about Africa relations, such as the Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs  Tim Watts expressing the desire to “reinvigorate relationships with African nations,” much of those relationships are still extractive, characterised by the exploration and mining of precious minerals. 

Australia’s footprint in Africa is largely in the natural resources sector. The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) states that over 170 Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) listed companies operate in Africa. According to the Australia Council for International Development, most of these companies are mining-based and operate in 44 of the 54 countries on the continent. 

A 2018 report by the Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee declared that Australia’s commercial presence in Africa is “strongly focused” on extracting minerals, including but not limited to coal, diamonds, and gold. The report recommended that the Australian Trade and Investment Commission (Austrade) promote “non-extractive trade and investment opportunities” in Africa, and facilitate greater participation in non-mining industries. 

Such recommendations have not led to reforms. Australia’s economic diplomacy in Africa remains tied to its mining activities, with limited engagement in public and cultural diplomacy—the kind that contributes to deep, respectful, and time-tested relations. 

The Senate report recognised the reliance on mining as the glue that holds the engagement between two continents together. However, it may have deemed the connection not strong enough to sustain long-term relations by recommending “new methods of operation.” It called for cooperation in education, research and development, and soft power tools such as increasing the visibility of Australian alumni in Africa. 

Much has not changed. 

It is no wonder that mining-related platforms, the African Down Under Mining Conference and Mining Indaba in South Africa, feature as multilateral engagement platforms in the DFAT “African region brief.” Australia-Africa Week, an outlier in the list, fosters economic, social, and cultural engagement; a combination that could lead to long-term and mutually beneficial relations. 

When Watts addressed the 2024 Africa Down Under conference, he laid bare Australia’s interests by recognising critical minerals in both continents, such as lithium and advocating for their extraction by invoking a World Bank report that they need to be extracted, “five-fold by 2050 to meet the demand for clean energy technologies.” Therefore, when an Australian corporate organisation says the “golden age” of Australia-Africa relations is here, they refer to increased mining activities in Africa. 

Here is why a foreign policy incentivised by Africa’s natural resource extraction is problematic. African citizens are sceptical of the value provided by mining activities and the foreign interests that drive such. While foreign policymaking in Africa is a reserve of elites, citizens use non-traditional channels, such as social media, to shape public opinion and pressure governments to change course. 

In this new environment, public discourse may hurt Australia’s standing in Africa due to negative experiences associated with mining. Various factors, including mismanagement of resources, allegations of human rights violations, and negative experiences by locals, such as land displacements, poor environmental conditions, and, in some cases, unemployment, may cause negative perceptions. 

In September 2024, Kenyan county governments were embroiled in a pay dispute with the national government over the mining royalties paid by Base Titanium, an Australian company. While the dispute is not a concern of the Australian miner, it denotes the unmet promise of economic empowerment to locals. 

Economic empowerment is often implied as the rationale for mining investments in Africa. When promises do not materialise, Australian miners may be targets for blame even though the responsibility lies somewhere else. Such negative feelings may permeate the national psyche and influence Africa’s foreign policy towards Australia. 

In December 2018, the Human Rights Law Centre published a report highlighting allegations of human rights violations by Australian multinationals. Key among them was the involvement of Anvil, an Australian-Canadian mining company, in a massacre in the Democratic Republic of Congo that killed over 70 residents. 

Anvil was accused of providing logistical support (vehicles and drivers) to the Congolese military in their suppression of a local uprising near a mine in Kilwa. An Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) Four Corners investigation confirmed their involvement. Stories of pain inflicted by foreign companies may dent Australia’s reputation and hamper its relations abroad, especially in a new era defined by public diplomacy. The report recommended the introduction of mandatory human rights “due diligence and reporting” for Australian companies operating in high-risk sectors abroad.  

Another risk for a mining-heavy engagement is Africa’s disposition to competition for natural resources by global powers. African countries do not want to be drawn to global conflicts, echoing the non-alignment movement during the Cold War.  

China has made mining inroads in Africa, while the United States (US) seeks to gain a foothold, at least according to a report by the United States Institute of Peace that encourages the US to “engage” in African critical minerals to protect its national security interests. Considering Australia’s established presence in mining, the race for Africa’s minerals may lead to new forms of conflict.  

The African Union Chair Moussa Faki Mahamat previously stated that Africa should not become a “geostrategic battleground” for global powers, signalling the risk for Australia if it wants to pursue a mining agenda and claim to be a “good” middle power.  

All is not lost.  

Australia provides humanitarian assistance and development funds to Africa. The Australia Awards Africa program promotes development and economic diplomacy, and private-sector non-governmental organisations, such as Barefoot to Boot, support refugees in Africa. 

The interest in deepening relations with Africa may peak soon owing to Australia’s campaign for a non-permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) for the 2029-2030 term. The last time Australia vied and won the seat, the then minister for foreign affairs, Bob Carr, attributed it to “strong support” from African and Pacific countries. Carr noted that the UNSC campaign forced Australia to intensify diplomacy with Africa.  

In the next campaign round, opportunities to strengthen relations with Africa exist—education, research and development, and genuine interaction with the African diaspora in Australia. Australian universities and skilled sectors can share knowledge and skills in a manner that does not contribute to Africa’s brain drain. African alumni can initiate long-standing cultural relations, though their negative experiences locally may be a barrier.  

Cooperation, rather than extraction, offers Australia the opportunity to cement its relations with Africa, one that it has preached for so long. 

Benjamin Opiyo holds a Master of Communication degree from the University of South Australia (UniSA). He is a former president of the African Society Club at UniSA. He sat on the Council of UniSA and is a member of the South Australian Chapter of the Australian Institute of International Affairs. Benjamin is a global citizen passionate about Africa’s engagement in the international system. His LinkedIn can be found here. 

This article is published under a Creative Commons License and may be republished with attribution.